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Nüzhet Sabit was a typical Ottoman intellectual of the Second Constitutional Period(19081918). He distinguished foreign politics from domestics politics, and discussed them separately in his articles. When the Constitution was restored in 1908, the Young Turks intended to establish friendly relations with both France and England. Towards Germany, which had supported Abdülhamid II, on the other hand, they had a more distanced attitude. In time this preference changed, and Germany was once more seen as an ally. The break-out of World War I, however, forced the heads of the Ottoman State to take sides. Eventually, it joined the alliance led by Germany and stayed in this group until the end of the war, which it would conclude in defeat for them. In this article as an opponent intellectual and journalist Nüzhet Sabit's views are explained about the foreign policy of Committee of Union and Progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did France influence the geopolitical system of eighteenth-century Europe more effectively than did Britain? Explanations pointing to states’ military and economic power are unable to explain this outcome. I argue that durable geopolitical influence depends on states’ symbolic capacities to secure recognition from competitor states, in addition to their coercive and economic capacities. And I show that states are liable to secure recognition to the extent that their agents embody social dispositions congruent with those of competitor agents. France converted military and economic power into durable influence in eighteenth-century Europe because French agents and most of their European counterparts shared courtly standards of competence, and they were invested in the common stakes of patrimonial sovereignty. By contrast, Britain failed to convert its greater material power into similar influence because British agents tended to lack courtly manners and they were uninterested in patrimonial stakes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a conference about the Congress of Vienna (Vienna, Austria) held in Bonn, Germany, from November 27-28, 2015. The event was organized by several associations including the Gesellschaft für Internationalen Kulturaustausch und Politische Bildung e.V. (GIK) and the Deutsch-Ägyptische Gesellschaft Bonn-Kairo e.V. and focused on topics including France's and Great Britain's role, Prussia and Rhineland (Germany), and the Congress's influence on the development of the Egyptian State.

Since the loss of their empires, Britain and France have been seen as states in historical but still only relative decline: no longer great powers but not typical of the large category of middle-range powers. Despite financial constraints and limited size they retain their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council and continue to display the ambition to exert global influence. At times, London and Paris deal with this anomaly by acting in harness but at others their foreign policies diverge dramatically, not least because of the contrasting domestic traditions from which they emerge, and because of their differing roles within the European Union. This article assesses the capacity of these two notable states to maintain a leading role in international politics given their own uneasy relationship and the significant constraints which they now face, both external and internal. The article is a revised version of the Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, held at Chatham House, London, on 3 November 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a theory of military retrenchment by states in relative decline. I argue that a declining state will choose to withdraw foreign military deployments and security commitments when there exists a suitable regional 'successor' to which it can devolve its current responsibilities. The degree of a successor's suitability and the strategic importance of the region to the declining state interact to determine when and how rapidly retrenchment will occur. Importantly, this devolutionary model of retrenchment predicts significant variations in retrenchment patterns across a declining state's multiple regional commitments. It advances the literature by producing nuanced predictions of precisely where, when, and how quickly retrenchment will occur. This paper assesses the theory empirically through an examination of Great Britain's varying regional retrenchment strategies prior to World War I. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 1916, the French government agreed with Armenian political elites to establish a Légion of Armenian volunteers in British Cyprus to fight the common Ottoman enemy. Despite British, French, and even Armenian rejections of such a Légion during different times throughout 1915 and early 1916, all sides overcame earlier concerns. Understanding how they managed to overcome these concerns will allow for this little-known episode in the history of the Great War in the eastern Mediterranean to contribute to the knowledge on (1) the complex French and British wartime stances towards this region, driven by imperialism and humanitarianism; (2) the ability of local elites to draw concessions from the Allies; (3) the important role played by local British and French colonial and military officers; and (4) broader historiographical debates on the responses to the Armenian Genocide. This article explores the origins of how the Entente co-opted Armenians in their eastern Mediterranean campaigns, but also made them into pawns in the French and British reinvention of their imperial rivalry in this region in order to achieve their post-war imperialist agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We examine the degree to which national political setting, namely domestic political opportunity structures, influences the transnational activities of women's groups in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The literature suggests that social groups are more likely to choose international activity when national institutions provide fewer opportunities for domestic activity (Keck and Sikkink 1998; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Using data about women's groups' activity from a content analysis of news wires from 1980 to 2008, we conclude that women's groups act in the domestic sphere significantly more than they act in the international arena-even when acting on transnational issues-and that groups choose international action when domestic opportunities are less hospitable to group action. Thus, we argue that the domestic sphere continues to be a major influence on social movement activity even as globalization and transnationalism increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history the Crimean War with a particular focus on the allegiance of the Crimean Tartar khans, or rulers, to the Allied Powers of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France against Russia during the war. The article also discusses the issue of independence for Crimea debated by the Allied Powers during the war, including their fear that if Crimea gained autonomy, Russia would regain it. An overview of the British home secretary Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, including his hope that the Crimean War would weaken Russia's power in its frontier regions, is provided.

The article discusses the history surrounding the 1858 petition from the governors and chiefs of Raiatea, French Polynesia and Tahaa, French Polynesia requesting to be an American protectorate. An overview of the French and British involvement in the Society Islands, including Tahiti becoming a French protectorate in 1842 and Great Britain and France's recognition of the autonomy of the Leeward Islands, West Indies, is provided. The relationship between the political disputes among native rulers in the Society Islands and the foreign intervention of the U.S., Great Britain and France is discussed.

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the recent literature on the socialisation and punishment of state and non-state actors. First, it argues that the English School can add significantly to our understanding of the socialisation and punishment processes because of the theory's emphasis on great powers as ‘custodians’ of the society of states. Second, it analyses the policies of the United Kingdom, France, and, to a lesser degree, a number of other powers toward the Bolsheviks and the Whites during the Civil War and beyond (1917–1924). The basic argument is that London, Paris, and other capitals acted like ‘guardians’ of the society of states in their attempt to punish and socialise the participants in the Civil War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo-French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960-1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's - Macmillan, Wilson and Heath - attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the "special nuclear relationship" with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'échec du projet britannique de pacte tripartite franco–anglo–soviétique révèle quelques traits majeurs des relations entre la France et le Royaume-Uni au XXème siècle. Le premier est l'existence de divergences qui concernent davantage l'accessoire que l'essentiel. Si les deux pays sont d'accord pour considérer qu'une alliance entre Paris, Londres et Moscou est essentielle à l'équilibre européen, ils divergent sur la forme à lui donner, les Français préférant un système de pactes bilatéraux à la formule tripartite proposée par les Britanniques. En outre cet épisode se caractérise par une absence de consultation entre les deux diplomaties. Les incidents qui en découlent pourraient prêter à sourire s'ils n'étaient pas le signe d'un climat de suspicion réciproque. Celui-ci est d'ailleurs plus marqué à Paris qu'à Londres. Tous ces éléments participent aux difficiles relations franco–britanniques et expliquent qu'il ait fallu attendre le 4 mars 1947 pour voir l'alliance franco–britannique se matérialiser par le traité de Dunkerque. Abstract: The failure of the British project of a tripartite pact between France, Britain and the USSR exemplifies some of the main features of the Franco–British relationship in the twentieth century. The first is the existence of divergences, which concern more incidental details than essential matters. If the two countries agreed to consider that an alliance between Paris, London and Moscow was essential for European balance, they differed on the form it should take. The French preferred a bilateral pact system to the tripartite pact formula proposed by the British. Moreover, this episode was distinguished by an absence of consultation between the two diplomacies. The incidents that followed could be risible if there were not signs of a climate of mutual suspicion which was, incidentally, more distinct in Paris than in London. All these elements contributed to the difficult Franco–British relationship and explain why one had to wait until 4 March 1947 to see a Franco–British alliance realized by the Dunkirk Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the transformation of French policy of the Labour Party of Great Britain during the Phoney War. Labour leaders' advocacy of the establishment of a permanent Anglo-French alliance by 1940; Postwar organization of European security; Doubt about the usefulness of terms such as 'realistic' or 'idealistic.'

This article focuses on Great Britain's ambiguous stand over Algeria and the uncomforts it brought to the British embassy in France. For the first four years of the Algerian War, British ministers and officials reciprocated that while supporting the French position in North Africa they will not support their policies. But with successive conservative governments, there was a shift in the policy as they sought to sustain France in North Africa because of the impact that long term insurgency in Algeria would have on Western defense. Concerned about the prospective decline of Western influence in North Africa that could open the way for the communism and further add humiliation for France coming on the heels of Indochina, the whole scenario could lead to a "neutralist" government in Paris, which was unfavorable to Western alliance. Besides this, Britain's own foreign interests led it to wish to limit the spread of Arab nationalism and to avoid being tarred with the colonialist brush. The ambiguity of Britain's position led to shifting policies, which made the job of UN Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb particularly difficult.

Questions the role of the government of Great Britain on the coexistence between U.S. and French views on European security and defense in 2001. Relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain; Evolution of a European security and defense policy in the 1990s; Examination into the convergence of British and French visions of Europe.

Evaluates the triple alliance negotiations between Britain and France that provided Molotov's formal introduction to the diplomatic world. How the two sides approached the negotiations; Stages of the negotiations; Conclusion.

Presents an article which examines the foreign relations between Great Britain and France during the late middle ages. Details on alliances between Great Britain and Burgundy; Perception of Tudor historians concerning the accession of Henry VII of England; Examination of foreign relations which existed between the two countries.

Addresses the actions of Great Britain, France and Italy as they competed for influence and interfered in the affairs of League of Nations members in Southeastern Europe. Minorities in the Balkans and the League of Nations; Role in border disputes; From collective security to special guarantees for peace in the Balkans; High price of appeasement.

Focuses on the role of engineers as military spies in Great Britain. Visits of the French engineers in the British Isles; Disclosure of report on the foreign relations between France and England; Participation of both countries in the American War of Independence.

Focuses on France's diplomatic claim to the Mosul region of Iraq due to crude oil and its conflict with England. French knowledge of Mosul's oil potential before 1914; Importance of the oil factor for the French; France's initial approach to partition; Great Britain's interest in Mosul's oil; England's acceptance of France's claim to Mosul.

Discusses Tudor foreign policy during the reign of Henry VII of England. Transition from the policy pursued by the Plantagenets of acquiring and holding territories in France; Revival of the treaty of Redon in the alliance; Mediation between the king of France and the duke of Brittany; Reciprocal obligation of aiding Henry VII.

The article focuses on issues related to the pamphlet controversy that swept England after 1790. The controversy centered around Edmund Burke, an intellectual leader. Burke's opponents were indignant because his book "Reflections on the Revolution in France" appeared in November 1970, the moment when prospects seemed to glow brightly for a moderate settlement of French affairs. Indeed, most liberal Englishmen assumed that the worst days of the Revolution were passed, that the old regime was abolished, and that France was entering on a peaceful and prosperous career under a government which, unlike the English, they said, was based on full recognition of the rights of men. Within a few years, however some of the former friends of the Revolution were ashamed of their ardor. Without going into a detailed analysis of the "Reflections on the Revolution in France," one needs only to recall that Burke opposed the Revolution because it seemed to controvert all that in government, society, and religion, he held most dear.