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I argue that two theses, which get conflated tacitly but frequently in both the philosophical and the scientific literature on perception, must be distinguished. The first is that there are optimal viewpoints, viewpoints from which an object's shape is more readily discernable than from others. The second is that there are privileged viewpoints, viewpoints that alone secure the veridicality of perception. I claim that phenomenology establishes the ubiquitousness of optimal viewpoints, but that the notion of privileged viewpoints is indefensible. It emerges when the empirical investigation of the mechanism of perception, and specifically of the role of retinal images, becomes the basis for the phenomenology of perception. Both the notion of a privileged viewpoint and the models it serves, such as the two-step model, are, I argue, untenable. To emphasize: the claims are phenomenological, not empirical, and so cannot be confirmed or refuted by empirical evidence. Optimal viewpoints are further explored by critically examining Husserl's notion of a "sum of optima" and assessing it in the context of his claim that normal viewpoints are optimal. The paper ends with some thoughts on what the relationship between the science and the phenomenology of vision ought to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Merleau-Ponty's «Phenomenology of Perception» suggests perception to be the primary level of the giveness of the world. Perception appears as always an incomplete synthesis of the plural, bringing together bodily and material aspects. Such the simplest interpretation of perception as rendering a contact within the dyad «body-world» is a preliminary axiom for explaining the rest of the process of noematic sense formation. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical intuitions clearly presuppose more, and perception is also thought of as the final point where sense is already given by some way. Thus, in Phenomenology, the second interpretation of perception presumes it to be sense-giving accompanied by the tacit cogito. Merleau-Ponty suggests that these interpretations are compatible with each other, but the transition between them seems really problematic. In the research author shos that the limit of the initial synthesis of perception - some sense of the perceived (exemplyfing meanings as «this horse», «the green density that rushed towards me») - is unattainable from within perception itself and by its means. Perception is itself mediated by other faculties, such as memory, reflection, and imagination. Argumentation for this thesis is carried out in several ways; the relations in the perception/imagination pair show us the most characteristic case, where Merleau-Ponty, judging by later works, himself comes close to recognizing the limitations of the hypothesis of «the world of perception», to the need for a phenomenological development of the topic of faculties. Based on the application of the phenomenological method and the analysis of the conceptual constructions of Merleau-Ponty, we can conclude the following: «the world of perception» does not exist, but the phenomenology of faculties is demanded.

I argue that two theses, which get conflated tacitly but frequently in both the philosophical and the scientific literature on perception, must be distinguished. The first is that there are optimal viewpoints, viewpoints from which an object’s shape is more readily discernable than from others. The second is that there are privileged viewpoints, viewpoints that alone secure the veridicality of perception. I claim that phenomenology establishes the ubiquitousness of optimal viewpoints, but that the notion of privileged viewpoints is indefensible. It emerges when the empirical investigation of the mechanism of perception, and specifically of the role of retinal images, becomes the basis for the phenomenology of perception. Both the notion of a privileged viewpoint and the models it serves, such as the two-step model, are, I argue, untenable. To emphasize: the claims are phenomenological, not empirical, and so cannot be confirmed or refuted by empirical evidence. Optimal viewpoints are further explored by critically examining Husserl’s notion of a “sum of optima” and assessing it in the context of his claim that normal viewpoints are optimal. The paper ends with some thoughts on what the relationship between the science and the phenomenology of vision ought to be.

Video technology enabled professionals and patients to conduct consultations during the COVID‐19 pandemic when in‐person health care was minimised to reduce the spread of the virus. We present findings of a study of video‐consulting through in‐depth qualitative remote interviews with 40 health professionals, managers, support staff and 10 patients in health‐care services across the UK from 2020 to 2021. Drawing on Foucault's concept of the clinical gaze, Merleau‐Ponty's work on the phenomenology of perception and Ihde's postphenomenology we interpreted the ways in which remote consultations shaped patient–professional interactions, mediating and framing what was seen, revealed and known. We found that participating in video consultations not only involved creative adaption and adjustment to a virtual clinic but also changed how professionals and patients saw and were seen. We argue that this mode of consulting can transform boundaries and perceptions, alter aspects of clinical presence, knowledge and embodiment and thus both change and incorporate the clinical gaze. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an ontology and epistemology based on subjective perceptual experience, it is difficult to direct to the objective and rational design methodology, which is also the reason why the design methods of contemporary"perceptual phenomenology"architectural works are difficult to interpret. Combining the concepts of Merleau-Ponty's"perceptual phenomenology"and Steven Hall's"anchoring", this paper proposes that"perceptual anchoring"is the starting point of the phenomenological design method, and then points out that the design operation of physical experience is based on"touch-focus-body schema", and the design operation of spiritual experience is based on"extension-suggestion-narrative". Finally, the"perceptual anchoring"is transformed into the approach of architectural design works, in order to interpret the design technique based on"perceptual phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article deals with the comparative study of literary fiction and music in the short story Marsh al-Ghroub by Youssef Idris, based on comparative literature criticism studies and with a semiotics discourse approach. In this story, in addition to the musical title, a kind of folk music related to the profession, in the overall structure of its plot, advances the narrative sequence. In this discourse three types of active, tense and aesthetic presence are formed and the main core of the process of meaning is aesthetic presence. At this stage, the music becomes the essence of music. Therefore, the issue that arises is what the aesthetic presence is based on. How the dialogue between literature and music guarantees the transformation of the world? This research examines three types of presence in this story with a descriptive-analytical method, and at the same time, they refer to the role of title, place, and time. This study shows that the subject, passing through two relations of action and tension due to the phenomenological view, reaches one of presence and aesthetic moment, and its manifestation is shown in his improvisation and his ecstatic and transcendental relationship with existence. At this stage, due to the disturbance in the action and tension relationship, the literary narrative suffers a deficiency in its progress, from here, literature and music enter a dialogue, and the reflection of the voice of the narrative is entrusted to music. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The study of the semantics of singular terms, that is, such expressions of language that are used to designate a single concrete object, which, first of all, can be sensibly perceived and be a component of our practice in the physical sense, has been going on for several decades. But, according to the author, the essence of singular terms still needs to be clarified in many ways. Does analysis require the meaning of singular terms for tools outside the semantics? If so, what tools should be used? We would like to outline some considerations that may help in answering these questions.Methodology and sources. A considerable number of works by famous researchers of the language are devoted to the disclosure and description of possible approaches to the problems of using singular terms (see, for example, the works of B. Russell, M. Cresswell, Z. Vendler, D. Ninan, M. Schwager, etc.). This article attempts to expand the methodology with phenomenological analysis and description, what explain the citation of M. Merleau-Ponty, A. Schutz, E. Husserl, N.V. Motroshilova, and others.Results and discussion. On the one hand, we classify various linguistic units as singular terms, distinguished according to the specificity that their use has. On the other hand, endowing singular terms with a special status, we are forced to ask ourselves about the prerequisites for the «genesis» of such terms. The work demonstrated the necessity and effectiveness of the phenomenological method, which performs the propaedeutic and explanatory functions in relation to the semantic analysis of singular terms itself. The reason for this is the close connection between the natural language and the sensory world as a given, which, as the research has shown, cannot be ignored.Conclusion. The closedness of semantics in itself limits the possibilities of analyzing a natural language, in connection with which it seems to us quite clear the actual need to turn to phenomenology. We tried to illustrate the importance of considering the genetic aspects of the use of singular terms and the relationship of their pre-linguistic genesis with the uniqueness of the status of these linguistic units. Therefore, we have good reasons to turn to the phenomenological description of perception and to assert its conceptual connection with the semantics of singular terms.

Copyright of ZARCH: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Architecture & Urbanism is the property of Universidad de Zaragoza and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article offers a thorough and critical reading of Husserl’s Thing and Space. This reading is principally motivated by the effort to methodologically design a phenomenological–topological approach to the research of lived sonic environments. In this book, Husserl lays foundations of phenomenological topology by understanding perceptions as places and defining, consequently, the space as a system of places. The critical reading starts with pointing out the ambiguity of location in Thing and Space, which consists mainly in the insufficient implementation of the distinction between the location and the localization. Further investigations then reveal the roots of this ambiguity in both the preference of visual perception and the omission of subjective aspects of kinesthesia. The article critically examines Husserl’s notion of the appended localization that expresses the marginalization of (among others) acoustic experience. In conclusion, the article utilizes the critical findings to formulate the project of a place-based (phenomenological–topological), medium-centered, and multi-sensory approach to sonic environments.

Copyright of Comprendre: Revista Catalana de Filosofía is the property of Herder Editorial S.L. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Approved or not, the Hermann Rorschach test can be considered more than just a test to a clinical trial. Reflection on it as a broader phenomenon may yield what is the most valuable: better knowledge of human nature. This article aims to present the dual nature of Rorschach's inkblots: as a test of "guessing" the meaning of signs and as a test of perception. Narrative literature review on the meaning and interpretation of the Rorschach test. The nature and reception of inkblots. The inkblots have a dual nature: they require visual perception, and at the same time they are signs, whose meanings are extracted in the process of interpretation. This process is largely subject to cultural determinants; it also depends on the structure of stimuli and on their artistic expression. Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs and the sign nature of inkblots. According to Peirce, the interpretation of a sign, as a triadic structure, belongs to the ontic order and is a continuous process, taking place perpetually. Mental interpretation, as it were, follows the ontic dimension and constitutes a kind of reflection of this dimension. The phenomenology of perception and the interpretation of inkblots. Perception as viewed by Rorschach found its unintended, though strikingly consistent, complement in the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This is particularly clear in the acknowledgment of the role of the body in perception and in emphasis placed on the active and dynamic nature of the subject–object relationship. Rorschach and Merleau-Ponty vs. Peirce: similarities and differences. The seemingly completely different ways of understanding interpretation in Peirce's semiotics (indirect cognition) and in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology (direct cognition), actually show important similarities. I draw attention to the ontic dimension of interpretation and its systemic character, which both philosophers stress, and to the view of interpretation as a perpetual process that is never completed, both in Peirce's semiotics and in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The semiotic and perceptual nature of the inkblots created by the Swiss psychiatrist reflects two basic and mutually complementary ways in which humans experience the world. This experience has both a psychological and an ontic nature, which makes it possible for an examination using the Rorschach test to become an encounter with an existential dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the perceptual model of mystical experience, the mystics are said to "perceive" God much like ordinary people perceive physical objects. The model has been used to defend the epistemic value of mysticism, and it has been championed most vigorously by William Alston in his work Perceiving God. This paper is a critique of the model from a phenomenological perspective. Utilizing insights from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I show that models like Alston's are based on an inadequate notion of perception, which fails to distinguish perception from other modes of intentionality; the result is that even if we assume the mystics have directly experienced God, it is not clear why we should say they have "perceived" God. Then, using a better and richer concept of perception, I show that the mystical experiences under discussion cannot be truly perceptual, because they lack some salient features of perception. The conclusion is that talks of "perceiving God" can only be analogical or metaphorical, but not literal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ekstasis: Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox.

Copyright of Rocznik Naukowy Kujawsko-Pomorskiej Szkoly Wyzszej w Bydgoszczy is the property of Kujawy & Pomorze University in Bydgoszcz and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How have contemporary media artworks been proposing hybrid experiences, discussing the ontological implications from the experimentation with emerging techniques that alter our way of being-in-the-world? These experiences dialectically articulate aesthetic relations between real and virtual, visible and invisible, human and technological. In this article, we develop a participant observation of two specific works: Generation 244 (2011), by Scott Draves, and Zee (2008), by Kurt Hentschläger. This observation establishes a dialogue with phenomenology as it considers experience and perception as needed prerequisites for the analysis, as proposed by Merleau-Ponty. In this scenario, we have observed that a whole way of partitioning the sensible resets itself and points in the direction of a trans-immanence, generating an integrated knowledge that not only relies on reason, but in a collective wisdom where we can find, according to Didi-Huberman, a 'light of survival'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the complexity of the historical body of experienced workers in organizations, especially with regard to experience and insight into the decision making process. Thus, the aim of this study is to demonstrate the regulation strategies used, through field observations. The main aspects of the creation and transmission of tacit knowledge and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception are presented in a way that allows the confrontation of ideas about following or not following the rules. The research was conducted at the System Operation Center of a large energy company in Minas Gerais. Ergonomic Work Analysis and action research were the methods used, comprising immersion in the labor field, the identification of trials, and “shortcuts” related to cognition and perception. The convenience sample was composed of five technicians who work in the energy sector. The results showed that perception and expertise help workers in the decision-making process when faced with a problematic or conventional situation.

In the early 1940s, Karel Teige, a prominent theorist of the Czech avant-garde, returns to Max Dvořák’s concept of history of art as ‘history of the spirit’. Starting in the late 1930s, Teige pursued a sustained inquiry into the essence of the so-called imaginative (or ‘phantasizing’, in Teige’s own terminology) art, and his findings, which he intended to synthetize in a broadly conceived Phenomenology of Art (left unfinished), led him to the view that the essence of imaginative art consists in the visualization of ‘spiritual forms’ of an inner model. Primarily, it consists in a substantial transformation of one’s relationship to the external world: specifically, an internalization of senseperception and its metamorphosis into spiritual forms of subjective perception and consciousness. This is where Teige might have been influenced precisely by Dvořák’s abolition of any antithesis between naturalism and idealism, internal and external image, and his quest for a unity of Kunstwissenschaft and artistic practice. Teige was aware that this problem is central and constitutive for the entire era of Modernity and of the avant-garde, just as Dvořák was aware that the history and theory of modern art cannot consist in a mere mechanic continuation of the traditional arthistorical method; rather, it must reflect upon the creative processes of modern art.

Social work counsellors, exposed to hardships of clients’ lives, might, over time, experience strain as bodily reactions of muscle tension and pain. Within the framework of improving professional practice, the aim was to explore meanings attached to moving and breathing by studying the influence of supervision, encompassing experiences and reflections on bodily exercises, and reflection on challenging professional experiences. Action research of interdisciplinary supervision for seven counsellors, based on observations, field notes, reflection notes, and a focus group interview, was carried out. Data were analysed across participants within sessions and over time to compare meaning variations. The counsellors’ change of experiences were identified as phases: What is in it for me, not knowing what to perceive, attention as basis for knowing how to move, experiencing and creating connections, and knowing oneself better. Adjusted to change of experiences, supervisors encouraged counsellors to give attention to, become aware of, and relieve and explore muscle tension and breathing restrictions to contexts of meaning. Supervision based on movement opened access to personal learning. Supervision as approaches of movements and reflections contributed to increased self-knowledge in professional social work practices. Based on ability to perceive and relieve muscle tension and flow of breathing, the approach might be a potential for professionals to handle challenging situations. The findings, related to the lived body, encompass appearances of new meanings and new uses to experiences of muscular tension and flow of breathing.

The text proposes a way for the concept of sound as a phenomenon of listening. Based on the Phenomenology of Perception of M. Merleau-Ponty, one starts from the reading of D. Ihde on problems with a sound ontology in the molds of Cartesian dualism. Then it point out the criticism of B. Kane on the construction of an ontology of sound distant from studies in cultural listening. Finally the text presents ideas of T. Ingold against the concept of soundscape and towards the understanding of sound as an experience of bodies acting with other bodies in specific places. It is hoped to contribute to the discussion of the ontology of sound as an ontology of listening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff's Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator's walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl's phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between speaking and spoken speech, and the relation between the two, in his Phenomenology of Perception. Against a common interpretation, I argue on exegetical and philosophical grounds that the distinction should not be understood as one between two kinds of speech, but rather between two internally related dimensions present in all speech. This suggests an interdependence between speaking and spoken aspects of speech, and some commentators have critiqued Merleau-Ponty for claiming a priority of speaking over spoken speech. However, there is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty is right to emphasize the priority, namely, in terms of the ontological priority of the speaking subject with respect to language understood as a constituted cultural ideality. The latter only maintains its ontological status insofar as it is taken up by a language community. I favorably contrast Merleau-Ponty’s views on this question to those of the late Heidegger and de Saussure, and suggest potential applications of this clarified position for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A film is a few moments worth of looking on and a lifetime of memory. Not just the memory we may retain of the film after the projection-which inevitably fades and soon enough either changes or is lost-but the memories we already have at the moment of watching: all those associations, souvenirs, and traces of encounters that give shape to the personal meaning a film may hold for us. Film memory, in this sense, evokes and plays within a heterogeneous and diffused space of film experiencing, which involves not only a general semiology of the image, but also the "idiom" of each and every spectator. Every time we watch a film, our whole history as spectators is called into being. Some parts of this history may rush to the foreground and play a greater role in determining what images mean for us, some may disappear in the background or go unobserved, but it is only as a history that the image comes to exist. This is the source of its evocative power. Arguing for an extension of the domain of the image beyond the disciplinary concerns of film theory, as well as beyond the modernist conception of the work of art as an object independent from its contingent situation and subjective perception, the article will discuss the status of the cinematic image as an evocative object within the frame of Jacques Rancière's theory of aesthetics and address it, more specifically, as a tension between different conceptions of memory in the work of Victor Burgin and Laura Mulvey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Compilation & Translation Review is the property of National Academy for Educational Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of the study was to explore how third year social educator students reflect in writing on challenging practice-based experiences of communication, and how they experience the writing process. Based on selected and analyzed research material of students’ texts of reflective writing and texts of comments on reflective writing, following findings emerged: I) Experiences of reflective writing included the themes a) to learn to reflect and to become conscious of lived experiences, and b) to improve reflection on connections between experienced relationships and theoretical concepts. II) Reflecting on participation in challenging relationships in specific contexts of communication: a) the relationship of a student and a service receiver with learning disabilities preparing crossing a road, and b) the relationship between a student, a colleague and a patient with stroke, ordering food in a restaurant. Use of reflective writing facilitates self-consciousness, professional reflection and action.

I aim to provide some evidence that Husserl's description of perceptual updating actually fits very nicely into the Bayesian Brain paradigm, articulated by Karl Friston and others, and that that paradigm, in turn, can be taken as an excellent example of 'Neurophenomenology'. The apparently un-phenomenological Helmholtzian component of the Bayesian Brain paradigm, according to which what one consciously seems to see is a product of unconscious causal reasoning to the best explanation of one's sensory stimulations, can be finessed, I claim, in a way that makes it compatible with a phenomenological orientation. I begin by roughly characterizing the Bayesian Brain paradigm as it relates to perceptual cognition. I then show how Husserl's descriptions of the conscious perceptual process relate to the paradigm. I conclude with some considerations about how to understand the relation between conscious and unconscious brain process in the present case and in relation to Neurophenomenology generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the nature of sensation, perception and proprioception in contemporary digital and mobile culture, as exemplified in digital games. It argues that the application of theories of the phenomenology of perception to digital media and games needs to be extended and adapted to acknowledge and describe the sensing and proprioceptive abilities of technological bodies (both hardware and software) as well as human bodies. The article explores the idea that the embodied 'feeling' (proprioception) of virtual physics, particularly gravity, in gameplay experience must be understood as distributed across and through human and non-human sensing bodies. It will take the popular mobile game Angry Birds as a starting point, but will then explore the achievement of distributed proprioception in other games and games hardware more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Livro do Desassossego (The Book of Disquiet) we can read that "To see and to listen are the only noble things that life comprehends. All other senses are plebeian and carnal." What happens if in our approach to Pessoa we read this affirmation straightforwardly, replacing the visible with the optic and the auditory with the acoustic? In other words, what if we read Pessoa´s subject not just as a body-without-organs constantly producing sensations, but instead as a non-body that requires media (and artifacts) as a prerequisite for its exteriorization?

In the early 1940s, Karel Teige, a prominent theorist of the Czech avant-garde, returns to Max Dvorák's concept of history of art as 'history of the spirit'. Starting in the late 1930s, Teige pursued a sustained inquiry into the essence of the so-called imaginative (or 'phantasizing', in Teige's own terminology) art, and his findings, which he intended to synthetize in a broadly conceived Phenomenology of Art (left unfinished), led him to the view that the essence of imaginative art consists in the visualization of 'spiritual forms' of an inner model. Primarily, it consists in a substantial transformation of one's relationship to the external world: specifically, an internalization of senseperception and its metamorphosis into spiritual forms of subjective perception and consciousness. This is where Teige might have been influenced precisely by Dvorák's abolition of any antithesis between naturalism and idealism, internal and external image, and his quest for a unity of Kunstwissenschaft and artistic practice. Teige was aware that this problem is central and constitutive for the entire era of Modernity and of the avant-garde, just as Dvorák was aware that the history and theory of modern art cannot consist in a mere mechanic continuation of the traditional arthistorical method; rather, it must reflect upon the creative processes of modern art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]