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This article examines responses to the Syrian government's possession and eventual use of chemical weapons (CW) in that country's civil war from 2012 to 2013. During this time, the United States and other outside powers applied coercive strategies, in both deterrent and compellent modes. Outcomes varied: compellence in the form of coercive diplomacy achieved a partial success, getting Syria to give up much of its chemical stockpile, but there were multiple deterrence failures, culminating in a large-scale sarin gas attack in August 2013. We examine this record to draw lessons about factors associated with the effectiveness of coercion. Our analysis draws on insights from existing research on both deterrence and coercive diplomacy to develop an integrated analytical framework involving the interplay of three factors: credibility, motivations, and assurance. We find the typical default approach to coercion, based on demonstrating toughness and threatening to impose costs using airpower—an approach we call the "resolve plus bombs" formula—was not sufficient to change Syria's calculations regarding chemical use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The repeated use of the nerve agent sarin against civilians in Syria in 2013 emphasizes the continuing threat by chemical warfare agents. Multiple studies demonstrated a limited efficacy of standard atropine–oxime treatment in nerve agent poisoning and called for the development of alternative and more effective treatment strategies. A novel approach is the use of stoichiometric or catalytic bioscavengers for detoxification of nerve agents in the systemic circulation prior to distribution into target tissues. Recent progress in the design of enzyme mutants with reversed stereo selectivity resulting in improved catalytic activity and their use in in vivo studies supports the concept of catalytic bioscavengers. Yet, further research is necessary to improve the catalytic activity, substrate spectrum and in vivo biological stability of enzyme mutants. The pros and cons of catalytic bioscavengers will be discussed in detail and future requirements for the development of catalytic bioscavengers will be proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) in the analysis of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), specifically those involving the organophosphorus-based nerve agents (OPNAs), is a continually evolving and dynamic area of research. The ever-present interest in this field within analytical chemistry is driven by the constant threat posed by these lethal CWAs, highlighted by their use during the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, their deliberate use on civilians in Syria in 2013, and their use in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Great Britain in 2018 and Alexei Navalny in 2020. These events coupled with their potential for mass destruction only serve to stress the importance of developing methods for their rapid and unambiguous detection. Although the direct detection of OPNAs is possible by GC-MS, in most instances, the analytical chemist must rely on the detection of the products arising from their degradation. To this end, derivatization reactions mainly in the form of silylations and alkylations employing a vast array of reagents have played a pivotal role in the efficient detection of these products that can be used retrospectively to identify the original OPNA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the United Nations' (UN's) selection of several laboratories to investigate a sarin nerve gas attack by the Syrian government on its civilians. Topics include improvements in the detection of chemical weapons or their breakdown products, such as novel methods to detect nerve gases attached to long-lived blood proteins, what UN investigators are looking for, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, Netherlands.

The article reports on the release of guidelines by the World Health Organization (WHO) on treating chemical warfare patients. The guidelines were released within days of reports of possible chemical weapons attacks in Syria in 2013. The nerve agents that are reportedly weapons in Syria's arsenal include sarin. The drug atropine was used to treat Syrian patients.