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The article discusses the death of Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi by U.S. forces. The leader of the terrorist group Al Qaeda in Iraq was killed by two 500 pound bombs on Wednesday June 7, 2006. The article discusses the impact that al-Zarqawi's death may have on the Iraq War and an eventual reduction in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq.

The article offers a look at how and when United States military forces may begin a withdrawal from the war in Iraq. The author reviews how the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has begun to shed light on a possible timetable for trimming America's presence in Iraq after a nationwide increase in criticism related to the war. The author discusses whether or not Bush's troop-reduction plan is serious and which conditions need to be met in Iraq for the troop level to be drawn down.

Comments on the impact of the July 7, 2005 London subway bombings on the War on Terrorism. Portrait of the organization of terrorist activities under Al Qaeda; Impact of the U.S.-led War on Terrorism on Al Qaeda's organization and leadership; Influence of the London bombings on the world's understanding of Al Qaeda's actions and goals; Argument that Europe has become a central focus of both terrorist activity and counterterrorism efforts; Changes in the organizational behavior of terrorist groups since the capture of key leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq; Discussion of the impact of the Iraq War on the prevention of terrorism worldwide.

Discusses the role of insurgent Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi in organizing the rebel forces in Iraq to fight against U.S. troops and their Iraqi allies. How al-Zarqawi has successfully organized daily bombings, kidnappings, mass executions, and televised beheadings in Fallujah and other Iraqi cities; Consideration of how religious extremists and national resistance were two major factors in the growth of the insurgency in Iraq; Contempt expressed by al-Zarqawi for the Shi'ites and those who sympathize with the U.S. and the new Iraqi authorities; Assassination of Ayatullah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a prominent Shi'ite leader, in an August 2003 bombing in Najaf; How al-Zarqawi has pledged his allegiance to terrorist Osama bin Ladin in various Web announcements.

Discusses five goals that should be met before the U.S. leaves Iraq. Overview of recent political violence in Iraq, including kidnappings and decapitations of foreigners; Doubts about the future of the American effort in Iraq; Views of President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry; Importance of launching offensives against the insurgency, training Iraqi forces and improving intelligence; Reconstruction efforts; Goal of holding real elections; Outlook for Iraq, if all the suggested goals are achieved.

Investigates potential dishonesty from president George W. Bush on his reasons for going to war with Iraq in 2003. Efforts by the Bush administration to allay concerns over intelligence shortcomings concerning Iraq and weapons of mass destruction; Comments from Democrat congressmen and voters about Bush's credibility; Aspects of Bush's recent decline in public opinion; Counter-attacks by Bush administration members starting with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. INSETS: Credibility Questions on Two Fronts;BUSH'S CREDIBILITY.

Offers a look at the information provided by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prior to the Iraq War of 2003. Role of David Kay in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Report that Kay and his Iraq Survey Group found no weapons of mass destruction and did not expect to find any in the future; Criticism of the President George W. Bush administration and the CIA; Doubts raised over the Administration's conduct in the weeks leading up to the war; Completion of an internal review of the CIA by Richard Kerr, a former CIA deputy director; Report on the prewar weapons of mass destruction by the Senate Intelligence Committee; Discussion of the various actions taken by former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein that were in violation of international law; Importance of spy operations in uncovering substantial intelligence.

Describes the difficulty associated with the reconstruction of Iraq after the war. Consideration of how 1,170 U.S. soldiers have died in Iraq after the end of major combat operations; Increase in the incidence of guerrilla attacks; Assassination of two Iraqi leaders Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and Akila al-Hashimi; Possibility that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction; Approval ratings of U.S. President George W. Bush; Impact of the war on the oil industry in Iraq; Consequence of the decision of U.S. proconsul L. Paul Bremer to disband the Iraqi army; Miscalculation of cost estimates by the U.S. government. INSET: THE POLITICS BEHIND THE PRICE TAG.

Discusses how weapons of mass destruction have yet to be found in Iraq. War against Iraq that was based on intelligence about banned arms; Argument of U.S. President George W. Bush in favor of a preemptive strike against Saddam Hussein; Experts who believe that weapons will not be found; U.S. officials who argue that weapons will eventually be found; Critics of British Prime Minister Tony Blair who feel that he overstated the case for war; Mistrust of the Iraqi intelligence; Roles of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Pentagon deputy Paul Wolfowitz; Possibility that the Defense Department overinterpreted threats posed by Iraq's stockpiles; Evaluation of the process of interpreting intelligence.

Focuses on the immediate future in a post-war Iraq. Discussion of the 13-point platform produced from a meeting of leaders of the different factions and groups living in Iraq; View of the author that all the ends for which the war launched must be achieved; Discussion of the need to find Saddam Hussein; How the Iraqi fearful of Hussein need to know that he is dead or captured; Impact of not finding weapons of mass destruction; View that the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush is desperate to find weapons of mass destruction; Cash reward offered for information leading the discovery of weapons; Discussion of Jay Garner, the man in charge of restoring order to Iraq with respect to democratic principles.

Focuses on the message U.S. President George W. Bush is trying to convey with respect to the war in Iraq while the American public and press question the progress made and military preparedness. Discussion of the administration's new message about resolve; View of the progress made by coalition forces as being stalled by guerrilla attacks and sand storms; Discussion of the expectations of the administration when entering the war; Recount of press conference.

The article focuses on Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Everyone outside Iraq and just about everyone inside believed that he harbored a secret stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. So imagine the shock his generals received in late 2002 when U.S. forces were massing on the country's borders for an imminent invasion, and Saddam suddenly informed them that Iraq had no biological or chemical or nuclear weapons at all. Longtime aide Tariq Aziz told U.S. interrogators that military morale plummeted the moment senior officers learned Iraq would have to fight the U.S. without those weapons. The Saddam who emerges from the pages of a new, comprehensive CIA report on Iraq's alleged arsenal will be remembered for the colossal misjudgments that cost him his rule. The exhaustive detail compiled by the report's author, Charles Duelfer, chief U.N. weapons inspector in the 1990s and the Bush Administration's top hunter since January, richly fills in the previous portrait of a paranoid and brutal dictator who believed that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were the prime tools with which to advance his extravagant ambitions. Drawn from lengthy interrogations of the core Iraqi leadership and Saddam during their months in U.S. custody, the Duelfer report sheds fresh light on the dictator's inner motivations and artful deceptions. The vast array of evidence uncovered to date shows that when the U.S. invaded in March 2003, Saddam had not been armed with WMD for a decade and that his ability to make new ones had been in a state of continual degradation. Far more worried about Iran, Saddam did not consider the U.S. a "natural adversary" and throughout the '90s, he had his officials make overtures for a dialogue with the U.S. He said he was disappointed that Washington never gave him a chance.

The article focuses on issues related to the abuse of prisoners by U.S. soldiers in Iraq. With each new revelation of abuses inflicted by U.S. troops in Iraq, it seems evident that the damage goes far beyond the appalling acts of a few miscreants. As public doubts about the Iraq War grow, the images of sadism symbolized all that is going wrong with the coalition venture in Iraq.

The article reports on how former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was perturbed by his own intelligence services. A former colonel in the Iraqi intelligence service says that Saddam's analysts presented him with reports that predicted a decisive victory for the U.S. Internal intelligence reported to Saddam that Iraq's defenses would probably collapse.

Focuses on the problem of the United States not finding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in post-war Iraq. Discussion of whether American intelligence agencies overstated the issue of WMD to support the policy of the Bush administration and the invasion of Iraq; Idea that the credibility of President George W. Bush is being investigated by the U.S. Congress; Controversy surrounding the role of Dick Cheney with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Vulnerability of Secretary of State Colin Powell to blame for overstating evidence against Saddam Hussein; Role of CIA Director George Tenet in the search for WMD; How the Democratic Party can use the credibility issue in their campaign theme; How problems with prewar intelligence can impact the war against terrorism.

Describes an April 2003 bombing attack by the United States on Baghdad, Iraq. The flight commander of B-1B Lancers assisted by an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane to ensure precision targeting with their weapons; Indication that special forces and Iraqi informants were helping the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in trying to pinpoint the location of Saddam Hussein; Uncertainty of whether Saddam had survived the March 19 bombings; Nickname of the B-1 aircraft; Type of ordnance used by the U.S. Central Command for the April strike.

The article focuses on Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Everyone outside Iraq and just about everyone inside believed that he harbored a secret stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. So imagine the shock his generals received in late 2002 when U.S. forces were massing on the country's borders for an imminent invasion, and Saddam suddenly informed them that Iraq had no biological or chemical or nuclear weapons at all. Longtime aide Tariq Aziz told U.S. interrogators that military morale plummeted the moment senior officers learned Iraq would have to fight the U.S. without those weapons. The Saddam who emerges from the pages of a new, comprehensive CIA report on Iraq's alleged arsenal will be remembered for the colossal misjudgments that cost him his rule. The exhaustive detail compiled by the report's author, Charles Duelfer, chief U.N. weapons inspector in the 1990s and the Bush Administration's top hunter since January, richly fills in the previous portrait of a paranoid and brutal dictator who believed that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were the prime tools with which to advance his extravagant ambitions. Drawn from lengthy interrogations of the core Iraqi leadership and Saddam during their months in U.S. custody, the Duelfer report sheds fresh light on the dictator's inner motivations and artful deceptions. The vast array of evidence uncovered to date shows that when the U.S. invaded in March 2003, Saddam had not been armed with WMD for a decade and that his ability to make new ones had been in a state of continual degradation. Far more worried about Iran, Saddam did not consider the U.S. a "natural adversary" and throughout the '90s, he had his officials make overtures for a dialogue with the U.S. He said he was disappointed that Washington never gave him a chance.

The article reports on the plans in Saudi Arabia to build a $7 billion partly virtual fence along its 500 mile border with Iraq. Saudi diplomats say that the fence would be built to inhibit weapons and drug smuggling as well as illegal immigration but also admit they want protection should the sectarian violence and jihad militancy in Iraq spread south. Sources say the kingdom is seeking bids from contractors, such as U.S. based Raytheon.

This article discusses the ramifications that the death of terrorist Abu Muusab al-Zarqawi has on U.S. military operations in Iraq. Even with the post-Zarqawi prognosis for Iraq unclear, a loud debate erupted in the U.S. government over when to bring the troops home. Also discussed is Abu Ayyub al-Masri, seen to be al-Zarqawi's successor.

Argues that the bipartisan panel named by U.S. president George W. Bush to study intelligence prior to the Iraq war may not be sufficiently even-handed, as a number of the nine members have ties to the Bush administration. Claim that panel co-chair Laurence Silberman is a friend of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney; Claim that panel member Henry Rowen worked under Cheney at the Pentagon; Claim that panel member William Studeman contributed to the Bush campaign in 2000; Claim that panel member Charles Vest, president of MIT, has been accused by a colleague of being slow to investigate allegations of fraud at a lab that does work for the Pentagon.

Reports on a summary prepared for President George W. Bush of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. Reasons for the importance of the Senate Intelligence Committee reviewing this summary in connection with the decision to go to war against Iraq based on the presence of weapons of mass destruction in that country; Possibility that the Bush team ignored important caveats that accompanied intelligence estimates about Iraq's suspected WMD.

Discusses the various stories that are stemming from the events surrounding the capture of Saddam Hussein. Allegations that Saddam spit on one his captors and then was punched; Doubt on the account and other accounts such as a comment made by another soldier to Saddam; Details of the capture of Saddam, including the discovery of him in his so called spider hole; Reactions to the various stories by the military and other United States officials.

Discusses the pros and cons of Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi will be dismantling their weapons of mass destruction through an agreement with United States President George W. Bush. Effect that the dismantling of the weapons will have on intelligence officials unraveling the world of illicit-weapons supply; Terms of the agreement which calls for improved relations between Libya and Western countries; Effects that the Iraq War had on the decision by Libya to comply to the demands of the U.S.; Background of the beginning of the communications between Libya and the U.S. as the Iraq War began.

Comments that a majority of Americans believe that Saddam Hussein played a role in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, despite acknowledgements by the George W. Bush administration that no such evidence exists. Use of insinuation by U.S Vice-President Dick Cheney; Official White House statements; Probe by U.S. House Intelligence Committee.

This article presents information related to George J. Tenet, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. After weeks of pressure to explain what it knew about the alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq before launching the war there, the U.S. administration has placed the issue in Tenet's lap. He has recently been given an assignment to hunt for the WMD in Iraq.