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The problem of consciousness is one of the most important problems both in cognitive science and in philosophy. There are different philosophers and different scientists who define consciousness and explain it differently. In philosophy, 'consciousness' does not have a definition in terms of genus and differentia or necessary and sufficient conditions. In this paper, I shall explore the very idea of machine consciousness. The machine consciousness has offered causal explanation to the 'how' and 'what' of consciousness, but they fail to explain the 'why' of consciousness. Their explanation is based on the ground that consciousness is causally dependent on the material universe and that of all conscious phenomena can be explained by mapping the physical universe. In this regard, consciousness is basically a physical phenomenon and can be mechanically explained following the naturalistic methods of science. In other words, the mechanistic assumption is that consciousness and mind have an artificial origin and therefore have to be understood only within a mechanistic framework available in the sciences. If this is so, then this epistemological theory of consciousness is essentially committed to scientific world view that cannot avoid metaphysical implication of consciousness. At the same time, neo- Advaitins have maintained that the evolution of nature leads to the manifestation of human consciousness only because consciousness is already implicit in the material nature. Thus, the existence of consciousness in this physical world far exceeds the methods of science and needs a non-mechanical metaphysical explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the mahant- ātman-, or 'vast self', found in some of the Early and Middle Upaniṣads, has, at least since the days of Hermann Oldenberg, been explored by a number of scholars, most notably by van Buitenen (Hist Relig 4(1):103-114, 1964). These studies have usually emphasized the cosmic implications of this concept; the vast ātman- being the non-individualized spirit that brings forth and pervades the universe, then enters the bodies of all created beings as their animating principle. As such it precedes the mahān ( ātmā), or mahat, of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The present paper argues that the concept of a mahant- puruṣa- or 'vast (soul-)person', appearing parallel to the vast ātman in these texts, is in fact older, being traceable to Middle Vedic texts; the emergence of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine has eventually led to its replacement by the mahān ātmā. Originally, it is argued, the adjective mahant- stressed the difference between this 'vast' puruṣa, who is said to dwell in the sun, and the minute puruṣa within man, who is seen as the tiny 'person' in one's pupil, or resides in the heart, having the size of a thumb. In contradistinction to the ātman, the puruṣa is a thoroughly anthropomorphic soul-concept, a 'person' within the person. The ultimate identity between this tiny soul-person and the puruṣa in the sun is a recurring, but little studied, motif in the micro-macrocosmic speculations of the Brāhmaṇa texts. This 'vast', solar puruṣa is sometimes identified with the Puruṣa or primeval man of Ṛgveda 10.90, from whose body the universe was formed, and much of the imagery surrounding the vast puruṣa of Middle and Late Vedic literature seems to derive from this hymn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines one of the main questions of intercommunications between main religious and cultural systems in India: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. The article, using detailed factual material, focuses the similarities and differences between those systems, results in the basic data regarding ontology, cosmology, ethics and sociology of those systems. The article shows the interaction and mutual enrichment of so different systems.

This paper aims to show that the problem of personal identity is a fundamental question of the classical Indian thought. Usually we tend to think that personal identity is a Western philosophical subject, and so we tend to forget the significance of the Self (Atman) in Hinduism and even in Buddhism. The author shows how the Indian thought approached the question of personal identity and which was the singular solution outlined in the work consensually attributed to Gotama, the Buddha.

The tradition of Vedant and Sufism both as doctrines and practices are firmly founded on the priori that there is a dimension of existence which is beyond conceptual comprehensions. A mystic and spiritual dimension that is more experienced than explained. Mystical traditions of Vedant and Sufism although sprouting from two distinct belief systems address the same universal human problem of being, truth and absolute reality. Both aspire and expect from its adherents to search for truth through intuition and personal experience while rejecting sources of knowledge other than divine to be authentic . Present paper is an attempt to deconstruct the phenomena of mystical practices of Vedant and Sufism which defy to be subjected to explanation and empirical applications, thus are resilient to be reduced to be confined to time and space; as an absolute is by its nature eternal and infinite beyond the realm of time and space. Although not claiming to be strictly a comparative study, the paper takes these mystical traditions as a general human phenomenon with a few commonalities, in cosmogony, ritual practices structural organization despite a marked difference between the universalizing Islam and ethnic religion Hinduism. However in a crude sense both are cults and fringe religions in a sense that the cults arise to meet demands not being satiated by the existing exoteric forms held by the majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis in this article is driven by a question concerning how self (ātman) has been thought by Vaiśeika philosophers within the Vaiśeikasūtra commentarial tradition. That is to say, how the category of self is expressed, and how the thinking on self is structured, in Praśastapādabhā?ya, and in its commentaries Nyāyakandalī and Vyomavatī. The idea of self is discussed within three main aspects: first, cognition and action; secondly, incentive and action; and lastly, merit, demerit, and liberation. The article shows how these interrelated factors are used in order to delineate a self that could be understood in two ways, bodily and disembodied. It is furthermore shown how the bodily self is in focus for these philosophers insofar as it is the key to the possibility of liberation (mok?a) through the categories of acting and knowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has a twofold aim. Its main purpose is to analyse the arguments that Theravada Buddhism claims for rejecting the Self (ātman). The concept of anātman rests on four arguments. The first and second arguments are aimed at eternalism, which supposes a permanent ātman. The third argument seeks to refute materialism: as, if there is no Self that survives death, who is reborn and who is liberated? Buddhism is based on the concept of dependent origination (paṭicca samuppāda), which allows us to see ourselves, not as substantial agents, but instead as a process that may be tracked through continuity. The fourth argument states that belief in ātman is harmful: the «self» functions like a magnet for attachments and leads only to suffering. The paper's secondary purpose, framing this discussion, compares this change in the Indian conception of the Self with certain western views of Subjectivity: the Cartesian model, which is similar to the Vedic conception of ātman rejected by Buddha; Hume's model based on continuity, which is similar to early Buddhist conceptions; and Kant's model of a transcendental Subject that unifies experience, theoretically related to some later developments of Mahayana Buddhism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article argues that the historical development of both the Christian doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and the Buddhist doctrine of “no-self” can be understood in terms of the principle of “metacontrast,” developed in the context of social identity theory. That is, each of these doctrines reflects an effort to establish intrareligious hegemony by maximizing the contrast with the dominant outgroup, Judaism for the one, Brahmanism for the other. Moreover, both doctrines exemplify an important consequence of the metacontrast principle, namely, that the drive to maximize intergroup difference tends to produce extreme, maximally counterintuitive concepts. Recognizing the social identity processes behind the emergence of such counterintuitive theological concepts adds to our understanding of the phenomenon of “theological correctness” as discussed in the cognitive science of religion: that is, the notion that the religious concepts implicit in everyday thought and action often do not coincide with the official concepts of theological doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Danubius is the property of Danubius and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ancient Indian ethos emphasize that all the efforts of human life should be directed towards practical realization of the ultimate truth or reality which could be realized by merging the individual consciousness with the universal consciousness. Contemporary understanding of Mindfulness is awareness and open and receptive attention toward whatever is happening at present moment internally and externally This paper is an attempt to enrich the concept of mindfulness through ancient Indian ethos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Vedic texts are sacred to many Hindus. Adi Shankara was a 9th century Hindu mystic and commentator of the Vedic texts that explicate the philosophical view of Advaita Vedanta. While there are some problems still not solved in Shankara's meaning at this time, there is a consensus as to his intent in his writings about the Oneness of Brahman and Atman and how one is to come to know this connection. The commentators that I use to shed light on Shankara's meaning are N. K. Devaraja, Eric Lott, and Arvid Sharma. According to Shankara, whose position I sympathize with, we come to know Atman, Brahman and the Oneness, ultimately, though not exclusively, through direct experience. Primarily, the purpose of this essay is to explicate and qualify the truth of Shankara's position. Secondarily and more specifically, I argue that either Shankara exaggerates the delusional nature of the external world or that there are a few mistranslations concerning the external world. I attempt to fulfill this purpose by first answering the question of how one is supposed to come to know Atman, Brahman, and the connection between the two. Next, I will answer the question of what we can know about Atman, Brahman, and the Oneness. These questions will be answered by analyzing Shankara's text and secondary sources. I will also provide a few personal illustrations for clarification that could be interpreted as direct experiences of Oneness that Shankara discusses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is an attempt to understand emotions and the affect from Indian traditional point of view. In the Indian philosophical texts' detailed descriptions of emotions are not available nor are dealt with as a separate concept. This view of emotions lays emphasis on desires as the root cause of emotional upheavals. They are seen as modification of desire and attachment. The desires are seen as arising from the contact and attachment of the ego or ahamkara with the external world and are caused by a sense of imperfection, incompleteness or non-fulfillment. Ego or ahamkara is differentiated from the true Self or atman. Emotions are viewed as springs of action and are bipolar in nature. According to Patanjali's Yoga Shastra, suffering is due to ignorance about one's true "self" (avidya). Hence, suffering or dukha arises from within and not from the outside world. Bhagvadgita traces all emotional experiences to the gunas, i.e., sattva, rajas, and tamas. Works of Bharathmuni have contributed to the understanding of emotional experiences. Concept of rasa or aesthetic relish is central to this approach to understanding affective experiences as dealt with in the Natyashastra of Bharathamuni. These views underline the recommended path for self-transformation. Regulating emotions, both emotional experience and emotional expression, is an integral part of the recommended "principles of living". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from one of Franco Ferrarotti's latest publications Atman. Il respiro del bosco (Ed. Empiria, Rome, 2012), this essay develops on the basis of the considerations in the last sections of the text, to which we refer. The interpretation key to this note, purposefully hermeneutic though unveiled in its conclusions, relates to the return to nature. The transition from culture to nature and to the nature of the trees is not seen, in the long trajectory described by Franco Ferrarotti, as a «regression», but rather as the achievement of a wisdom able to contemplate sine ira ac studio (without anger or concern) the enormous short-fallings and decline of the public and private life in our country. The solitude of the «naturalized» thought brings a glimpse of hope, in that memory resumes its course no more towards the past but towards the future. Ferrarotti's «lessons» interpret the dramatic sequences of our history, remain in the atmospheres of thought, and are «received» as such, fertile sources of underground action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares philosopher Utpaladeva's notion of the self, or ātman, in the context of Western theological idealism in the thought of the philosophers George Berkeley and F. H. Bradley. Topics include the notion of Śiva as the ontological Absolute, Buddhist views on the nature of memory, and Buddhist epistemology.

Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof ( avīta/āvīta), is presented in a prasaṅga-style, and contains double negation ( na nairātmyam) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style ( sātmakam). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa. On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion ( vyāpti). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman, discusses the negative expressions '' nairātmya' and '' a-nairātmya' Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman, he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka, whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya, because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a close reading of the famous upanişadic story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya-Upanişad versus Śankara's bhāşya, with special reference to the notions of suşupti and turīya. That Śankara is not always loyal to the Upanişadic texts is a well-known fact. That the Upanişads are (too) often read through Śankara's Advaitic eyes is also known. The following lines will not merely illustrate the gap between text and commentary but will also reveal an unexpected Upanişadic depiction of 'dreamless sleep' and 'transcendental consciousness'. Suşupti is described here as 'one step too far', as a 'break' or discontinuity in one's consciousness: whereas turāya is depicted positively, and surprisingly even in wordly terms. Unlike the third state of consciousness in which there is no 'world' nor 'me', and which is described through Indra's character as 'total destruction' (vināşa); in turīya, the world 'comes back', or rather the 'renouncer' returns to the world. Śankara's position, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is radically different. For him, the Upanişadic story illustrates the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (adhyāsa) which causes suffering. Consciousness prevails even in suşupti, and turīya has nothing to do with 'coming back to the world', since there is nowhere to come back from or to. Turīya, as seen by the Advaitin, consists of all the other states of consciousness together, or as K. C. Bhattacharyya puts it, 'It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dependent-origination, possibly the most fundamental Buddhist philosophical principle, is generally understood as a description of all that exists. Mental as well as physical phenomena are believed to come into being only in relation to, and conditioned by, other phenomena. This paper argues that such an understanding of pratītya-samutpāda is mistaken with regard to the earlier meanings of the concept. Rather than relating to all that exists, dependent-origination related originally only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the self, not of reality, embedded in the Upaniṣadic search for the ātman. The teaching also possessed important ontological implications regarding the nature of the relation between consciousness and reality. These implications suggest that rather than things being conditioned by other things, they are actually conditioned by consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the epistemologies of Vedānta, a monotheistic system of thought. It examines the basic tenets of Vedānta, including the concept of Brahman, the true self and karma. It also highlights the development of Vedic philosophy and psychology in the U.S. as well as the features of personality development that were incorporated in the Vedānta model, such as the awareness of atman or the true self and its convergence with cultural philosophical orientations.

Many religious traditions ascribe to the term "heart" a meaning that goes beyond the physical and the emotional levels. In Hinduism, the discovery of the spiritual heart is generally seen as a precursor to higher experiences that transcend the mind and the senses, and culminate in the vision of God. This essay briefly describes the Hindu view of the spiritual heart, where the heart is located, and how it is experienced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I attempt to understand the implications of Saṅkara's claim that liberation is not an action. If liberation is not an action, how is it up to us and therefore our responsibility? What role do actions have in a life concerned with liberation? The key to understanding Saṅkara's view, I suggest, requires broad reflection on his claim in his commentary on Brahma Sutra I.1.4 that cessation of action in accordance with Vedic prohibition is not an action. I will conclude by discussing the implications of this interpretation on the nature of māyā in Saṅkara. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the contribution of Indian theology to the rediscovery of pneumatology, its role in missiology and the role played by the Spirit in mission. The views are made from a Christological perspective. Terms such as "atman," "antaryamin," and "shakti," which were used by Indian theologians are examined.

This paper questions the nature and existence of the ego and I from a Western and Eastern viewpoint, which has been a question for 2,500 years when the Buddha rejected the Brahman idea of ātman. The answer for an ego depends partly on the state of consciousness; the existence of the Western objectifying ego is undeniable in ordinary consciousness, but not in extraordinary consciousness with no objectifying. The subtle question remains about the existence of an I that is distinct from the ego and that is best represented by most meditative or contemplative states. Here a subjectified, witnessing, consciousness-maintaining I still seems to exist. This may be called the “High-I,” which appears to provide for all states of consciousness a constancy and awareness not provided by the ego. This finding has implications for psychology and religion as well as philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the development of self from the Hindu perspective, which views the Atman or inner self as the real self, transcending the empirical self that is socially embedded and subject to change across the life span and with intercultural contact. The article presented the following principal arguments: First, to capture the complexity of the self seen as multifaceted, multivoiced and multilevel, there is a need to move beyond the dichotomous classifications that are in existence; (2) the Hindu worldview of the Atman, or the spiritual self, considered as the real self, warrants examination; (3) both interindividual and intraindividual variations may be anticipated in the expression of selfways at the empirical level; (4) existing literature focuses little attention on developmental changes in construing the self across life stages; and (5) globalization and its consequences for the development of a multifaceted self must be taken into account.

A pilgrimage to an Indian ashram leaves breath-taking memories of beauty, love and spirituality of the people, as well as profound, yet subtle experience of a message from the Bhagavad Gita: “All this is God.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anattā). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (Ātman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of Ātman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status quo has not, however, gone unchallenged. I shall join forces against this pernicious view, integrating some recent contributions into a sustained, two-pronged argument against no-Ātman theories of anattā. At the end it shall be suggested, in line with Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that anattāis best understood as a practical strategy rather than as a metaphysical doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]