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Objective/Context: The article analyzes the partisan nature of ministers in Uruguay (96 % of the total) during the period 1985--2024, based on the institutional and political constraints of cabinet appointments. Given that the president has moderate legislative powers, nominations are used to build majorities capable of approving government initiatives and preventing the opposition from censuring ministers in Parliament. As the political system operates based on the logic of the party government model, the article explores the consequences of its application by analyzing the behavior of the ruling party's caucus in a sample of ministerial interpellations conducted in Parliament. Methodology: The research is a case study based on statistical analysis of original data. The main hypothesis considers four independent variables (size of the president's legislative contingent, party cohesion, type of government, and evolution of the government period) and a series of control variables. Conclusions: The study confirms that Uruguayan presidents make strategic use of ministerial appointments, based on the assumption that the relationship between powers functions as a typical party government model, similar to that observed in parliamentary regimes. Presidents appoint highranking partisan ministers when they have support in Parliament and the party is strongly cohesive. They appoint mid- and low-ranking partisan ministers when the president forms coalitions and when the party is less cohesive. Finally, they prefer new or discreet partisan ministers when the president loses his coalition or during the last years of the mandate. Originality: It analyzes the appointment of ministers in Uruguay under a presidential system that, despite not having excessive legislative powers, resembles the typical party government model of parliamentary regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: By developing an empirical study on the Colombian case, this article tests a flexible typology to identify the variants of partisanship of 196 ministers, grouped in 91 different cabinets, during six governments between 1998 and 2022. The paper also explores the factors associated with the strategic decision made by a president regarding the degree of partisanship of their cabinet. Methodology: For the former, we classified different variants of partisanship based on a biographical log, which grades the partisan experience of the ministers at the time of appointment. For the latter, we estimated a linear regression model, taking the aggregate index of cabinet partisanship as the dependent variable. Conclusions: A better identification of the ministers who are considered partisan allows for finding a statistically significant correlation between the president's image and the cabinet's degree of partisanship. Originality: We used an original database containing information on 196 ministers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: Party recruitment is a crucial governance tool in contemporary democracies. Presidential and parliamentary heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios to party members in exchange for essential political resources, such as legislative support. This article explores the relationship between government formation and political parties, with parties that are not very institutionalized. In particular, it examines the extent to which arguments about presidential cabinet formation hold up when the hierarchical level of party ministers is considered. Methodology: This statistical study uses a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function with robust standard errors. It aims to carry out causality exploration to test the original indicators of the proposed dependent variables. Conclusions: Hierarchy and partisan powers are relevant factors to complement existing explanations of ministerial recruitment strategies. Originality: Comparative research on government formation and its connection to political parties has made significant progress, focusing on the distinction between ministers affiliated and not affiliated with a party. However, this dichotomous approach neglects consideration of the hierarchical position within the party structure, a fundamental aspect of the governing party model underlying parliamentary democracies. This article presents a trichotomous measure that considers the hierarchical level of ministers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective/context: Based on a definition consistent with the party government model, this article proposes a flexible typology to categorize and classify variants of partisanship in Latin American coalition presidential systems. Methodology: We advance a measurement strategy that, based on the assumptions of governmental partisanship, allows representing the individual-organizational link of cabinet members as committed, eventually consolidated, and hierarchical. This typology enables to measure the concept of governmental partisanship nominally, ordinally, and dichotomously. Conclusions: The measurement strategy makes it possible to observe a significant range of partisanship variation in Latin American coalition presidential systems. Additionally, it provides insights into how presidents decide on the composition of their cabinet. Originality: We propose an innovative approach to categorize and classify variants of partisanship in government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Es un parecer mayoritario en la academia (especialmente en Hispanoamérica) sostener que, frente a los sistemas de gobierno presidencialistas (hegemónicos en esa región), a los que frecuentemente se acusa de caer en el hiperpresidencialismo, los regímenes parlamentarios (mayoritarios en Europa occidental) garantizan per se un mayor control del Gobierno por parte del Parlamento. Sin embargo, se olvida a menudo que la propia exigencia, propia de todo régimen parlamentario, de que el Gobierno cuente con una legitimación democrática, mediada por el Parlamento, ha fundido en una sola y misma voluntad al Ejecutivo y a la mayoría parlamentaria que lo apoya. Como consecuencia, al ser el Gobierno el mismo sujeto que la mayoría parlamentaria que lo sustenta, ya no se puede sostener con propiedad que el Parlamento lo controle, constriñéndose éste a ejercer sobre el Ejecutivo una fiscalización más bien formal y rutinaria. Por esa razón, el mayor y más eficaz control parlamentario del Poder Ejecutivo depende en cada país, con independencia de su forma de gobierno (parlamentaria, presidencialista o semipresidencialista), de los concretos instrumentos con los que se dota a la minoría parlamentaria para llevar a cabo esta crucial labor, así como de la praxis política y judicial que en este se ha ido consolidando. Así resulta cuando se analiza, en dos países con formas de gobierno distintas, cuáles son las posibilidades reales que tiene la oposición política para controlar al Gobierno, tanto desde el Parlamento como a través de su participación en el nombramiento y fiscalización de instituciones y autoridades independientes.

Se analiza el rol de los órganos constitucionales autónomos en el sistema político mexicano como parte de la transición a la democracia y su actual encaje constitucional. Primero, se estudia el presidencialismo como forma de gobierno y específicamente su variante en México. Segundo, se examinan los órganos constitucionales autónomos como una de las innovaciones constitucionales mexicanas que allanó ese camino; se toma como estudio de caso a la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos. Se adelanta que este tipo de organismos podrían estar impactando el sistema político en términos de separación y división de poderes del Estado, aunque con límites.

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La Dirección de Presupuestos del Ministerio de Hacienda (DIPRES) es una institución de máxima relevancia para el presidencialismo chileno que, pese a ello, ha sido escasamente estudiada. En esta investigación se examina su evolución histórica y su esfera de influencia en el proceso de elaboración de las políticas públicas tanto desde sus competencias formales como desde sus atributos informales. Todo ello permite sostener que la DIPRES se encuentra en la “sala de máquinas” del presidencialismo chileno y proyectar algunos desafíos para el futuro.

Este artículo reconstruye herramientas de control público a partir de categorías conceptuales elaboradas en la teoría política y doctrina jurídica especializada. Para ello, se distinguen modelos de control según el carácter y competencia del órgano que lo ejerce: control parlamentario, control judicial, control administrativo y control social. El análisis permite evaluar comparativamente las ventajas y antecedentes de dichas tipologías, concluyendo respecto de su relevancia para la democracia, los derechos individuales y el buen funcionamiento de la administración pública. Al final del texto, se incluye una tabla que resume los contenidos y principales ejemplos citados.

This research addresses the role played by the Autonomous Constitutional Bodies (OCA) within presidentialism in the Mexican political system. It starts with the analysis of the presidential regime and the Mexican variant, paying special attention to the democratic transition in the 1990s. Subsequently, it analyzes from a constitutional and political point of view, one of the main Mexican constitutional innovations that paved the way for the creation of the OCAs, which facilitated the loss of constitutional powers of the head of state and the end of imperial presidentialism. To facilitate their understanding and legal configuration, the specific case of the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) is analyzed, which exemplifies well the limits of these institutions, but also their capacity to modernize and democratize the Mexican State. However, this type of institutions would apparently be redesigning the political system in terms of the separation and division of the powers of the State, but without achieving true autonomy and limits for governments with a majority in the chambers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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O tema da instabilidade política é recorrente em diversos estudos sobre a América Latina. O objetivo deste artigo é responder as seguintes perguntas: como a instabilidade presidencial tem se manifestado nos países da América Latina, no pós-redemocratização? A literatura sobre o tema é capaz de identificar os casos abusivos de destituição presidencial? Ela é capaz de identificar quando o os mecanismos de destituição presidencial são usados para dar aparência de legalidade a um golpe? Essas questões serão respondidas por meio de um levantamento dos estudos de caso acerca das quedas presidenciais na América Latina. Será verificado se esses estudos de caso auxiliam a identificar os usos abusivos e equivalentes às ferramentas clássicas de golpes de Estado da destituição presidencial no pósredemocratização. Conclui que a tese institucionalista, predominante na literatura, auxilia a entender as mudanças dos mecanismos de deposição presidencial, mas ajuda pouco a identificar o uso abusivo e equivalente às vias clássicas de golpe de Estado.

Resumo O artigo realiza uma investigação comparada sobre as instituições políticas das 18 maiores democracias em população e Portugal. Em seguida, avalia o papel dessas configurações institucionais na estabilidade governamental. São propostas duas visões sobre os sistemas de governo: (a) a tradicional, presidencialismo, parlamentarismo ou semipresidencialismo; e (b) uma transversal, focada na programação constitucional contra crises políticas, classificada como rígida, resiliente ou flexível. A pesquisa recorre a modelos de regressão logística e a dados em painel. É proposta a inferência de que programações constitucionais flexíveis (no parlamentarismo e no semipresidencialismo) apresentam menor estabilidade governamental. Os resultados são submetidos a uma análise comparativa que valida a interpretação e destaca as características institucionais cuja intencionalidade é a produção de estabilidade governamental.

La investigación analizó las interrupciones presidenciales que se han producido en América Latina entre 1990 y 2022. Los estudios realizados en la década de 1990 sobre la aparente falta de idoneidad del presidencialismo ante crisis políticas fueron cuestionados posteriormente por investigaciones que pusieron el relieve en la importancia de variables partidarias y contextuales para entender las crisis de gobierno. Este artículo intenta ir más allá, al describir la nueva ola de juicios políticos hasta 2022, planteando posibles causas de las salidas anticipadas de los presidentes y argumentado que puede estarse produciendo una parlamentarización del juicio político. Para ello, se llevó a cabo un análisis comparado y longitudinal de los 155 presidentes que ha habido en América Latina en el periodo de estudio, lo que evidenció una debilidad de los jefes de Estado, un fortalecimiento de los congresos y un determinante rol del juego de mayorías partidarias.

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Este artículo contribuye a la investigación abordando el uso del poder ejecutivo unilateral de manera comparada entre los Estados Unidos de América y España. Ambos países tienen herramientas legales que permiten al Ejecutivo legislar de forma unilateral, poniendo en cuestión el principio de separación de poderes. Basándonos en los estudios de Mayer y Santolaya sobre las órdenes ejecutivas y los reales decretos-ley respectivamente, revisamos y ampliamos sus hallazgos con datos actuales, además de realizar un análisis comparado de estas herramientas jurídicas. Nuestras hipótesis son que los Gobiernos progresistas tienden a recurrir con más frecuencia a estas herramientas, especialmente durante sus primeros cien días en el cargo, más aún, cuando los Gobiernos tienen poco apoyo de su rama legislativa. De esta manera, se hace un uso excesivo de la legislación que proviene del Ejecutivo para promover la agenda política del Gobierno, excediendo la intención con la que las órdenes ejecutivas y los reales decretos fueron planteados por los legisladores constituyentes en ambos países.

The present work studies the political and constitutional problems that have arisen as a result of the relations between the Executive and Legislative Powers. To do this, it studies the first debates on the form of government that arose after independence, as well as the existing constitutional crises, especially when the President of the Republic has not had a parliamentary majority and, on the contrary, has had governance problems due to to the opposition that emerged from Congress. Following this historical review, the current regulation of the question of confidence, the dissolution of Parliament, the presidential vacancy, the impeachment of the President of the Republic and the presidential succession are analyzed, proposing reforms to the constitutional text and interpretations of the Constitution that avoid the abusive and discretionary use of these institutions by the powers of the State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this research note we introduce an original database covering almost a century of legislative political parties (1925-2019) and reconstruct in the long term the evolution of the president's parliamentary support and coalition formation in Latin America. We identify some long-term perspectives that show that presidentialisms in the region have undergone transformations towards a greater fragmentation of the party system, with smaller presidential parties in Congress and the presence of legislative coalitions as a support base. The evidence highlights the importance of coalitional presidentialism in the third democratic wave and has implications for the literature on the factors that explain political stability in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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A presente pesquisa analisa eleições legislativas e presidenciais em sistemas presidencialistas e semipresidencialistas dos Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP). Especificamente, analisamos se a realização de eleições separadas ou simultâneas e se os níveis de poderes presidenciais afetam as taxas de participação política nesses países. Para isso, utilizamos os dados do Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) e elaboramos uma classificação das eleições e dos poderes presidenciais para todas as eleições nos cinco países do PALOP desde a sua democratização. Constatamos que, nos três PALOP semipresidencialistas (Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau e São Tomé e Príncipe), as eleições legislativas são mais importantes do que as eleições presidenciais, especialmente quando os poderes presidenciais são limitados. Por outro lado, em Angola e Moçambique, não encontramos relação entre a forma de realização das eleições e os poderes do presidente.

Este estudio analiza las particularidades y evolución del excepcionalismo americano, proporciona una visión comparada respecto a los sistemas parlamentarios que ayuda a ilustrar su singularidad. Destacamos que el presidente tiene la singularidad de ser, a la vez, jefe del Estado y jefe del Gobierno, además de ser escogido de manera indirecta en unos comicios diferentes a los del Congreso, haciendo, así, efectiva la separación de poderes. Los escaños del Congreso determinan el reparto de compromisarios que elegirán al presidente y, en caso de que ningún candidato alcance la mayoría de votos electorales, la Cámara Baja dirime la elección presidencial. Desde la redacción de la Constitución estadounidense, hace más de doscientos años, el electoral college, independientemente del resultado electoral, ha proporcionado una estabilidad al sistema. La evolución de la democracia americana ha sido posible gracias a las enmiendas constitucionales que han permitido que el derecho de sufragio se haya ido actualizando con el paso de los años, sin necesidad de dotarse de una nueva constitución. Sin embargo, el clima de polarización actual podría suponer una amenaza para el sistema político estadounidense que podría desembocar en una crisis del régimen presidencialista. Adicionalmente, en caso de aplicarse el plan de contingencia para elegir al presidente, los votos de Washington DC quedarían sin efecto, y la representación de los estados se reduciría a un único voto por estado. Es por todo esto que el sistema americano debe realizar los cambios necesarios para actualizar su marco legislativo a las prácticas democráticas del siglo XXI.

The study aims to determine the importance of the strategic management of Public Relations in the management of the presidential image in the administration of Lic. Enrique Peña Nieto (December 1, 2012 to November 30, 2018). The element that motivates these aspirations was the collection of memes by Dr. María Teresa Cervantes Loredo, observing that, on social networks, her messages are consumed by virtual communities with true avidity and immediacy with the topics in vogue and in this case it was the voracious critic in the memes of former president Peña Nieto. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este texto se revisará la recepción que se tuvo del texto La democracia en México de Pablo González Casanova, publicado en 1965 y que tuvo una gran influencia en los estudios sociológicos de México, así como generar una crítica analítica en torno al escenario político de mediados del siglo XX.

La presente nota de investigación analiza la incidencia de las va-riables institucionales sobre el Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción (CPI). Utilizando la metodología de paressobre una base de datos de países en se-rie temporal, se demuestra que las formas de gobierno presidencialistas tie-nen incidencia significativa en los resultados sobre corrupción en el mundo.

El artículo analiza la participación de los partidos en los cuatro go- biernos de la Concertación en Chile (1990-2010), un tema conocido en la Ciencia Política como party government. Esta participación estuvo influida por los rasgos institucionales del presidencialismo, con la centralidad decisoria del Presidente, por los cambios programáticos y organizativos llevado a cabo por partidos del conglomerado durante la dictadura, en el contexto más amplio de las lecciones extraídas por la caída de la democracia en 1973, y por decisiones estratégicas de los gobiernos. Estas tuvieron amplias repercusiones en la agenda del gobierno, no solo porque impusieron la primacía de la política económica sobre la agenda pública y no consideró la naturaleza política de la gestión del gobierno sino, también, porque se les descuidó en esas tres dimensiones, que explica su debilitamiento electoral, organizativo y en sus capacidades para participar en el gobierno. El artículo entrega elementos conceptuales y empíricos para el análisis de un tema hasta ahora no considerado por los estudios del presidencialismo en América Latina.

O que explica a saída forçada antes do término do mandato de presidentes democraticamente eleitos? O objetivo desse artigo é fazer uma revisão da literatura de remoção de presidentes, e discutir os pontos de convergência e divergência dessa literatura, que surgiu nos últimos 20 anos e vem ganhando cada vez mais importância com o surgimento de novos casos de líderes eleitos que saíram antes do esperado, especialmente na América Latina.

O artigo analisa a possibilidade jurídica de se substituir no Brasil, sob a égide da Constituição de 1988, o sistema de governo presidencialista pelo parlamentarista, semi-presidencialista ou outros modelos. Examina as Propostas de Emenda à Constituição apresentadas à Câmara dos Deputados e ao Senado com esse objeto, verificando suas eventuais incompatibilidades com as cláusulas pétreas. Analisa qual seria a consequência para os Estados e Municípios em caso de aprovação da mudança no sistema de governo, a partir do princípio da simetria enunciado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Conclui-se que, do ponto de vista jurídico-constitucional, é admissível a alteração do sistema de governo no país por via de emenda constitucional, desde que seja realizado um plebiscito para consultar previamente a população sobre a mudança.

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Resumo O que explica a produção legislativa dos ministérios federais no Brasil? O artigo explora a relação entre a instabilidade ministerial e o desempenho dos ministérios mensurado pela quantidade de propostas legislativas produzidas entre 1999 e 2014. Por meio de um modelo de média exponencial com regressores endógenos, argumentamos que a troca de ministros e ministras afeta negativamente a capacidade de produção legislativa das pastas. Ainda assim, o distanciamento ideológico entre os partidos do ministro e o presidente, bem como a expertise legislativa prévia dos ministros, tem impacto mais pronunciado no nível de produção de propostas legislativas dentro da agenda política do governo. Os resultados corroboram a percepção do efeito negativo da instabilidade ministerial na eficiência da concepção e da formulação de políticas públicas, contribuindo para o entendimento da produção legislativa e do desempenho burocrático do presidencialismo brasileiro.

El objetivo central de este artículo consiste en explicar cuáles son las condiciones en las que una convocatoria a mecanismos de democracia directa, como el referéndum, propuesta por el presidente ha sido exitosa en los países de la región andina. A partir de la revisión panorámica de los referéndum presidenciales en Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia y Ecuador, se aplica una metodología comparativa de las variables sociopolíticas para analizar las motivaciones y resultados de los referéndum en los casos estudiados. Al final del artículo, se concluye que entre los factores para determinar el éxito de un referéndum presidencial se encuentra: el piso institucional, el respaldo popular, el grado de polarización política, el contexto económico, contar con el apoyo de movimientos sociales o el periodo de mandato del presidente en cuestión.

Objective/Context: This paper analyzes factors related to political incentives for public organizations to cease operations. It suggests that political turnover has a negative effect on the duration of these types of entities. However, this effect differs according to the size of the governing coalition. Methodology: Semi-parametric models and Cox regressions are used to estimate the survival of 415 public organizations in Colombia. Conclusions: The data show that a change in the presidential administration allows the new president to reshape the administration according to their interests. Data analysis also indicates that the larger the size of the government coalition, the lower the probability that a public entity will be eliminated. Originality: The article uses an original database containing longitudinal information on public organizations in Colombia for the period 1958 to 2020. This database contains 415 observations on the organizational characteristics of each entity. This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the termination of public organizations in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador ha desarrollado un gobierno que pretende regresar a los orígenes revolucionarios y resolver los problemas sociales. Su política social ha estado basada en el desmantelamiento institucional y, en ocasiones, legal del sistema político y gubernamental, pero no ha sido el único en la historia nacional. Antes que él, lo han hecho Luis Echeverría y Carlos Salinas. Este artículo propone que no se trata solamente de voluntarismo personal, sino de una tradición y necesidad históricas: la construcción de una autoridad central que resuelva los problemas y las recurrentes fallas de los programas económicos que profundizan los desequilibrios sociales.

This paper analyses the development of the discretionary system of bureaucratic positions in Brazil. On the one hand, the research literature relates the allocation of public offices to the coalitional presidential system. On the other hand, this literature pointed out initiatives aiming to professionalise the bureaucracy and strengthen state careers. In this context, the presidential dilemmas refer to choosing between seeking support from the coalition by appointing party members and controlling public policies by nominating individuals aligned with the president's preferences. In this article, theories of institutional change are the main theoretical framework for analysing the progression of rules on appointments to public offices and their impacts on the portraits of nominees. Through a case study of Brazil, the paper assesses the congruence between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence regarding the relationship between institutions and the distribution of public sector posts. The methodology comprises bibliographic research, documental analysis, and descriptive statistics. The documentary search concentrated on the rules regarding the presidential coordination bodies and compulsory percentages of appointed career civil servants. The results demonstrated that the laws were not effective as federal public bodies did not comply with the rules. Furthermore, the quantity of career civil servants in discretionary public offices was already high before the establishment of compulsory percentages. The role of coordination bodies varied across the different administrations. Despite the centralisation of presidential power, evidence points out that public managers are partially free to choose their staff and only sometimes comply with the legal requirements. Thus, the conclusions reinforce the need to include informal institutions in further analysis. Besides promoting a contextual description of Brazil, the paper contributes to theory-testing and theory-building on the relationship between institutions and the distribution of public offices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the constitutional possibility of replacing in Brazil, under the aegis of the 1988 Constitution, the presidential system of government by parliamentary, semi-presidential or other models. Examines the Proposals for Amendment to the Constitution presented to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate with this object, verifying their eventual incompatibilities with the unamendable clauses. It analyzes what would be the consequence for the States and Municipalities in case of approval of the change in the government system, based on the principle of symmetry enunciated by the Federal Supreme Court. It concludes that, from the constitutional point of view, it is admissible to change the system of government in the country by way of constitutional amendment, provided that a plebiscite is held to previously consult the population about the change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Este artículo explica el proceso por el cuál un presidente sin ningún apoyo inicial en el legislativo ni con un partido de respaldo pudo gobernar de forma estable y con un amplio apoyo parlamentario. Gracias a la instrumentalización del Estado y a una concepción plebiscitaria de la democracia, el presidente Rafael Correa provocó un shock en el sistema institucional con el que alteró la correlación de fuerzas y se garantizó sólidos apoyos parlamentarios a largo plazo. Ello fue posible por tres elementos 1) un sistema de representación política en crisis, 2) un presidente que cuenta con altos niveles de popularidad y aceptación, y 3) un presidente plebiscitario convencido de que sus decisiones —en tanto representante directo del pueblo— pueden estar por encima de instituciones y normas.

Copyright of A&C - Administrative & Constitutional Law Review - Revista de Direito Administrativo e Constitucional is the property of A&C - Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional (Instituto Bacellar) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What explains the legislative production of Brazilian ministries? The article explores the relationship between ministerial instability and the performance of ministries measured by the number of legislative proposals they produced between 1999 and 2014. Using an exponential average model with endogenous regressors, we argue that the change of ministers negatively affects the entities’ legislative production. The ideological distance between the minister’s and president’s parties and the prior legislative expertise of the ministers, have a pronounced impact on the level of legislative production on the government’s political agenda. The results corroborate the perception of the negative effect of ministerial instability on the efficiency of the conception and formulation of public policies and contribute to the understanding of legislative production and bureaucratic performance of Brazilian presidentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) initially controlled the country’s presidency, Congress and the Morena party. One of the advantages that this represented for AMLO was the possibility of seeing all his initiatives approved, in particular those that do not require a qualified majority, so the opposition could not establish itself in the role of political counterweight. Subsequently, the president exercised power under the logic of the unified government, in which there is a clear tendency to the concentration of power, this fact generates as a consequence the loss of plurality and the weakening of political control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all portfolios are equally important. But despite recognizing that the relative value of portfolios is central to government formation, the criteria that determine why certain portfolios are more important than others is rarely made explicit and justified. The lack of transparency about the criteria that determines the value of portfolios is particularly important where party institutionalization is low, where single-party governments are the norm and where non-partisan groups participate in government formation. In this article we develop a framework that proposes measuring portfolio salience based on four dimensions: the opportunities the portfolio offers its occupant to influence relevant public policies, to influence the governments political agenda, to distribute discretional resources, and to intervene in the functioning of other portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the most important ministries in Honduras? And why are important ministries important? To answer these questions, this study offers an analysis of the importance of the Honduran ministerial portfolios from 1982 to 2020. For this, this study follows the theoretical proposal of Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo that suggests distinguishing four key dimensions (policy management public, discretionary allocation of resources, political capacity and organizational capacity). The findings of this research showed that the ministerial relevance in this country is linked to those portfolios that, in addition to having strategic value and impact, potentially have the possibility of having discretionary funds to develop clientelistic policies that have allowed traditional parties stay in power throughout the period analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collectivus. Revista de Ciencias Sociales is the property of Universidad del Atlantico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)