Author: "Charles Figuieres" - Searchworks@Jio Institute Digital Library Search Results

Your search keyword '"Charles Figuieres"' showing total 41 results

Start Over Author "Charles Figuieres"

41 results on '"Charles Figuieres"'

1. Conservation priorities when species interact: the Noah's Ark metaphor revisited.

Author: Pierre Courtois, Charles Figuieres, and Chloé Mulier
Subjects: Medicine, Science
Abstract: This note incorporates ecological interactions into the Noah's Ark problem. In doing so, we arrive at a general model for ranking in situ conservation projects accounting for species interrelations and provide an operational cost-effectiveness method for the selection of best preserving diversity projects under a limited budget constraint.
Published: 2014
Full Text: View/download PDF

2. The impact of academic information supply and familiarity on preferences for ecosystem services

Author: Hélène Rey-Valette, Charles Figuieres, Monique Simier, Mariam Maki Sy, Rutger de Wit, MARine Biodiversity Exploitation and Conservation (UMR MARBEC), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), ANR-11-LABX-0010,DRIIHM / IRDHEI,Dispositif de recherche interdisciplinaire sur les Interactions Hommes-Milieux(2011), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-11-LABX-0010/11-LABX-0010,LabEx DRIIHM,Dispositif de recherche interdisciplinaire sur les Interactions Hommes-Milieux(2011), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro, Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), and Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Citizens’ workshop, 010504 meteorology & atmospheric sciences, Process (engineering), paternalism, coastal lagoons, citizens' workshop, Cultural ecosystem services (CES), 010501 environmental sciences, 01 natural sciences, Paternalism, Ecosystem services, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Citizens' workshop, Ecosystem, Preference elicitation, 14. Life underwater, Marketing, veil of ignorance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 0105 earth and related environmental sciences, General Environmental Science, preference elicitation, cultural ecosystem services (CES), business.industry, Provisioning, Veil of ignorance, 15. Life on land, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial Ecology, [SDE.ES]Environmental Sciences/Environmental and Society, Environmental education, 13. Climate action, Coastal lagoons, Business
Abstract: International audience; Preferences elicitation can be a challenging exercise for citizens participating in assessment surveys. It is even more challenging when it comes to complex and unfamiliar ecosystems and the threatened ecosystem services they provide. Making people aware of the characteristics of the ecosystem services being valued is determinant for the assessment process. We investigated the impact of familiarity and academic information supply on people's preferences for twenty selected ecosystem services of French Mediterranean coastal lagoons. The results show that regardless of familiarity and information supply, there is a strong consensus about the highest importance of regulation and maintenance ecosystem services as well as environmental education and research opportunity ecosystem services. By contrast, nine of the cultural ecosystem services, together with two provisioning ecosystem services showed heterogeneous preferences among the different citizen groups. Using a combination of descriptive and inferential statistics these eleven ecosystem services split up into three clusters characterized as (i) contemplative leisure, (ii) heritage, and (iii) consumptive activities. Familiarity and academic information supply had a strong impact on the preferences for these three clusters of ecosystem services.
Published: 2021

3. Theory Of Conjectural Variations

Author: Charles Figuieres, Alain Jean-marie, Nicolas Querou
Published: 2004

4. How to turn crowding-out into crowding-in? An innovative instrument and some law-related examples

Author: Charles Figuieres, Gilles Grolleau, Antoine Beretti, Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC) (BSB), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)
Subjects: crowding-out, Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Commercial law, Outcome (game theory), Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy, 050207 economics, Business and International Management, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q58 - Government Policy, media_common, 050208 finance, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, 05 social sciences, Internalism and externalism, Payment, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Crowding out, Incentive, moral motivation, environmental regulation, heterogeneity, Law, Mechanism (sociology), Public finance, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General
Abstract: International audience; Using a simple decision-theoretic approach, we formalize how agents with different kinds of intrinsic motivations react to the introduction of monetary incentives. We contend that empirical results supporting the existence of a crowding-out effect under various legal procedures hide a more complex reality, where some individuals contribute thanks to these additional monetary incentives while others reduce their contributions. Our approach allows us to study the theoretical ability of the self selection mechanism (Mellström and Johannesson in J Eur Econ Assoc 6:845–863, 2008; Beretti et al. in Kyklos 66(1):63–77, 2013) to reduce the likelihood to backfire against the cause it is meant to promote. This mechanism consists of a monetary payment for the pro-social behavior and it offers agents the choice to either keep the money for themselves or to direct it to a charity. We show that this legal procedure dominates others more classical procedures because it taps wisely into the motivational heterogeneity of individuals. It uses a self-selection mechanism to match adequate monetary incentives with individuals’ types regarding intrinsic motivations. It may even turn a situation subject to crowding-out into a crowding-in outcome.
Published: 2019

5. Identifying consensus on coastal lagoons ecosystem services and conservation priorities for an effective decision making: a Q approach

Author: Monique Simier, Hélène Rey-Valette, Mariam Maki Sy, Rutger de Wit, Vanina Pasqualini, Charles Figuieres, MARine Biodiversity Exploitation and Conservation (UMR MARBEC), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Sciences pour l'environnement (SPE), Université Pascal Paoli (UPP)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), This study was ﬁnanced by the DRIIHM LabEx, 'Device for Interdisciplinary Research on human-environments Interactions' and the human-environment observatory 'Mediterranean coastline'. The Laboratory for Excellence project (LabEx) is supported by the program 'Investment in the future' (ANR), ANR: ANR-11-INBS-0001,Investments for the Future, Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Pascal Paoli (UPP), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), ANR-11-INBS-0001,ANAEE-FR,ANAEE-Services(2011), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Institut Français de Recherche pour l'Exploitation de la Mer (IFREMER)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), and Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)
Subjects: Prioritization, Economics and Econometrics, Decision support system, 010504 meteorology & atmospheric sciences, Decision Making, coastal lagoons, 010501 environmental sciences, 01 natural sciences, Ecosystem services, Ecosystem, 14. Life underwater, Environmental planning, Coastal Lagoons, Ecosystem Services, 0105 earth and related environmental sciences, General Environmental Science, Valuation (finance), Q Methodology, Non-monetary Valuation, 15. Life on land, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Q methodology, Value Plurality, non-monetary valuation, 13. Climate action, Business, ecosystem services
Abstract: International audience; Coastal lagoons ecosystems, while representing benefits for the local populations, have been subjected to high anthropogenic pressures for decades. Hence, conservation measures of these ecosystems are urgently needed and should be combined with their sustainable uses. To address these issues, new research avenues for decision support systems have emphasized the role of the assessment of ecosystem services for establishing conservation priorities by avoiding monetarization approaches. These approaches, because they flatten the various values of nature by projecting them on the single monetary dimension, are often rejected by the stakeholders. We undertake a Q analysis to identify levels of consensus and divergence among stakeholders on the prioritization of ecosystem services provided by two French Mediterranean coastal lagoons areas. The results highlighted that there is a strong consensus among categories of stakeholders in the study sites about the paramount importance of regulation and maintenance services. Three groups of stakeholders, each sharing the same points of view regarding ecosystem services conservation, were identified for each study site. As a non-monetary valuation, Q methodology is very instrumental for the new pluralistic approach of decision support by capturing the values expressed by the stakeholders, without triggering a rejection reflex due to the monetarization.
Published: 2018

6. A cost-benefit approach for prioritizing invasive species

Author: Pierre Courtois, Chloé Mulier, Joakim Weill, Charles Figuieres, Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Innovation et Développement dans l'Agriculture et l'Alimentation (UMR Innovation), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad), University of California [Davis] (UC Davis), University of California, NRA-ONEMA/AFB Convention 2016-2018 / ANR Green-Econ (ANR-16-CE03-0005, Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Innovation et Développement dans l'Agriculture et l'Agro-alimentaire (Innovation), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Centre national d'études agronomiques des régions chaudes (CNEARC)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier (CIHEAM-IAMM), Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), University of California (UC), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), and École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)
Subjects: 0106 biological sciences, Prioritization, Economics and Econometrics, [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio], biological invasions, Biodiversity, ioritization, Biology, 010603 evolutionary biology, 01 natural sciences, Invasive species, diversity, biodiversité, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, espèce invasive, Economic impact analysis, Environmental planning, conservation des espèces, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Budget constraint, cost/benefit, General Environmental Science, biodiversity, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], modèle économique, 010604 marine biology & hydrobiology, prioritization, 15. Life on land, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, choix d'espèce, ComputingMethodologies_GENERAL, Cost benefit, [SDE.BE]Environmental Sciences/Biodiversity and Ecology, Construct (philosophy), JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation, optimization, economic model
Abstract: Ce WP a fait l'objet d'une publication in Ecological Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 146, pp.607-620. 〈hal-01672020〉; Biological invasions entail massive biodiversity losses and tremendous economic impacts that justify significant management efforts. Because the funds available to control biological invasions are limited, there is a need to identify priority species. This paper first review current invasive species prioritization methods and explicitly highlights their pitfalls. We then construct a cost-benefit optimization framework that incorporates species utility, ecological value, distinctiveness, and species interactions. This framework offers the theoretical foundations of a simple and operational method for the management of invasive species under a limited budget constraint. It takes the form of an algorithm for the prioritization of multiple biological invasions.
Published: 2018

7. The MBR intertemporal choice criterion and Rawls’ just savings principle

Author: Ngo Van Long, Mabel Tidball, Charles Figuieres, Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU), Department of Economics [Montréal], McGill University = Université McGill [Montréal, Canada], Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Department of Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), McGill University, Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: State variable, Mathematical optimization, Sociology and Political Science, Inequality, Comparative statics, media_common.quotation_subject, Control (management), Monotonic function, Intertemporal choice, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Quadratic equation, 0502 economics and business, 050207 economics, General Psychology, Economie quantitative, 050205 econometrics, Mathematics, media_common, intergenerational equity, 05 social sciences, General Social Sciences, Minimax, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, just savings principle, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Mathematical economics
Abstract: ACL-2; International audience; This paper provides general theorems about the control that maximizes the mixed Bentham–Rawls (MBR) criterion for intergenerational justice, which was introduced in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009). We establish sufficient concavity conditions for a candidate trajectory to be optimal and unique. We show that the state variable is monotonic under rather weak conditions. We also prove that inequality among generations, captured by the gap between the poorest and the richest generations, is lower when optimization is performed under the MBR criterion rather than under the discounted utilitarian criterion. A quadratic example is also used to perform comparative static exercises: it turns out, in particular, that the larger the weight attributed to the maximin part of the MBR criterion, the better-off the less fortunate generations. All those properties are discussed and compared with those of the discounted utilitarian (DU, Koopmans 1960) and the rank-discounted utilitarian (RDU, Zuber and Asheim, 2012) criteria. We contend they are in line with some aspects of the rawlsian just savings principle.
Published: 2017

8. The determinants of households' flood mitigation decisions in France - on the possibility of feedback effects from past investments

Author: Katrin Erdlenbruch, Claire Richert, Charles Figuieres, Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages (UMR G-EAU), Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture (IRSTEA)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-AgroParisTech-Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad), Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 (CEE-M), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), University of Bristol [Bristol], Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture (IRSTEA), UMR G-Eaux, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-AgroParisTech-Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture (IRSTEA)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-École Centrale de Marseille (ECM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques (AMSE), ANR-16-CE03-0005,GREEN-Econ,Vers une économie plus verte : politiques environnementales et adaptation sociétale(2016), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-AgroParisTech-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture (IRSTEA)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Risk perception, 010504 meteorology & atmospheric sciences, JEL: R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R2 - Household Analysis/R.R2.R22 - Other Demand, Mitigation, ACL-1, media_common.quotation_subject, 0211 other engineering and technologies, 02 engineering and technology, 01 natural sciences, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Perception, Flood mitigation, Environmental planning, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, 0105 earth and related environmental sciences, General Environmental Science, media_common, risk, 021110 strategic, defence & security studies, Discrete choice, business.industry, Environmental resource management, Flooding (psychology), JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Floods, Protection motivation theory, 8. Economic growth, Feedback effect, France, business
Abstract: 2016-11; In this paper, we focus on a decomposition property recently introduced in the inequality literature and known as the weak decomposition. Such a property provides interesting analyses by allowing one to separate the within-group contribution to total inequality from the between-group contribution. A limitation of the current method of decomposition is that, depending on the structure–absolute, relative, compromise–of the inequality index, specific weights have to be used. To avoid such a problem, we propose a unique decomposition property where the weighting functions depend on the size of the population and the mean income. This allows us to characterize a large family of weakly decomposable inequality indices without any recourse to implicit invariance value judgments.; Dans cet article, nous étudions les déterminants de la lutte individuelle contre les inondations en France. Nous avons mené une enquête auprès de 331 habitants de deux zones inondables et recueilli des données sur plusieurs questions, comme l’atténuation individuelle contre les inondations, la perception du risque, l’expérience du risque, et les caractéristiques socio-démographiques. Nous estimons des modèles de choix discrets pour expliquer les mesures de précaution mises en place par le ménage, et aussi l’intention de prendre de telles mesures. Nous testons la robustesse de la Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) en France ; nous discutons de son champ d’application et nous questionnons l’existence d’effets de rétroaction des investissements passés sur les intentions de protection. Nos résultats confirment que la PMT est un cadre pertinent pour décrire les mécanismes de lutte contre les inondations privée en France, en soulignant en particulier l’importance de l’évaluation de la menace, de l’expérience de la menace, et de l’adaptation. Certaines caractéristiques socio-démographiques sont également importantes pour expliquer l’atténuation privée des inondations. Nos résultats corroborent aussi la présence d’effets de rétroaction, qui suggèrent que la mise en place de mesures de précaution réduit la perception du risque d’inondation. L’existence de ces effets de rétroaction implique que les mesures envisagées, plutôt que celles mises en œuvre, devraient être examinées pour explorer davantage les déterminants de la lutte privée contre les inondations
Published: 2017

9. Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

Author: Charles Figuieres, Marc Willinger, and David Masclet
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Repetition (rhetorical device), 05 social sciences, Internalism and externalism, Public good, Turnover, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Positive economics, Social psychology, Game theory, Finance, 050205 econometrics
Abstract: Under the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents, average voluntary contributions decline with repetition of the game, provided that the aggregate moral motivation cannot increase. Our model is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis.
Published: 2013

10. Behavioral innovations: The missing capital in sustainable development?

Author: Charles Figuieres, Gilles Grolleau, Antoine Beretti, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio], Public interest theory, comportement économique, 050109 social psychology, Behavioral economics, innovations, 11. Sustainability, 0502 economics and business, behavioural economics, Economics, dual interest theory, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, Environmental quality, General Environmental Science, Sustainable development, Ecological economics, behavioural capital, economic behaviour, Public economics, business.industry, human behaviour, 05 social sciences, Environmental resource management, innovation, comportement humain, intérêt gèneral, 13. Climate action, new technology, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, Natural capital, business
Abstract: Many scholars argue that environmental issues can be addressed through technological innovation, a proposal which echoes a lasting debate between environmental and ecological economics about the substitution rate between natural and manufactured capital. In addition to these two established types of capital, this paper introduces the idea of ‘behavioral capital’. We define behavioral capital as the latent potential of behavioral change to affect improvement in environmental quality. Our contribution argues that technological and traditional regulatory innovations serve as insufficient tools for addressing modern environmental issues and ensuring sustainable development. Without discarding these solutions, we contend that because human behavior is a significant contributor to environmental problems, it should be regarded as a key component of continued solutions. We suggest that the dual interest theory can serve as an integrative framework for behavioral innovations related to environmental issues. In suggesting this, we assume that behavioral innovations can both overcome some of the limitations of technological innovations and offer new solutions. Our main insight is to suggest that some depletion of natural capital – but not all – can be offset by behavioral changes without decreasing, or even increasing, subjective well-being.
Published: 2013

11. Using Money to Motivate Both ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’: a Field Experiment on Motivational Crowding-Out

Author: Gilles Grolleau, Charles Figuieres, and Antoine Beretti
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, 05 social sciences, Control (management), Crowding out, Test (assessment), Microeconomics, Incentive, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Order (exchange), 0502 economics and business, Respondent, Premise, Economics, 050207 economics, Social psychology, 050205 econometrics
Abstract: Summary Economists recognize that monetary incentives can backfire through the crowding-out of moral and social motivations leading to an overall decrease of the desired behaviour. Under the premise that agents are heterogeneous and have various intrinsic motivations we suggest precise strategies to reduce counterproductive motivational crowding-out. In order to test our suggestions, we implement a field experiment where participants are asked to fill a questionnaire on pro-environmental behaviours under different incentive schemes, either with no monetary incentive (control) or with low or high monetary incentive directed either to the respondents (design A) or to an environmental cause (design B), or with a choice offered between A and B (design C). We investigate (i) whether there is a significant crowding-out effect, (ii) which design performs better to promote participation. Except for a high monetary incentive where the respondent chooses himself the end-recipient, we show that monetary rewards directed either at the individual or at the cause actually harms intrinsic motivations, but not to the same extent.
Published: 2013

12. Sustainable Development: Between Moral Injunctions and Natural Constraints

Author: Gilles Rotillon, Charles Figuieres, Hervé Guyomard, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Laboratoire de Microbioologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Bourgogne (UB)-Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Biologie Appliquée à la Nutrition et à l'Alimentation de Dijon (ENSBANA), EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire de Microbiologie, and Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Biologie Appliquée à la Nutrition et à l'Alimentation de Dijon (ENSBANA)-Université de Bourgogne (UB)
Subjects: INDICATORS, lcsh:TJ807-830, Geography, Planning and Development, Social sustainability, lcsh:Renewable energy sources, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 12. Responsible consumption, ressource naturelle, jel:Q, 11. Sustainability, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, natural resources, development, lcsh:Environmental sciences, 050205 econometrics, lcsh:GE1-350, Sustainable development, Equity (economics), DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, WEAK AND STRONG SUSTAINABILITY, INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, NATURAL RESOURCES, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment, lcsh:Environmental effects of industries and plants, 05 social sciences, jel:Q0, sustainable development, weak and strong sustainability, intergenerational equity, indicators, jel:Q2, Environmental economics, jel:Q3, sustainability, Natural resource, jel:Q5, lcsh:TD194-195, jel:O13, 13. Climate action, Weak and strong sustainability, développement durable, Intergenerational equity, Sustainability, General & Multiple Resources, jel:Q56, indicateur, équite intergénérationnelle
Abstract: International audience; Sustainable development must satisfy the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. Although it looks at the economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainability, this article focuses specifically on an analysis of the concept in conjunction with the use and protection of natural resources. It shows how taking account of environmental goods, including the finite nature of certain natural resources, can change the way economists deal with the issues of growth, development and equity between generations. In this context, after a brief historical perspective on the concept of development, the paper shows how the potential for substitutability between natural and manufactured capital, for example in production technologies, lead to two paradigms, that of weak sustainability and that of strong sustainability. These two approaches are presented in an effort to explain how their merits can be mutually reinforcing.
Published: 2010

13. Les aides fédérales peuvent-elle pallier les effets de la compétition sociale ?

Author: Jean Hindriks, Jacques H. Dreze, Charles Figuieres, Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: Economic integration, Economics and Econometrics, Geography, Planning and Development, fiscal federalism, adjustment process, matching grants, social competition, fiscalité, Economies et finances, Competition model, Willingness to pay, Complete information, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, Public economics, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, 05 social sciences, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Economies and finances, Turnover, Optimal allocation
Abstract: The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the federal authority progressively raises the matching grants to the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase efficiency of both production and redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient allocation of factors are achieved. We then describe an adjustment process for the matching rates that will lead districts to the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain. (JEL Classification: H23, H70) Copyright , Oxford University Press.
Published: 2008

14. Une brève analyse économique orthodoxe du concept de développement durable

Author: Hervé Guyomard, Charles Figuieres, and Gilles Rotillon
Subjects: 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, 0211 other engineering and technologies, 021107 urban & regional planning, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, 02 engineering and technology
Abstract: Le developpement durable doit permettre la satisfaction des besoins des generations presentes sans compromettre la capacite des generations futures a satisfaire les leurs. Les auteurs s’interessent a l’analyse de ce concept en liaison avec l’utilisation des ressources naturelles epuisables. Ils montrent comment les limites de la nature appellent la technologie a jouer un role clef, a travers les possibilites de substitution entre capital naturel et capital fabrique.
Published: 2007

15. The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

Author: Charles Figuieres, Marc Willinger, Agathe Rouaix, Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université de Montpellier (UM), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, Endowment, media_common.quotation_subject, [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio], 1. No poverty, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), Public good, Turnover, 8. Economic growth, Economics, 10. No inequality, Welfare, Lump sum, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), media_common, Public finance, Social policy
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good in which we implement a redistribution of the group endowment among group members in a lump sum manner. We study the impact of redistribution on group contribution, on individuals’ contribu- tions according to their endowment and on welfare. Our experimental results show that welfare increases when equality is broken, as predicted by theory (Itaya, De Meza & Myles, 1997), because the larger contribution of the rich subjects overcompensates the lower contribution of the poor subjects. Last but not least, agents’ behavior in situations of inequality of income, depends on initial conditions. In particular, the decisions of those who become poor seem to express a form of protest against the new distribution of incomes compared to those who started out as poor: from a behavioral point of view, being poor is therefore not equivalent to becoming poor.
Published: 2015

16. Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?

Author: Charles Figuieres, Marc Willinger, Estelle Midler, Basque Center for Climate Change, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Inequality, media_common.quotation_subject, 02 engineering and technology, Compensation (engineering), [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, 0502 economics and business, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Economics, Production (economics), compensation mechanism, 050207 economics, Adaptation (computer science), media_common, experiment, 05 social sciences, externalities, [SDE.ES]Environmental Sciences/Environmental and Society, Nash equilibrium, Key (cryptography), symbols, 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Externality, Mechanism (sociology)
Abstract: In this paper we test the effectiveness of a compensation mechanism when a negative externality is produced. It allows agents suffering from the negative externality to compensate those who reduce its production. Transfers are implemented via a two-stage design which is 10 an adaptation of Varian’s mechanism. It has been previously tested in the lab with different types of games, and its effectiveness turns out to depend on the experiment, for unclear reasons which we try to decipher in this paper. Three possible explanations, choice overload, mere coordination and inequality, are proposed and studied. We show that, other things equal, the larger the size of the strategy space, the lower the mechanism’s efficiency (choice overload ef15 fect). Perhaps surprisingly, the data show that the appearance of additional equilibria does not jeopardize effectiveness (no mere coordination effect). Finally, inequality of outcomes plays a key role (fairness effect).
Published: 2015

17. Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Author: Gareth D. Myles, Jean Hindriks, and Charles Figuieres
Subjects: Economic integration, Economics and Econometrics, Public economics, Revenue sharing, 05 social sciences, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Outcome (game theory), Microeconomics, Competition (economics), symbols.namesake, Intervention (law), Nash equilibrium, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Economics, symbols, Federalism, 050207 economics, Finance, 050205 econometrics, Public finance
Abstract: Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.
Published: 2004

18. COMPLEMENTARITY, SUBSTITUTABILITY AND STRATEGIC ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL

Author: Charles Figuieres
Subjects: General Computer Science, Differential (mechanical device), Investment (macroeconomics), Microeconomics, symbols.namesake, Capital accumulation, Nash equilibrium, Complementarity (molecular biology), Capital (economics), Economics, symbols, Initial value problem, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Business and International Management, Mathematical economics
Abstract: The preemptive role of capital is analyzed in a class of differential games of capital accumulation with reversible investment for two symmetric players. Two dynamic concepts of interaction are defined: feedback substitutability and feedback complementarity. These concepts are useful for exploring the dynamic properties of the stocks. In particular it is proved that if the equilibrium of the game is characterized by feedback substitutability, the firm with the higher initial condition overshoots his long-run level of capital.
Published: 2002

19. Matching grants and Ricardian equivalence

Author: Charles Figuieres and Jean Hindriks
Subjects: Ricardian equivalence, Economics and Econometrics, Matching (statistics), Optimal matching, jel:H70, Fiscal Federalism, Ricardian Equivalence, Matching Grants, Redistribution (cultural anthropology), jel:H23, Federal budget, Urban Studies, Microeconomics, Economics, Fiscal federalism, Arbitrage, Externality
Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of matching grants to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of Bernheim general neutrality result. Indeed this result suggests that the usual argument that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising from the existence of interjuridictional spillovers is an artifact of the assumption that jurisdictions neglect the impact that their decisions have on the federal budget. Relaxing this assumption and using a classical model where the arbitrage resulting from labor mobility implies that redistribution has the properties of a public good, we find that matching grants are relevant although somewhat less ective. We also find that optimal matching rates are independent of the number of jurisdictions and their strategic variables contrarily to the case where jurisdictions ignore the impact of their decisions on the federal budget.
Published: 2002

20. Conservation Priorities when Species Interact: the Noah's Ark Metaphor Revisited

Author: Charles Figuieres, Chloé Mulier, Pierre Courtois, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), and Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)
Subjects: Conservation genetics, In situ conservation, Economics, Biodiversité et Ecologie, lcsh:Medicine, Social Sciences, sciences économiques, biodiversité, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, conservation priorities, lcsh:Science, Budget constraint, Conservation Science, media_common, biodiversity, Multidisciplinary, Ecology, Environmental resource management, Weitzman ranking criterion, jel:Q5, Mathematical Economics, Physical Sciences, conservation des ressources, protection de l'environnement, biodiversite, theorie economique, ecological interactions, choix d'espèce, Biodiversite, Theorie economique, Environmental Economics, Conservation biology, Research Article, Conservation of Natural Resources, Metaphor, media_common.quotation_subject, Biology, Theoretical ecology, choix sélectif, Biodiversity and Ecology, Conservation priorities, Ecological interactions, Biodiversity, Weitzman's ranking criterion, Species Specificity, Ecological Economics, Conservation des ressources, Protection de l'environnement, conservation des espèces, jel:C6, Ecosystem, modèle économique, business.industry, lcsh:R, Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Biology and Life Sciences, Models, Theoretical, 15. Life on land, Ranking, lcsh:Q, [SDE.BE]Environmental Sciences/Biodiversity and Ecology, business, Environmental Protection, Mathematics, Diversity (business)
Abstract: Cette note intègre les interactions écologiques dans le problème Arche de Noé [ML Weitzman, The Noah's Arch problem, Econometrica 66 (6) (1998) 1279-1298]. Ce faisant, nous arrivons à un modèle général pour étudier le classement des projets de conservation in situ pour des espèces en interactions, et nous offrons une méthode coût-efficacité opérationnelle afin de mieux préserver la diversité sous une contrainte de budget., This note incorporates ecological interactions into the Noahs Arch problem [M.L. Weitzman, The Noahs Arch problem, Econometrica 66(6) (1998) 1279-1298]. In doing so, we arrive at a general model for rank- ing in situ conservation projects accounting for species interrelations and provide an operational cost-e¤ectiveness method for the selection of best preserving diversity projects under a limited budget constraint.
Published: 2014

21. Non comparabilité et incommensurabilité : réflexions sur l’évaluation de la nature

Author: Charles Figuieres, Jean-Michel Salles, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Chenorkian, Robert, Robert, Samuel, and Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)
Subjects: Ecosystème, [SHS.ENVIR]Humanities and Social Sciences/Environmental studies, Biodiversite, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q50 - General, Valeur, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Abstract: L'objectif de cette note est de présenter et d’articuler quelques analyses pionnières sur cette question d’incommensurabilité – menées en économie ou dans d’autres disciplines - et ce faisant de proposer un éclairage sur la pertinence (et les limites) de la pratique qui consiste à mettre des prix sur l’environnement. En quoi les contraintes sur la nature remettent-elles en cause la façon traditionnelle de penser la rationalité des choix et l’évaluation ? Et, pour ces situations de tension, sans doute appelées à devenir plus fréquentes, quelles perspectives de recherche est-il souhaitable d’envisager ?La section 1 rappelle d’abord brièvement les fondements conceptuels de l’évaluation économique. Dans ce cadre, la section 2 s’efforce de préciser le sens de l’objection d’incommensurabilité. La section 3 explique en quoi la monétarisation de la nature est moins neutre que certains voudraient le croire. La section 4 résume quelques résultats empiriques récents en sciences du comportement sur la façon dont les individus réagissent face à des choix qui touchent au sacré. La section 5 conclut.
Published: 2014

22. [Untitled]

Author: Philippe Michel, P. Garderes, Charles Figuieres, and F. Rychen
Subjects: symbols.namesake, Capital accumulation, Rate of convergence, Nash equilibrium, Theory of computation, Differential game, Econometrics, symbols, Economics, General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Mathematical economics, Stock (geology)
Abstract: In a two‐player capital accumulation differential game with reversible investment, wepropose a simplifying method to calculate the open‐loop Nash equilibrium and the centralizedsolution. Then we relate the two outcomes through their dynamic properties, namelythe pattern and the rate of convergence. It is demonstrated that the two outcomes share theproperty that a stock will have a non‐monotonic trajectory as a medium-run consequence ofthe differences in the initial conditions and of the heterogeneity of the agents. On the otherhand, the solutions differ in the speed of convergence of the aggregated variables, which isgreater under the centralized behavior.
Published: 1999

23. La baisse de la motivation conduit à la diminution des contributions volontaires

Author: Marc Willinger, Charles Figuieres, David Masclet, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (M.E.N.E.S.R.), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)
Subjects: Persistence (psychology), conditional cooperation, voluntary contributions, 05 social sciences, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, Internalism and externalism, Public good, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments, Ideal (ethics), experiments on public goods games, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, contribution, moral motivation, Turnover, 0502 economics and business, Public Good, game thoery, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making, 050207 economics, Positive economics, Psychology, 050205 econometrics
Abstract: This paper provides a general framework that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. Each player balances her material utility loss from contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her moral ideal. The novel and central idea of our model is that peoples moral motivation is "weak": their judgement about what is the right contribution to a public good can evolve in the course of interactions, depending partly on observed past contributions and partly on an intrinsic "moral ideal". Under the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents, average voluntary contributions can decline with repetition of the game. Our model also explains other regularities observed in experiments, in particular the phenomenon of over-contributions compared to the Nash prediction and the so-called restart effect, and it is compatible with the conditional cooperation hypothesis.
Published: 2013

24. Public infrastructure, non-cooperative investments and endogenous growth

Author: Fabien Prieur, Mabel Tidball, Charles Figuieres, EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Public infrastructure, Endogenous growth theory, Welfare economics, 05 social sciences, jel:C73, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 0502 economics and business, [No keyword available], Economics, 050207 economics, 050205 econometrics, jel:D9
Abstract: This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model with endogenous growth where governments behave strategically in the provision of productive infrastructure. The public capitals enter both national and foreign production as an external input, and they are nanced by a at tax on income. In the private sector, fi rms and households take the public policy as given when making their decisions. For arbitrary constant tax rates, the dynamic analysis reveals two important features. Firstly, under constant returns, the two countries growth rates differ during the transition but are identical on the balanced growth path. Secondly, due to the infrastructure externality, assuming away constant returns to scale a country with decreasing returns can experience sustained growth provided that the other grows at a positive constant rate. Then we endogeneize tax rates. It is shown that both a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) and a Centralized Solution (CS) exist, even when the parameters allow for endogenous growth, therefore explosive paths for the state variables. Nash growth rates are compared with the centralized rates. We show that cooperation in infrastructure provision does not necessarily lead to higher growth for each country. We also show that, in some con gurations of households' preferences and initial conditions, cooperation would call for a slowdown in the initial stages of development, whereas strategic investments would not. Lastly, depending also on the con guration of preferences, we show that cooperation can increase or decrease the gap between countries' growth rates.
Published: 2013

25. Social Exclusion and European Policy: Globalization and Welfare Social Indicators: The EU and Social Inclusion

Author: Charles Figuieres
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, media_common.quotation_subject, Social sustainability, Social mobility, Globalization, European policy, Political science, Development economics, Social position, Social exclusion, Social indicators, Economic system, Welfare, media_common
Published: 2003

26. Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments

Author: Denis Claude, Charles Figuieres, Mabel Tidball, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion ( LEG ), Université de Bourgogne ( UB ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée ( LAMETA ), Université Montpellier 1 ( UM1 ) -Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 ( UM3 ) -Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques ( Montpellier SupAgro ) -Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] ( INRA Montpellier ) -Université de Montpellier ( UM ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier ( Montpellier SupAgro ), Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion (LEG), Université de Bourgogne (UB)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and PRZEDWOJ, VALERIE
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Public infrastructure, Sociology and Political Science, 0211 other engineering and technologies, 02 engineering and technology, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, Competition (economics), Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, [ SHS ] Humanities and Social Sciences, Economics, [ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances, 050207 economics, Investments, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Short run, Endowments, 05 social sciences, 021107 urban & regional planning, Subsidy, Investment (macroeconomics), [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Global public good, Complementarity (molecular biology), Capital (economics), [SHS] Humanities and Social Sciences, Finance
Abstract: This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogeneity that disappears in the long run. Therefore, at the steady state, usual intuitions from static settings apply: identical jurisdictions inefficiently underinvest, calling for public subsidies. In the short run, however, counterintuitive properties are established: (i) the evolution of capital stocks can be nonmonotonic and (ii) one jurisdiction can be temporarily taxed, even though it should increase its investment, whereas the other is subsidized. It is shown how these phenomena are related to initial conditions and the kind of interactions between infrastructure capitals, complementarity or substitutability.
Published: 2012

27. Vanishing leadership and declining reciprocity in a sequential contribution experiment

Author: Marc Willinger, David Masclet, Charles Figuieres, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre de recherche en économie et management (CREM), Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO), Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal (UQAM), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Université de Caen Normandie (UNICAEN), and Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)
Subjects: JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, Economics and Econometrics, Sequence, 050208 finance, 05 social sciences, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods, Average level, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, General Business, Management and Accounting, Sequential treatment, sequential contribution experiment, 0502 economics and business, Statistics, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, Economics, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, Operations management, 050207 economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Reciprocity (cultural anthropology)
Abstract: International audience; We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round (“sequential treatment with information”) to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds, but cannot observe earlier contributions (“sequential treatment without information”). We also investigate whether average contributions are affected by the length of the sequence by varying group size. Our results show that sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions, but that the level of contributions increases when subjects are informed about the contributions of lower-ranked subjects. We provide evidence that the so-called “leadership effect” vanishes within rounds, and that group size has no significant impact on the average level of contributions in our sequential contribution games.
Published: 2012

28. Exploitation durable d'une ressource naturelle: utilisation satisfaisante du critère de Chichilnisky

Author: Mabel Tidball, Charles Figuieres, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Discounting, Existential quantification, 05 social sciences, Context (language use), 16. Peace & justice, NATURAL RESOURCES, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, SUSTAINABILITY, Golden Rule (fiscal policy), restrict, CHICHILNISKY’S CRITERION, 0502 economics and business, Path (graph theory), Intergenerational equity, Economics, INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY, 050206 economic theory, Mathematical economics, 050205 econometrics, Drawback
Abstract: International audience; Chichilnisky’s criterion for sustainability has the merit to be, so far, the unique explicit, complete and continuous social welfare criterion that combines successfully the requirement of efficiency with an instrumental notion of intergenerational equity (no dictatorship of the present and no dictatorship of the future). But it has one drawback: when applied in the context of renewable resources, and with a constant discount factor, there exists no exploitation path that maximizes this criterion. The present article suggests a way to cope with this problem. The idea is to restrict attention to the set of convex combinations between the optimal discounted utilitarian program and the stationary program leading to the green golden rule. It is shown that an optimal path in this set exists under rather weak sufficient conditions on the fundamentals of the problem. Some ethical properties of this approach are also discussed. In some cases, it turns out that the restricted solution implies no loss of efficiency and benefits intermediate and infinitely distant generations.
Published: 2012

29. The REDD scheme to curb deforestation: a well-designed system of incentives?

Author: Charles Figuieres, Sophie Thoyer, Estelle Midler, Solenn Leplay, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Oréade-Brèche - Environnement et développement, Basque Center for Climate Change, Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)
Subjects: Natural resource economics, REDD, media_common.quotation_subject, [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio], climate change, Climate change, Developing country, Convention, Deforestation, 0502 economics and business, Economics, environmental agreement, 050207 economics, global change, media_common, Tropical deforestation, 040101 forestry, changement climatique, marchandage, accord environnemental, business.industry, déforestation, 05 social sciences, Environmental resource management, 1. No poverty, bargaining, 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences, 15. Life on land, Payment, Negotiation, Incentive, 13. Climate action, 0401 agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, business
Abstract: Bioprospection is, largely, meant to help reducing deforestation and, the other way around, stopping deforestation enhances the prospects of bioprospection. The need for a global agreement to the problem of tropical deforestation has led to the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) scheme, which proposes that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through avoided deforestation and degradation. The remaining issue at stake is to definer the rules defning payments to countries reducing their deforestation rate. This article develops a game-theoretic bargaining model, simulating the on-going negotiation process which is currently taking place within the Convention of Climate Change, after the Copenhagen agreement of December 2009. It shows that the conditions under which developing countries are left to bargain over the allocation of the global forest fund may lead to an ineffective system of incentives. Below a given level of contributions from the North, the mechanism fails to curb the deforestation. Beyond this level, it induces perverse effects: the larger the North's contribution, the larger the deforestation rate. Consequently, the mechanism is most effective only at a specifc threshold level which, given the unobservability of countries'preferences, can only be found by a repeated "trial and error" implementation process.
Published: 2012

30. Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games

Author: Charles Figuieres, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: EFFICIENCY, DUOPOLY, OPEN-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIUM, General Decision Sciences, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT, MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, PUBLIC-GOODS, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, MARKOV INTERACTIONS, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), 0502 economics and business, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Economics, 050207 economics, Applied Psychology, 050205 econometrics, PROVISION, 05 social sciences, DYNAMIC GAMES, General Social Sciences, CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS, Computer Science Applications, OLIGOPOLY, MODEL, ADJUSTMENT COSTS, PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM, COMMITMENT, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Mathematical economics, Humanities
Abstract: International audience; This paper contributes to the understanding of economic strategic behaviors in inter-temporal settings. Comparing the MPE and the OLNE of a widely used class of differential games it is shown: (i) what qualifications on behaviors a markov (dynamic) information structure brings about compared with an open-loop (static) information structure, (ii) what is the reason leading to intensified or reduced competition between the agents in the long run. It depends on whether agents’ interactions are characterized by markov substitutability or markov complementarity, which can be seen as dynamic translations of the ideas of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity (Bulow et al. 1985, Journal of Political Economy 93:488–511). In addition, an important practical contribution of the paper for modelers is to show that these results can be directly deduced from the payoff structure, with no need to compute equilibria first.
Published: 2009

31. Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment

Author: Marisa Ratto, Juergen Bracht, Charles Figuieres, University of Aberdeen, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Policy Studies Institute, Partenaires INRAE, and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, public goods, Average level, Compensation (engineering), Economies et finances, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, bien public, 050207 economics, PUBLIC GOODS, VOLONTARY PROVISION, INCENTIVE MECHANISMS, économie publique, bien publicexpérimentation, 050205 econometrics, Simple (philosophy), 05 social sciences, Subsidy, Public good, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, économie publique, Economies and finances, Incentive, incentive mechanisms, volontary provision, expérimentation, Finance, Mechanism (sociology)
Abstract: International audience; We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mecha- nism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents. contributions (compen- sation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.
Published: 2008

32. Vountary matching grants can forestall social dumping

Author: Jacques H. DREZE, Charles FIGUIERES, and Jean, HINDRIKS
Subjects: jel:H70, Fiscal federalism, Adjustment process, Matching grants, jel:H23
Abstract: The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of redistribution in the presence of factor mobility. We use a fiscal competition model a la Wildasin (1991) in which states differ in their technologies and preferences for redistribution. We first investigate a simple process in which the regulatory authority progressively raises the matchning grants sto the district choosing the lowest transfer and all districts respond optimally to the resulting change in transfers all around. This process is shown to increase total production and the level of redistribution. However, it does not guarantee that all districts gain, nor that an efficient level of redistribution is attained. Assuming complete information among districts, we first derive the willingness of each district to match the contribution of other districts and we show that the aggregate willingness to pay for matching rates converges to zero when both the efficient level of redistribution and the efficient outcome and guarantee that everyone will gain.
Published: 2006

33. Un tour d’horizon des critères d’évaluation de la diversité biologique

Author: Katrin Erdlenbruch, Stéphanie Aulong, and Charles Figuieres
Subjects: politiques de conservation, mesures de biodiversité, biodiversity measures, conservation policies
Abstract: Cet article passe en revue différentes méthodes pour mesurer la biodiversité et propose d’expliciter leurs fondements axiomatiques. Il offre ensuite un aperçu des concepts développés pour sa protection et il s’achève sur une discussion de quelques spécificités du problème, comme la prise en compte de certains attributs spatiaux et d’effets de seuils. This paper provides a review of different methods for measuring biodiversity, with an effort in making explicit their axiomatic foundations. Then, it broaches some concepts of biodiversity protection, and finally it discusses several specificities in this issue, such as the role played by spatial attributes and by threshold effects.
Published: 2006

34. Conjectures as Reduced Forms for Dynamic Interactions

Author: Mabel Tidball, Alain Jean-Marie, Nicolas Querou, and Charles Figuieres
Published: 2004

35. Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Settings

Author: Nicolas Querou, Charles Figuieres, Alain Jean-Marie, and Mabel Tidball
Published: 2004

36. Dynamic Conjectures, Incomplete Information and Learning

Author: Alain Jean-Marie, Charles Figuieres, Mabel Tidball, and Nicolas Querou
Subjects: Theoretical computer science, Complete information, Mathematics
Published: 2004

37. Théorie des variations conjecturelles

Author: Charles Figuieres, Alain Jean-Marie, Nicolas Querou, Mabel Tidball, University of Bristol [Bristol], Algorithmes et Performance des Réseaux (APR), Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier (LIRMM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UM3)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Inconnu
Subjects: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, 020209 energy, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, [INFO]Computer Science [cs], 02 engineering and technology, 050207 economics, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences
Abstract: Series on mathematical economics and game theory ; 2; International audience; We have witnessed in recent years a revival of Conjectural Variations in Game Theory. This reincarnation of an old idea, using a dynamic point of view, aims at combining the adequacy with facts to the requirements of a firmly grounded theory.This book presents, for the first time, a comprehensive account of conjectural variations equilibria in their static inceptions, featuring new comparative results of equilibria with regard to efficiency. It then describes several advances in Dynamic Game Theory, allowing to understand Conjectural Variations Equilibria as dynamic equilibria. The question of how conjectures evolve in strategic and learning situations with boundedly rational agents is also discussed.; Ces dernières années ont vu resurgir le concept de variations conjecturelles en théorie des jeux. Cette réincarnation d'une vieille idée adopte un point de vue résolument dynamique, avec pour ambition de combiner l'adéquation aux faits économiques observés et les exigences d'une théorie aux fondations solides. L'ouvrage présente, pour la première fois, un compte rendu synthétique des équilibres en variations conjecturelles dans les jeux statiques où ils ont vu le jour, et apporte de nouveaux résultats de statique comparative par rapport à l'équilibre de Nash, en terme d'efficacité. Ensuite il décrit différentes avancées en théorie des jeux dynamiques, qui permettent de comprendre les équilibres en variations conjecturelles comme des équilibres de Nash dynamiques. On y trouve également une discussion de la façon dont des agents à rationalité limitée apprennent les comportement rivaux pour faire évoluer leurs conjectures au cours du temps.
Published: 2004

38. Infrastructures publiques et politiques de développement décentralisées

Author: Charles Figuieres, Frédéric Rychen, and P. Garderes
Subjects: Environmental Engineering, Political science, Humanities
Abstract: Cet article apporte une contribution théorique au débat sur le sous-investissement en capitaux publics. Il utilise pour cela un jeu différentiel d’accumulation de capitaux entre deux collectivités. Dans ce jeu l’équilibre de Nash en boucle ouverte et la solution centralisée du jeu convergent à long terme vers un régime stationnaire. Dans le long terme nous étudions la nature de l’inefficacité de l’équilibre de Nash en prenant comme référence la solution centralisée utilitariste. Lorsque les stocks d’infrastructures sont des compléments stratégiques, les collectivités surinvestissent (sous-investissent) en présence d’externalités négatives (positives). Lorsque les stocks d’infrastructures sont des substituts stratégiques, les mêmes résultats restent vrais si les collectivités sont similaires. En revanche, nous montrons dans un exemple que lorsque les collectivités ont des structures de coûts assez différentes, la collectivité qui a le coût le plus faible sous-investit tandis que la collectivité qui a le coût le plus fort surinvestit. Nous discutons ensuite brièvement les implications de ces résultats en termes de politiques économiques., This article provides a theoretical contribution on the issue of under-investment of public capitals. In a differential game of accumulation of capital between two jurisdictions, the open loop Nash equilibrium and the centralized solution converge towards their respective steady states. In the long run we characterize the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium using as a benchmark case the utilitarian centralized outcome. When the stocks of infrastructures are strategic complements, the jurisdictions under-invest (over-invest) in situations with negative (positive) externalities. When the stocks are strategic substitutes the same results hold for similar jurisdictions. On the contrary when the cost structures of the jurisdictions are different enough, it is shown within an example that the low-cost jurisdiction under-invests whereas the high-cost jurisdiction over-invests. We then broach briefly the economic policy implications of these results.

39. Services ecosystémique dans un état équilibre général

Author: Nicola Gallai, Charles Figuieres, Jean-Michel Salles, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (AERE). USA., and European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE). INT.
Subjects: pollinisateur, évaluation, pollinisation, modèle d'équilibre général, écosystème, services écosystémiques, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences
Abstract: International audience; Insect pollination is widely used for agricultural production and contributes significantly to the global value of crops. In this study, the impact of insect pollinators on the social welfare is assessed within a general equilibrium. What would be the general consequences of a production loss due to pollinators decline? How are changes in profits distributed between producers of pollinated goods and other producers? These questions are studied within two alternative distribution of property rights over the firms: the case when agents possess and equal share of the firms (egalitarian ownership structure) and the case where each agent possesses one firm (polarized ownership structure). For each case, we consider the case when agent and firms are homogeneous, and the case when firms are heterogeneous. Under the egalitarian ownership structure, a pollinator decline will result in the decrease of the utility of both agents. When the distribution of the property right is polarized, the utility of the owner of the firm that produces the good which is not pollinator-dependent, will increase. Under specified condition, the social welfare might increase, especially if the production function of the firm of the non dependant sector is more efficient than the other.

40. Analyses économiques de la biodiversité : évaluation des enjeux et modélisation des politiques

Author: Charles Figuieres, Robert Lifran, Jean-Michel Salles, Sophie Thoyer, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), and Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)
Subjects: [SHS.SOCIO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Sociology, RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE
Abstract: National audience; Faut-il s’inquiéter de l’érosion de la biodiversité ? Que peut-on y faire ? Un ensemble de travaux menés au sein de l’UMR LAMETA présentent la biodiversité comme une notion singulièrement complexe, dont la valeur ne se révèle correctement sur aucun marché. Les estimations partielles qu’on peut en faire par d’autres moyens montrent néanmoins son importance, mais sa protection n’est pas chose aisée. Parce que la biodiversité concerne largement des domaines privés, et aussi des Etats souverains pour lesquels la protection de la nature n’est pas (encore) une priorité, les approches règlementaires sont d’un secours limité. Il faut s’efforcer de mieux comprendre les forces sociales qui compromettent la biodiversité, et utiliser ces mêmes forces pour la préserver.

41. [Sur les effets de conjectures dans un modèle d'interaction stratégique]

Author: Charles Figuieres, Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Tidball, Inconnu, Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro), and UCL - CORE - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
Subjects: Economics and Econometrics, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, Conjectural Variations, jel:D62, jel:E61, media_common.quotation_subject, [SDV]Life Sciences [q-bio], jel:H41, jel:D43, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, symbols.namesake, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Function (engineering), Set (psychology), Nash Equilibria, 050205 econometrics, media_common, 05 social sciences, Rank (computer programming), jel:C72, Pareto principle, Conjectural variation, Action (philosophy), Nash equilibrium, symbols, Consistency, conjectural variations, Nash equilibria, consistency, Mathematical economics, Sign (mathematics)
Abstract: This paper deals with the effect of conjectures in a strategic setting. To do this it focuses on the so-called Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE).According to this concept, each agent chooses his most favorable action taking into account that rival strategies are a conjectured function of his own strategy. In the existing literature, a central role is played by the comparison between the CVE and the NASH Equilibrium (NE). The purpose of such a comparison is to appraise the impact of non zero conjectures on agents'behaviors.The existing results suggest that it is not possible to know, in advance, the consequences of non zero conjectures on behaviors. Our aim is: i) to identify situations where it is indeed possible, a priori, to know which kind of non cooperative concept Pareto dominates the other, ii) to provide out the corresponding theoretical explanations. The economic situations can be divided into two families, depending on whether they admit a stable Nash equilibrium and an interior Pareto situation (family 1) or not (family 2). Within each family it is shown that the sign of the externalities (positives or negative effect of the rival actions on a player's payoffs) together with the properties of conjectures (their sign and their absolute value): i) indicates how to rank the action levels associated with the NE and the CVE, ii) allows one to predict which kind of behavior leads the players to the most favorable outcome. It turns out that the qualitative results prevailing for family 1 are reversed for the family 2. This classification is useful in that outcomes and payoffs need not be calculated to assess the impact of conjectures on players'payoffs; the only relevant pieces of information are the sign of second order derivatives of the payoff function and the properties of conjectures, i.e. the description of the game. We then study in which kind of game reasonable conjectures, i.e. consistent conjectures, belongs to the set of conjectures that produces superior outcoumes.

Catalog

Books, media, physical & digital resources

See catalog results

Searchworks

Select search scope, currently: Articles Catalog books, media & more in Jio Institute collections Articles journal articles & other e-resources

Search

Search Constraints

Refine your results

Search Limiters

Topic

Publication Year Range

Language

Category

Publication Type

Journal

Database

Publisher

41 results on '"Charles Figuieres"'

Search Results

Catalog

Select search scope, currently: Articles

Catalog

books, media & more in Jio Institute collections

Articles

journal articles & other e-resources