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The article mentions Washington National Airport and Dulles International Airport with a focus on solving the problems of safety and traffic flow at major airports in the United States. Solutions to airport congestion include expanding peak-load capacity by building more airports, improving air traffic control by implementing the National Airspace System, and allocating landing and flight space by fiat rationing. The locational dimension of traffic patterns, passengers' preferences, role of ticket prices in relation to airport use, effect of price differentials on distribution of demand, recommendations of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the FAA Bureau of National Capitol Airports are mentioned.

We analyze the optimal behavior of a platform providing essential inputs to downstream firms selling a primary and a second complementary good. Final demand is affected by consumer foresight, that is, consumers may not anticipate the ex post surplus from the secondary good when purchasing the primary good. We first set up a reduced‐form platform model and evaluate the effects of consumer foresight on the platform's optimal decisions. Then, we specialize the analysis in the context of airports, which derive revenues from both aeronautical and, increasingly, commercial activities. An airport sets landing fees and, in addition, it chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions' revenues. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport's choices: the optimal policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport's profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the influence of market accessibility on hotel prices and how this influence is moderated by various quality-signaling factors, such as online user ratings, “thumbs up” (recommendation) percentage, hotel class, and chain affiliation. Using a randomized sample of hotels in the Caribbean islands, we employ a three-level mixed-effect linear regression model to investigate the plausible relationship between market accessibility and hotel prices. After controlling for unobserved island-level and hotel-level characteristics, the model indicates that in most periods, low market accessibility (high flight costs) leads to lower hotel prices, and this influence is mitigated by well-established positive reputations as represented by the quality-signaling factors. Our findings imply that hotels should work to increase their reputations to help buffer the impacts of inaccessibility. In an effort to increase market accessibility, one course of action is to reduce airport landing taxes and fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the federal legal requirements relating to airport ratemaking in the USA and demonstrates that establishing rates by ordinance or resolution is not only consistent with federal law, but also provides certain benefits to airport operators. Airport operators are permitted to establish rates and charges for the use of their airport by air carriers, by ordinance -- an agreement between the airport and the carriers serving the airport is not required. Rates established by ordinance must be fair, reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory and should be established on a compensatory basis; however, different methods may be used for recovering the airport's costs. Before establishing a new method for imposing rates and charges, and generally before establishing new rates periodically, an airport operator must consult with the air carriers using the airport. Although establishing rates and charges by ordinance is complicated and challenging, it provides necessary flexibility for airport operators and also establishes the baseline when seeking to negotiate an agreement with the air carriers operating at the airport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many airports rely on data received from external sources to bill aeronautical charges for the use of their facilities. Billings apply to landing and terminal fees, which are intended to recover the costs associated with constructing and operating airport infrastructure, including runway systems and terminal buildings. This paper addresses the question of whether airports are 'getting enough' in fees for the use of their facilities. By independently observing and recording aircraft landings at a major North American airport and tracing these movements through the airport's billing system, it was observed that the data provided by outside parties to charge for the use of facilities were both incomplete and inaccurate. This means that not all revenues were collected because they were either not billed or incorrectly billed. The results of this investigation suggest that a case can be made for an airport acquiring its own system for capturing and recording aircraft movements. This will ensure correct billings for the use of airport runways and terminal buildings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Airport infrastructure in many countries is being up-graded to meet the growing demands of tourism, and air travel more generally, but this poses problems for sustainable development. Thus, there is the need to establish an alternative to the traditional airport pricing structure for landing fees so as to reflect the true cost that air transports imposes on others. This paper analyses one application of Ramsey pricing to some Spanish tourist airport that embraces environmental as well as conventional financial costs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We study alternate approaches to implement congestion pricing at US airports. Conventional formulations toll all aircraft without determining whether a plane operated by a given airline delays other planes that it operates or planes operated by other airlines. Recent work points out optimal pricing calls for carriers to be charged only for the delay they impose on other airlines. We find a small difference between the net benefits generated by the two congestion-pricing policies because the bulk of airport delays are not internalized and because the efficiency loss from pricing internalized congestion is small. ( JEL L11, L93, R41) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A one-shot simultaneous game-theoretic model is applied in a duopoly market to investigate how airport landing fees could influence airlines’ decisions on aircraft size and service frequency. It is found that higher landing fees will force airlines to use larger aircraft and less frequency, with higher load factor for the same number of passengers. It is also found that airlines will be better off if some of the extra landing fees are returned to airlines as a bonus for airlines using larger aircraft, which consequently reduces airport congestion. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Chicago''s O’Hare airport is extremely congested, especially in the late afternoon and early evening. The paper uses a publicly available database to estimate the relationship between the number of flights wishing to depart and the delays they experience. This relationship is used to calculate congestion fees that provide airlines with incentives to move some flights out of the peak period and to slightly alter the scheduled departure time of other flights to avoid the rush of departures that occur on the hour. The very high fees at certain times of day point to the benefits that can be obtained from current plans to expand and reconfigure the airport to reduce delays in both good and bad weather. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The relative efficiency of binding fees versus quota controls to achieve given escapement levels is examined. The criterion is profit per year over a given time horizon. The model employed is a discrete version of the logistic model where growth is influenced by a random variable. Simulations are used to compare landing fees and quota controls under imprecise stock estimates, variable availability of fish, and random fish prices. While ecological uncertainty combined with imprecise stock estimates favors fee control, as shown by Weitzman, the opposite can be the case under uncertainty about the availability of fish or fish price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describes the landing fee structures prevalent at most European airports. Alternative pricing systems which emphasize economic efficiency rather than airport finance considerations; Concerns on landing fees, passenger fees and other charges; Issue on the utilization of resources.

This paper models and estimates congestion prices and capacity for large hub airports. The model includes stochastic queues, time-varying traffic rates, and endogenous, intertemporal adjustment of traffic in response to queuing delay and fees. Relative costs of queuing and schedule delays are estimated using data from Minneapolis-St. Paul. Simulations calculate equilibrium traffic patterns, queuing delays, schedule delays, congestion fees, airport revenues, airport capacity, and efficiency gains. The paper also investigates whether a dominant airline internalizes delays its aircraft impose. It tests game-theoretic specifications with atomistic, Nash-dominant, Stackelberg-dominant, and collusive-airline traffic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The long-term growth in the air transport is leading to the need to expand airport infrastructure but this has serious environmental implications. Thus, there is the need to establish an alternative to the traditional airport pricing structure for landing fees, which reflects the overall costs that air transport operators impose on others. Airport pricing should provide a sound guide for future investments, and at the same time reflect whether additional facilities are needed and at what price, by taking into account all costs, including environmental costs. This paper analyses one application of Ramsey Pricing on uncongested Spanish airport, by considering the CO2 emission costs as a valuable input. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We present a simple and easily calculated expression for the Shapley value whenever the characteristic function is a "cost" function with the property that the cost of any subset of players is equal to the cost of the "largest" player in that subset. It turns out that a simple rule previously proposed for calculating airport landing charges generates precisely the Shapley value for an appropriately defined game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the proceedings of a meeting of the Agence pour la Securite de la Navigation Aerienne en Afrique et a Madagascar, the regulating body for commercial aeronautics in francophone Africa. Flight volumes; Safety issues; Runway maintenance; Landing fees to operators; Extension of the "Open Skies" program with the United States State Department.