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Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer is eyeing the introduction of new business jets and larger jetliners as it seeks to sustain its growth. It also looks to expand into the US military aviation market.

The civil helicopter market has grown over the past three years, with 545 deliveries worth over $2.1 billion in 2006. Demand for additional helicopters for exploration in more distant oil fields, public sector demand, and corporate demand are the reasons for the growth in the industry. The performance of helicopter manufacturing companies, like Eurocopter, Bell, AgustaWestland and Sikorsky, and some of their products are presented.

A focus United States military budget allocations amidst increasing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is presented.

The increased production of 1995 model aircrafts by airplane manufacturing industry is discussed.

The financial problems faced by the jetliners market and the need of additional new-build aircraft in United States Airlines is discussed. The details of the history and the forecasts of jetliners like Air Canada in earning a huge profit in 2005 are also discussed.

Boeing announced in October 2003 that the production of 757, the first Boeing legacy jetliner program would be stopped because of the dwindling sales. The decision was taken after Continental Airlines announced that it would change its last six 757-300 orders to 737-800s, reducing the backlog to 12 planes.

Boeing's planned 767-X jet aircraft featuring Mach 0.85 speed would be considerably cheaper than existing aircraft in its class. The jet at first would have a 7,500 nautical mile range, and future models would have a 8,500 nautical mile range. A problem is that the jet's passenger capacity would be in the 200-250 seat category, a category whose market share has declined in recent years.

Falling prices for commercial aircraft, particularly used aircraft, coupled with easy financing has worked to aggravate the current down cycle afflicting the commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. The heart of the problem is the battle for market share between Boeing and Airbus. Unable to match the agressive pricing policies of Airbus, Boeing turned to manufacturer financing to to improve its profitability and competitive standing.

Airbus' plans to boost production in 2003 to 400 aircraft has been trimmed back to around 2002's level of 300, while rival Boeing will cut its airplane production in 2003 to between 275 and 300 aircraft, versus 380 deliveries in 2002 and 527 in 2001. These moves reflect the slumping profits and traffic afflicting the airline industry, as well as the inventory of parked aircraft awaiting service re-entry. While both builders can massage their respective delivery schedules to keep their production lines operating in 2003 to planned levels, both companies must deal with 2004. New orders are currently confined to the low-cost airline segment and hopes for new orders by the major air carriers are not high, given that low-cost carier orders tend to come at the expense of the majors. In addition, while Boeing's wide-body dominance ensures it a 53.8% delivery market share in 2003, Airbus is likely to see a boost in that area from its A380, which is slated to see service entry in 2006.

United Airlines' decision in March 2002 to hold-off on its Avolar fractional business jet ownership program is seen as being deeply disappointing. Initially viewed as heralding a new growth opportunity for the private aviation industry, by lowering the cost of operating and owning a business jet, the move not only raises questions concerning the market for business jets, but also comes as worries have arisen over fractional ownership and questions about its profitability.

The slumping market for maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) may be near an end. Although the United States Navy and other allied navies continue to relay upon the P-3 Orion design, P-3 airframes are getting scarce and the production line for the aircraft is currently dormant. Meanwhile other countries, as well as the Navy, are starting to look toward acquiring additional MPAs. However, restarting the P-3 production line appaers to be a costly option. Thus, to meet the need for additional MPAs, a number of alternatives to the Orion have either been initiated or are under study. This development holds the promise that the market for MPAs could be moving out of the doldrums.

The development of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 is discussed in detail. Also discussed are questions facing the Lockheed Martin program such as price, funding, and concerns regarding possible export markets.

This article examines the rivalry between Boeing Co. and Airbus, four years after Boeing's purchase of McDonnell Douglas. The market share of both aircraft companies is discussed.

Issues concerning the entries in the Paris Air Show in France, 2001, are discussed. Particular attention is given to shared fleet tendencies exemplified by the Flight Training programmes of Canada, which trains pilots from different countries on a BAE Hawk fleet.

The majority of jet transports apart from Concorde travel at similar speeds, but since the late 1990s some manufacturers have begun to look at the viability of increasing such speeds. Boeing has put forward proposals for a supersonic business jet in its Sonic Cruiser program.

Issues concerning economic aspects of the aircraft industry are discussed. Particular attention is given to technological aspects of aircrafts, to global standards of aircraft safety and to competitive aircraft models, including the Boeing E-737 model.

The Joint Strike Fighter program and its survival are discussed.

Issues concerning the state of France's space programme, defence capabilities and aircraft building industry is discussed.

Issues are presented concerning the growth of the business jet industry between 1995 and 2000, when sales value tripled. The difficulties faced by the industry as production falls behind demand are discussed.

The US government's policies towards the defence industry have sought to strike a balance between the free market and government control. This approach has caused a range of difficulties.

Airbus Industrie won 476 jetliner orders in 1999, against Boeing's 391 orders. However, the main test for jetline makers is return on investment, not market share, and Airbus's performance is irrelevant unless it can make a profit.

The Mako light combat aircraft/advanced jet trainer programme is a collaborative venture uniting the United Arab Emirates and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA). It now seems increasingly likely that Mako will be commercialized, especially if DASA can attract further partners. DASA has designed Mako to function as both a light combat aircraft and an advanced supersonic jet trainer, with the former role being more significant than the latter. The key direct competitor to Mako is the Samsung Aerospace/Lockheed Martin KTX-2.

China is a larger market for jetliners than neighboring Taiwan but the Taiwanese market is healthier and more stable. China has more than 30 carriers, of which only 20 are significant, including the unprofitable market leaders Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, China Southwest and China Northern, which have a 73% share of the home market. By contrast, the Taiwan market is growing rapidly, with jetliner capacity dominated by China Airlines and EVA Airways. The main differences in the two markets involve military aircraft, with Taiwan's military dominance erasing China's lead in the commercial market.

Jet aircraft have captured an increasing amount of the world's regional air travel market in the last decade, with regional jets reaching 69% of the market in 1998, from just 21% in 1989. However, a stream of new regional jet launches, including Embraer's ERJ-170/190 range and Fairchild Dornier's 728JET, is raising questions about overcapacity and the market's ability to absorb extra planes. With forecasts suggesting that jets will comprise 82% of the market in 2008, manufacturers need to freeze the number of new jet programs and refocus their investments.

The business jet market has seen unprecedented growth during the last three years and preliminary numbers for 1999 suggest deliveries of 532 jets worth $7.7 billion. US corporate profits have been the main external market driver and companies are increasingly seeing business jets as useful tools. New models and fractional ownership are also important drivers in the growth of the market. The high end of the business jet market is the most vulnerable sector, followed by the upper middle, although there are many new models about to come into service in the upper middle sector.

Jetliner industries are taking a different approach to new model development, due to technological factors, corporate spending patterns and the wider economic environment. The level of development spending has fallen considerably relative to the size of the market and jetliner technology has reached a plateau. It is unlikely that a radical new design will be introduced for some time, and the airline industry is tending to favor concentration, with airlines and airline alliances getting larger. With less aircraft being developed and fewer players in the market, there will be less program failures.

The regional aircraft market has been considerably altered by introduction of new-generation regional jets. Regional jets have captured about 60% of the market while the share of turboprop aircraft has dwindled to 40%. The first regional jet to successfully penetrate the market was the Canadair CRJ which was developed in the late 1980s. The CRF was followed by the Fokker F70, the Embraer EMB-145 and the Fairchild 328JET. The market share of regional jets is expected to stabilize at 60% over a 10-year period but this could increase to 85-90% if 70-100 seat jets displace turboprops.

Aircraft manufacturer Airbus Industrie's goal to achieve equality with Boeing is affecting profits at Boeing. Airbus has been unable to compete closely with Boeing for many of the 30 years prior to 1998, but it has gradually improved its marketing capabilities and gained market share. Airbus's A320 and A330/340 range of commercial airliners became successful by the early 1990s, but the company was unable to challenge Boeing's dominance in aircraft with 200-250 and 400-plus seats. Airbus was determined to move beyond its one-third market share and began an aggressive marketing campaign to which Boeing had to respond.