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This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 21st century ushered in rising nationalism in both Japan and China. Mutual Sino-Japanese suspicions and accusations have been aggravated by the dispute over demarcating the resource-rich continental shelf in East China Sea and by the competition with regard to securing preferential access in the future construction of a pipeline from East SiberiaGiven that China?s imports of crude oil are projected to double by 2020 in tightening global energy markets, is it likely that Japan, whose dependence on oil imports is nearly 100 percent, may simply escalate conflicts with China with regard to energy security, due to the lack of policy coordination between the two? Is there any conceivable catalyst which may otherwise reverse what is seemingly a spiral of deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations?This paper sheds light on the ?hidden? side of so-called energy security, namely energy conservation; the other side of the coin as regards competition over limited energy supplies is usually emphasized from traditional geopolitical viewpoints. It attempts to explore the prospects for the emergence of an issue-oriented regime by focusing on energy-environmental areas and to examine the possibility of achieving a ?win-win? situation (or positive-sum game) in Northeast Asia It is estimated that China needs approximately ten times the amount of primary energy that Japan does to produce US one dollar equivalent of GDP, whereas the Chinese government considers energy conservation to be an unavoidable impending national issue in terms of maintaining its economic development, as endorsed by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Promoting technology transfers from Japan would bolster the sustainable development of the Chinese economy on the one hand, while on the other, Japan would also benefit, not only from mitigating China?s soaring energy demand, but also from promoting carbon emissions trading, particularly by employing the Clean Development Mechanism.It is argued that, despite the prima facie aggravation in the Sino-Japanese relationship, there nevertheless exists much potential for mutual cooperation or, at least, strategic trade-offs, which may in turn lead to stability in bilateral ties in the years to come. In addition to discussing the ongoing development of energy conservation business between the two, this paper addresses the implications of the Asia-Pacific Partnership, advocated by the Bush Administration since July 2005, and the conceivable roles of the United States in stabilizing Northeast Asian energy and environmental issues for the sake of future Sino-Japanese relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]