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The article focuses on Professor R. Kent Greenawalt as a thoughtful and compassionate colleague. It highlights compassionate and considerate relationships, attentiveness and drive to enhance theories in law disputes, and major contributions to Columbia Law School through an academic career and prominent title as University Professor. It discusses numerous books, including jurisprudence works, and emphasizes humanism in academic endeavors despite personal loss and challenges.

In 30 years of writing about the rule of law, Martin Krygier has not reached a final understanding of this most important legal and political ideal, any more than anyone else has. Krygier's question is a good one: "[W]hat if the problem is less that the rule of law was installed but failed to do much good than that what was installed was not yet the rule of law but only bits of legal apparatus not on their own up to the job?" 1 Philip Selznick, "Legal Cultures and the Rule of Law" in Martin Krygier and Adam Czarnota (ed), I The Rule of Law after Communism i (Dartmouth, 1999) 21, cited in Clarence Ling, "Martin Krygier's Contribution to the Rule of Law", I Western Australian Jurist i 4 (2013) 211, at p. 215. [Extracted from the article]

There are all sorts of ways in which one can dirty one's hands in politics. The classic problem is that of the political leader who finds he has to act immorally for the sake of the greater good. But some dirty-hands problems are more mundane. They arise out of the fact that one acts in politics alongside others, particularly in a democracy, and so one is not always in control of the values and principles that are being put into play. This happens sometimes because of the need for compromise; or through procedures like majority decision. Some of these cases have an interesting historical dimension. They reflect the fact that politicians have to act against the background of decisions made by their predecessors. Laws routinely remain in force, for example, despite the demise of the political factions that enacted them: so a politician may have to keep faith with and faithfully administer a legal decision he condemns. I argue that this is best understood not as the balancing of disparate personal convictions, but of his having to act in the name of the whole society (understood as an entity existing over time). The sense of "dirty hands" arises from the juxtaposition of the politician's own convictions with the requirements of his particular role as speaking for an entity larger than himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the relationship between a judicial review of legislation and the principle of political legitimacy understood as the capacity of a legal and political system to generate support for the implementation of laws and policies, even among those who are opposed to them on their merits. The article claims that, despite the existence of multiple forms of judicial review, as well as diverse and respectable sources of legitimacy, judicial review is not designed to generate political legitimacy. In this sense, given the impossibility of solving this 'democratic difficulty,' the article proposes different approaches that might help to mitigate it, as is the case of judicial super-majorities to strike down legislation, following a strong presumption of constitutionality or offering explicit reasons for addressing these democratic concerns. Finally, the article calls for civility in constitutional litigation in order to prevent demonization of the opponent and to open the door to political legitimacy in the context of judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the legal aspects of the practice of heckling, particularly whether heckling is protected free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a violation of free speech or both. It also examines the philosophical background of heckling in the works of philosopher John Stuart Mill and the U.S. Supreme Court case In re Kay. The concepts of liberty and political choreography are also discussed.

The article presents a reply to Professor James Weinstein views on legitimacy and propriety of hate speech regulation. Topics discussed include controversies surrounding the justification of hate speech laws in liberal democratic orders; relationship between political legitimacy and speech restriction; and prevention of discrimination in free speech, along with nature of the same.

The article discusses issues related to target killing, which is officially authorized and premeditated killing by military or intelligence officials of named and identified individuals without the benefit of any judicial process. Topics discussed include effect of targeted killing on innocent civilians, issues related to target killings and adoption of a new practice of individualized killing.

An essay is presented which reviews the book "Religion Without God" by the late legal philosopher and author Ronald Dworkin, focusing on Dworkin's views about values and religious experience. The relationship between law and religion is mentioned, along with American jurisprudence and Islamic law. A series of lectures that Dworkin delivered at the University of Bern in 2011 are assessed, as well as religious faith and the U.S. Constitution’s Freedom of Religion Clause.

Courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, make important decisions about rights by voting, and often the decision is determined by a bare majority. But the principle of majority decision (MD) for courts has not been much reflected on. There is very little scholarly literature on this and only a handful of articles proposing alternatives to MD in the judicial context. So what justifies judges' reliance on MD? In democratic contexts, MD is usually defended on one of three grounds: (i) as a decision-procedure that is efficient; (ii) as a way of reaching the objectively best decision; or (iii) as a way of respecting the principle of political equality. However, it is difficult to see how any of these arguments really explains or justifies MD in the case of judicial decision-making. Regarding (i), other efficient procedures are available: we want to know why this sort of efficiency should be valued. On (ii), epistemic arguments for MD do not work well for the sort of bare majorities that we see in Supreme Court decision-making. And, on (iii), it is hard to rig up an argument based on political equality or political fairness that works for unelected judges as opposed to ordinary citizens or their elected representatives. After reflecting on these possibilities, the Essay concludes that, at the very least, defenders of judicial authority should be more tentative in their denunciations of democratic majoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationale of the separation of powers is often elided with the rationale of checks and balances and with the rationale of the disper-sal of power generally in a constitutional system. This Essay, however, fo-cuses resolutely on the functional separation of powers in what M.J.C. Vile called its "pure form." Reexamining the theories of Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison, this Essay seeks to recover (amidst all their tautologies and evasions) a genuine case in favor of this principle. The Essay argues that the rationale of the separation of powers is closely related to that of the rule of law: it is partly a matter of the distinct integrity of each of the sepa-rated institutions---judiciary, legislature, and administration. But above all, it is a matter of articulated governance (as contrasted with com-pressed undifferentiated exercises of power). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the political theory of Scottish philosopher David Hume. G. A. Cohen, Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory, examines whether the possibility of changes to the society's institutional structure should be considered when talking about a just society. Cohen addressed the questions on justice and social states of affair in a paper entitled "How to Do Political Philosophy?" Particular focus is given to Hume's two-fold choice between an emphasis on virtue and an emphasis on institutions. Isaiah Berlin, another Chichele predecessor, examines the tasks of political philosophy. Berlin claims that social situations includes political organization and the relations of the individual to the community.

Stare decisis remains a controversial feature of the legal systems that recognize it. Some jurists argue that the doctrine is at odds with the rule of law; others argue that there are good rule-of-law arguments in favor of stare decisis. This Article considers one possible good rule-of-law argument. It suggests that we should approach stare decisis in a layered way, looking at what the rule of law requires of the various judges involved in the development of a precedent. One rule-of-law principle, the principle of constancy, counsels against lightly overturning such precedents as there are. But that is not in itself an argument for stare decisis since it presupposes that precedents have already been created. However, there is another principle, the principle of generality, which requires all judges to base their decisions on general norms and not just leave them as freestanding particulars. A third principle, the principle of institutional responsibility, requires subsequent judges not to give the lie to the use by precedent judges of certain general norms to determine their decisions. And finally, the fundamental principle of fidelity to law requires the precedent judge to approach her decision as far as she can by trying to figure out the implicit bearing of such existing law as there is on the case in front of her. Together, these principles make up a layered case--not an absolute case, but a strong and productive case--for stare decisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author presents his views on the religious ethics required to deal with several issues including torture, gay rights and fetal abortion. He discusses the views of professor David Gushee who is one of the renowned theologians and Christian ethicists. He informs about the role of religious participation in the civil political conversation of a democratic citizenry.

The article focuses on the relation between human dignity, rights, and responsibilities. Topics discussed include analyzing the relationship between rights and responsibilities by thinking beyond civil liberties, green paper titled "Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our Constitutional Framework" issued by the British government, and use of the Human Rights Act for interpreting common law and the right to freedom of religion.

The article discusses an individuals socioeconomic rights and theories of justice as they are shaped by class, geography, and morality. The author discusses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the principles set forth in the book "A Theory of Justice," by John Rawls.

The applicability of the ideal we call ‘the Rule of Law’ (ROL) in international law (IL) is complicated by (1) the fact that there is no overarching world government from whom we need protection (of the sort that the ROL traditionally offers) and it is also complicated by (2) the fact that IL affects states, in the first instance, rather than individuals (for whose sake we usually insist on ROL requirements). The article uses both these ideas as points of entry into a consideration of the applicability of the ROL in IL. It suggests that the ‘true’ subjects of IL are really human individuals (billions of them) and it queries whether the protections that they need are really best secured by giving national sovereigns the benefit of ROL requirements in IL. For example, a national sovereign's insistence that IL norms should not be enforced unless they are clear and determinate may mean that individuals have fewer protections against human rights violations. More radically, it may be appropriate to think of national sovereigns more as ‘officials’ or ‘agencies’ of the IL system than as its subjects. On this account, we should consider the analogous situation of officials and agencies in a municipal legal system: are officials and agencies in need of, or entitled to, the same ROL protections as private individuals? If not, then maybe it is inappropriate to think that sovereign states are entitled to the same ROL protections at the international level as individuals are entitled to at the municipal level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the author's general observations on the insights, criticisms, and suggestions given in his article "Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Rule of Law?." The author mentions his philosophical orientation of the rule of law and the international legal system associated with the understanding of international sovereignty. The author is particular on the relation between law and state and its implication on the international law in sovereigns and jurisprudence.

The article focuses on the relationship between rights and responsibilities for civilians and provides an analysis of relation with inalienable human dignity. It mentions the views of Jeremy Waldron, Professor at New York University School of Law, that some rights are actually responsibilities and he want to concerns on some recent work on human dignity. It informs that way of thinking about freedom is like connecting rights with socially important functions.

The article presents the author's views on laws prohibiting group defamation which is regarded as hate speech. He argues that several law professors including Ronald Dworkin believe prohibiting hate speech might bring loss to the democratic legitimacy of other laws. He states several aspects of hate speech, regulations controlling hate speeches for the protection of each member of the society, and criticisms of his favoring the laws and legislation against the group defamation.

The article discusses Ronald Dworkin's lifeboat examples on his argument in the fairness of majority-decision voting in his book "Justice for Hedgehogs." One version of the lifeboat example is choosing the least popular passenger to be drowned to save the rest, instead of drawing lots. The other version shows the unfair inclusion of personal attachments and antagonisms in the selection process.

The article presents a lecture by Jeremy Waldron delivered at the 2010 Natural Law Lecture, in which he discusses positive law and its importance to natural lawyers as well as the view of Thomas Aquinas about the Latin word determinatio that means concretization or positivization within the principles of natural law.

The article discusses the logical arguments about judicial review and the legitimate authorities of legislators who are acting as judges to the legislatures. Accordingly, when a statute restrict the liberties and individual rights of the people, the parliamentary supremacy overrules the rights-violation. It adds that the final arbitration rests with the legislature whether to amend or repeal the law in response to any complaint which effectively judge the legislature as an institution in a dispute.

The article presents a speech delivered by Jeremy Waldron during the symposium titled "The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century," held at the Boston University School of Law on November 14 and15, 2008, in which he discussed ways that make legislation an attractive mode of lawmaking.

An essay is presented on democratic jurisprudence. The author discusses the concept of general jurisprudence and compares it with democratic jurisprudence. He mentions that democratic jurisprudence can de distinguished from general jurisprudence in two ways in which democratic jurisprudence can be special jurisprudence or particular jurisprudence. He also shares his ideas regarding the ultimate definition of democracy and its importance.

Lon Fuller, in his response to H.L.A. Hart's 1958 Holmes Lecture and elsewhere, argued that principles of legality—formal principles requiring, for example, that laws be clear, general, and prospective—constitute the "internal morality of law." This Article contends that Hart never offered a clear response. Fuller's claim supposes that observance of the principles of legality is both fundamental to law and inherently moral. In different writings, Hart seems variously to affirm and to deny that legality is a necessary criterion for the existence of law. Likewise, he sometimes suggests and elsewhere scorns the idea that legality has moral significance. This Article proposes that Hart's apparent inconsistency might actually reflect the complexity of the terms. Some degree of legality might be a prerequisite of law, while some failures of legality might not condemn it. Principles of legality might have contingent rather than inherent moral value, might have moral value that is severable from their legal value, or might have both positive and negative moral effect. The Article argues, furthermore, that even the conclusion Hart strains to avoid— that legality inevitably links morality and law—is compatible with Hart's positivism and opens a promising field for positivist jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the obligations that the rule of law imposes upon lawyers in the international domain. It notes that the responsibilities of a lawyer advising the government are different from the lawyer's job in private practice. It also cites that the link between the rule of law and good lawyering in government service applies equally in the international realm as it does in constitutional law as well in administrative law.

The article shares the author's thoughts on the longevity and resilience of treaties. He stresses that no treaty is fit to be perpetual as in the case of applying the principle of rebus sic stantibus on the Treaty of Waitangi. He claims that the exploration of this treaty fills a gap on the work he has done on indigenous issues and on historic injustice. He asserts that the principle can also be seen as borrowing from contract law doctrines of frustration and impossibility.

The article presents an essay on the general case against judicial review of legislation. It criticizes the judicial review for its lack of reason to suppose the rights are better protected than they would be by democratic legislatures. Also, the essay argues that judicial review is democratically illegitimate. The essay claims that the case against judicial review is not absolute or unconditional because the society in question has good working democratic institutions.

Discusses the use of foreign law for the court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the U.S. in 2005. Distinction between the law of nations and natural law; Information on how the law of nations approach might bear on the juvenile death penalty; Capability of U.S. jurisprudence in recognizing the law of nations.

In recently published memoranda, Justice Department lawyers have suggested that it is not in all circumstances wrong or unlawful to inflict pain in the course of interrogating terrorist suspects. Also, at least one legal scholar has suggested that the United States might institute a system of judicial torture warrants, to permit coercive interrogation in cases where it might yield information that will save lives. The shocking nature of these suggestions forces us to think afresh about the legal prohibition on torture. This Article argues that the prohibition on torture is not just one rule among others, but a legal archetype-a provision which is emblematic of our larger commitment to nonbrutality in the legal system. Characterizing it as an archetype affects how we think about the implications of authorizing torture (or interrogation methods that come close to torture). It affects how we think about issues of definition in regard to torture. And it affects how we think about the absolute character of the legal and moral prohibitions on torture. On this basis, the Article concludes not only that the absolute prohibition on torture should remain in force, but also that any attempt to loosen it (either explicitly or by narrowing the definition of "torture ") would deal a traumatic blow to our legal system and affect our ability to sustain the law's commitment to human dignity and nonbrutality even in areas where torture as such is not involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the implications of the retroactivity provision under the Electoral Vacancies Amendment Bill for legislators having dual citizenships in New Zealand. Role of the Electoral Act in preventing Harry Duynhoven to sit in New Zealand's Parliament; Conflict between the Electoral Act and the retroactivity provision; Distinction between retrospective legislation and retroactive legislation; Impact on other laws and legal procedures.

``Terrorism'' is sometimes defined as a ``form of coercion.'' But there are important differences between ordinary coercion and terrorist intimidation. This paper explores some of those differences, particularly the relation between coercion, on the one hand, and terror and terrorization, on the other hand. The paper argues that while terrorism is not necessarily associated with terror in the literal sense, it does often seek to instill a mental state like terror in the populations that it targets. However, the point of instilling this mental state is not necessarily coercive or intimidatory: one can try to instill terror as an act of punishment, or as an expressive or therapeutic act, or because one values the political consequences that might follow, or because one thinks terror is preferable, from an ethical point of view, to the inauthentic complacency that characterizes the targeted population at present. Though this paper asks questions about the definition of ``terrorism,'' these questions are not asked for their own sake. The quest for a canonical definition of ``terrorism'' is probably a waste of time. But asking questions which sound like questions of definition is sometimes a fruitful way of focusing our reflections on terrorism and organizing our response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uses the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan to explore the issues of the moral problem of distance. Question of whether moral concerns diminish over distance; Assertion that the parable evokes the intuition that the sheer proximity of two human beings, even in the absence of any ethnic or other affiliations, generates moral obligations; Suggestion that the impartial and universal message of the parable can be useful for morality.

Focuses on the need for maintaining a balance between civil liberty and the security aspects of the society. Quantitative computation of balance between liberty and security; Detailed analysis of pitfalls to be kept in mind when balancing civil liberties and security; Different aspects of the meaning of civil liberties.

Focuses on the rights of citizens to establish community. Principles of cosmopolitan rights; Features of political theory; Control of resources.

Focuses on the principle of publicity by Thomas Hobbes. Importance of understanding the true basis of claims of the sovereign; Applicability of the principle of publicity in wholesale and retail; Anticipation of the Enlightenment commitment to rationality and transparency in social and political arrangements.

Analyzes observations on the relation between homelessness and community in California, derived from experiences with the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities. Community control of public places; Cost-benefit analysis of homelessness; Relation between the visibility of homelessness and the broken windows theory of community policing.

Focuses on the different dimensions of cosmopolitanism. Definition of cosmopolitanism; Information on cosmopolitan cultures; Cosmopolitan rights and civic responsibility.

Explores the theory of self-defense, considering the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Hypothetical case regarding innocent threat; Argument on the unintelligibility of a covenant renouncing self-defense; Hobbesian necessity; Rationality and the impulse to self-defense.

Comments on the article on technical legal vocabulary entitled `Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach' by Felix Cohen. Function of the technical legal vocabulary; Denial of Cohen and other legal positivists of the systemacity of the law; Role of technical terms to the coherence of modern legal system.

Discusses the status of the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States. Comments on the book `Freedom's Law,' by Ronald Dworkin; Effect of constitutional adjudication on the character of public debate.

Discusses the theoretical foundations of liberalism. Definition of the terms 'socialism', 'conservatism' in relation to liberalism; Practical propositions that might be regarded as the core or the essence of the ideology in question; Development of the theory of government.

Considers the way in which different images of charity are related to the issue of the justification of welfare provision. Denial of the moral legitimacy of welfare provision in the modern state; argument that if we adopt a different image of charity, one will find the complaint about the morality of compulsory charity less convincing.