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Is diplomacy an art of compromise or enterprise? This is the main challenge towards today’s Chinese foreign policy especially its American policy. The paper argues that the key to this question is how to manage the two basic goals: security and development. During the Iraq war, China focused on development factor more than security one. For the development means oil supply and Iraq market demand; the security factor has three basic meanings of state-power-will. Based on a survey on How Chinese View the Iraq War, one can see that China won the hard power in the short term and lost its soft power in the long term. The paper argues in the second part that from the Iraq war we can see that China considers the U.S. both as opportunities (which focus on America’s investment and export market) and challenges (America’s anti-terrorism campaign makes pressures on China’s strategic security environment) and explores what this means to the future Chinese-American relationship and international politics? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will use the example of Greater China to question the stability and legitimacy of the international norms of sovereignty and the nation-state. While most IR texts look to the high politics of diplomatic influence and military power, Greater China is interesting because, though it is seen by many as central to the international politics of the 21st century, it does not exist as a legal or an institutional body. The paper will use the examples of SARS, the Chinese diaspora, and the underclass of hooligans in urban China to highlight how Greater China is produced by transnational flows of economic and cultural capital. The paper will also expand the methodology and sources of East Asian IR analysis by using ethnographic approaches and films such as ‘Beijing Bastards’ and ‘A Confucian Confusion’ to chart out the contingent transnational flows of Greater China. The paper thus argues that Greater China presents challenges not only to economic and political order, but also to international relations theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the EU's use of strategic diplomacy as a means of positioning itself in the world arena and of managing relationships with major powers within the arena. The first part of the paper develops an argument about the place of strategic diplomacy in EU external policy, identifying key elements and proposing a framework for analysis. The second part looks at the record of EU diplomacy towards China since the mid-1990s, evaluating key phases in the evolution of the EU-China 'strategic partnership', and assesses the negotiations for an EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The conclusions revisit and reassess the arguments, and ask whether it is possible to identify 'value added' through the pursuit of EU strategic diplomacy in this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents the early stages of a new project that explores China's search for 'responsible' great power status through the case study of Sino-African aid relations. China has become less hesitant about its intentions of attaining the status of a 'responsible great power' in recent years, and it is often argued that part of its desire to play a more prominent role is manifest in its aid policies to the developing world. In the context of Sino-African relations, China's quest for natural resources and propping up of autocratic regimes has been subject to much scrutiny. It is, however, important to keep in mind that China is also under pressure to provide assistance to the developing world in a 'responsible' manner which befits the status of a 'responsible' great power as defined by the Western powers which continue to dominate International Society to this day. In this paper, I seek to analyse Chinese policy discussions on international aid and explore how Western norms of 'responsible' aid have made inroads into China. Its findings will help us better understand how the Chinese leadership conceptualises what a 'responsible' great power should do, and the extent to which such thinking is influenced by Western discourses. This, in turn generates interesting implications on debates of legitimacy in contemporary International Society, as well as who (especially in China's eyes) is bestowed with the moral authority to bestow recognition of a 'responsible' great power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of the bi-lateral relations of China, India and the United States with Burma over the past two decades. It analyses the growth of Chinese influence in Burma and how the Chinese have effectively utilised soft power to gain significant political and economic penetration within Burma. It also looks at the shifts in Indian policy formation in its relations with Burma to counteract this growing Chinese presence. It examines the Indian security concerns which prompted this policy shift and analyses the soft power sources and limitations which keep it from effectively competing with China in Burma. Furthermore this paper looks at the United States' hard line policy of economic sanctions and political isolation. It explores why this policy has been to date unsuccessful and how the incorporation of soft power into US Burmese policy could be crucial in beginning the reform process in Burma. Finally this paper also examines the potential to develop a "third way" of dealing with the Burmese Military Junta. This new way forward focuses on a cooperative strategy for dealing with Burma which incorporates beneficial common goals between all relevant actors to begin a unified international dialogue with the Burmese government. It also utilises the effective use of soft power to attract the Burmese government into reforms by placating fears and creating opportunities to benefit from openness to reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an overview of subtle yet significant shifts in Beijing's stance on non-interference and evolving standards of responsible international engagement in humanitarian crises to highlight China's clear, but cautious, support for the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although it is reticent to apply sanctions and objects to nonconsensual force, China has consistently affirmed the R2P principle and issued corresponding statements in favor of bolstering the UN's capacity to avert mass atrocity. China's statements provide a basis for Beijing to play a constructive, if reserved, role in translating the responsibility to protect from principle to practice. This paper argues that the path of most promise and least resistance for consolidating China's support for implementing the responsibility to protect is paved in practical engagement rather than polemics. It concludes with specific measures that may be taken for China to contribute to upholding the global pledge to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1975, American foreign policy in Southeast Asia can be characterized as "benign neglect". After the 9/11 attack, the Southeast Asian region has become refuge of Al Qaeda members and a "second front" of US global counter-terrorism operation. The rapid rise of China presents new challenges to US foreign policy. China's growing influence comes at the expense of US power and influence in Southeast Asia, hastening US-China competition in the region and increasing the probability of the outbreak of conflict. In order to prevent the decline of US influence in the region and maintain its sole super power status in the world, the US has sought to enhance and promote its relations with ASEAN countries, this way, the US has taken steps to become re-involved in the region. The purpose of this paper is to clarify expectations of future US strategy towards Southeast Asia by exploring the causes of US re-involvement in Southeast Asia as well as strategies the Bush administration undertook. This paper analyzes US goals and interests in the region, influences of the development of terrorism on the US and the effects of the rapid rise of China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has highlighted the "peaceful rise (heping jueqi)" in its projection of power, and the slogan will be retained during the second-term of Hu Jintao after the 17th National Party Congress. To corroborate the ideas, the country has been adopting various "soft power (ruan shili)" tools, and, in Asia at least, China's "charm offensive" has been working effectively, according to Joshua Kurlantzick.Recently, however, the ascendancy of China's soft power has been challenged in one of its neighboring countries, South Korea. The perception of South Koreans regarding China has been skewed to be negative for the past couple of years. On the other hand, in China, the "Korean Cultural Wave (hanliu)" has apparently started its ebb and has frequently faced "anti-hanliu" discourses, which are an extension of Chinese nationalism, practically employed by the communist party of China. Against this backdrop, my paper will try to 1) elaborate the current mutual perception between Korea and China; 2) address major factors affecting the mutual perception; and, 3) discuss what is the significance of the changing mutual perception to the current and future relations between Korea and China.For this paper, I will mainly rely on archive research and interview. For example, I will exam Chinese and Korean journal articles, reports, and empirical survey data. Also, I will visit China and Korea this summer to conduct interviews with Korean and Chinese professors and bureaucrats. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1368 and 1841 - almost five centuries - there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. These Sinicized states crafted the stable relations with each other, and the most violence and instability arose between these states and the "nomadic" peoples to the north and west of China and Korea. The nomads and the East Asian states both operated within a unipolar system, but whereas the states accepted Chinese authority, the nomads did not. This distinction is not important if Wohlforth's argument that associates unipolarity with stability prevailed in East Asia. Yet China's relations with the nomads were characterized by war and instability whereas relations with the Sinicized states were characterized by peace and stability. Unipolarity cannot account for both of these outcomes. What this paper demonstrates is that there is a hierarchical relationship in place in the context of China and the East Asian states that was generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview. These Sinic states possessed a shared sense of legitimacy which presupposes, in the context of Confucianism, that relations operate within an accepted hierarchy. The research presented in this paper helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSince 2000, China has a major economic player in Africa. China's role in Africa has manifested not only in trade but in investments in different sectors of the African economy, and in the provision of aid. There has been a significant increase in the flow and stock of China's FDI in Africa since 2000. The increase is largely driven by expansion in China-Africa trade, the search for new energy sources and the need to elevate China's international stature in the world. This paper examines the major policy changes in China which acted as fillip to Chinese firms; the characteristics and patterns of China's FDI; and the salience of Africa. The paper also assesses whether China's FDI is a catalyst to generate industrial development or a Trojan horse that will create a dependent linkage between the African economy and China ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Hu Jintao, China has promoted a “harmonious society” domestically and a “harmonious world” internationally. This policy has explicit Confucian overtones in obvious contrast to Maoist policies predicated on contradiction and conflict. The author inquires whether a foreign policy predicated on “harmony” can be theoretically and empirically differentiated from a realist outlook founded on “national interest.” The paper seeks to enrich sociological theories of international relations from non-Western sources and examine the real-world consequences of Chinese foreign policy discourse in an emergent East Asian order.The literature on traditional Chinese law distinguishes adjudication behaviour directed at Confucian notions of harmony from rights-based adjudication oriented towards justice and fairness in the Western legal tradition. The sociological work of Fei Xiaotong also distinguished traditional Chinese human relations from wetern sociological constructs. This paper applies Chinese sociological thought to international relations theory. How do contemporary Chinese views of world order bridge traditional themes with modern international relations theory? In what ways does Chinese pursuit of “harmony” complement or conflict with multilateral views of a liberal internationalism or the “international society” of the English School? The author looks at the Six Party Talks on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, China’s engagement of ASEAN and Africa as well as conflictual relations with Taiwan and Japan as evidence to interpret China’s role in constructing regional and world orders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the implications of the April 2005 Sino-Indian statement of strtegic partnership on the tripartite relations among Russia, China, and India. Less than a decade after Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov called for a strategic triangle among Russia, China, and India, the three countries have signed bilateral strategic partnerships with one another and regualarly meet in trilateral groups. The paper hypothesizes that the ties that bind these countries are tactical rather than strategic and therefore the long-term health of these partnerships will depend on whether changing identities and self-conceptions of leaders in each of these countries lead to a focus on absolute gains through cooperation versus an emphasis on relative gains leading to competition for influence and status in the Asian/Eurasian region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is attempted to research domestic changes in affecting China’s commitment to international institutions from international institutions-domestic institutions. It argues that some linkage factors which connect China and international system contribute to China’s strong compliance with international rules and norms. These factors cover coastal economic areas, outward sectors, and the rise of social middle class in China. With the rapid and deep involvement into global political economy system, positive changes happened in China’s domestic area. International institutions have great impacts on Chinese domestic political economy, and similarly, China must reform its domestic political economy system in order to meet global change and challenge. China has good reputation in complying global institutions. This paper concludes that domestic factors play key role in facilitating China’s compliance with international institution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts to illuminate diverse persepctives and images on China prevalent in contemporary Koreans by analyzing written materials by scholars and experts on the issue of China's Northeast Proejct. Historically, China and Korea have maintained good relationships which always accompany some sensitive tensions. The current China's Northeast Project has provoked national sentiment among contemporary Koreans. The paper is going to analyze the grounds of this Korean national consiousness and diverse images on China. This paper adopts a perspective of self-reflecting on contemproary Korean nationalism to identify its main distinnctions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of Southeast Asia have paid increasing attention to the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mediating the relations between the US and China. ASEAN has created a strong reputation for itself as a regional organization that embodies norms promoting respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. ASEAN scholars have argued that ASEAN norms have been adopted by China. This development has afforded ASEAN a more meaningful political institutional role in the region than its relative power merits. ASEAN is exercising a form of normative power in the Asia Pacific.This paper examines this argument from a critical constructivist perspective. ASEAN often does not function as a coherent bloc. The individual states of ASEAN have different perceptions of national interest and their behavior is described by a variety of theories. How do these differences affect the ability of ASEAN, the organization, to act in a coherent way? How is this potential incoherence perceived by the larger powers of the region and what are their respective approaches? China has decided to treat ASEAN as a coherent entity; the US has not. What are the long-term political consequences for these great powers of their respective strategies? This paper is based on field research conducted in the Asia Pacific in 2007. It examines the significance of the regional rhetoric around the ideas of shared norms and values. How credible are these claims and what are their strategic implications? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese relations with Africa have undergone a process of metamorphosis since the late 1950’s. From anti-imperialist posture and support for liberation struggles of the late 1950s and 1960s in Africa, contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Africa is a reflection of neo-liberal realpolitik or the Beijing consensus (BC) which is driven by power and an unprecedented need for resources in a fast competitive global market. As the Cold War petered out, western countries began to concentrate their investments in the transitions economies of Eastern Europe, China began to increase its investment in Africa with renewed policy based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs resonates with African leaders who are suspicious of motives of former colonial powers and the US. This new Chinese invigoration in Africa was crystallized with the formation in 2000 of the first China â€" Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF). China’s resurgence in Africa has seen tremendous increase in trade, aid, investment, and exchange of human capita and has become the envy of western countries.Critics of China’s resurgence in Africa have questioned China’s motives and characterized Chinese interest in Africa as a form of “new imperialism”, “scramble”, or new colonialism; and some, especially the Human Rights Watch and the World Bank have criticized China as ignoring human rights violations and encouraging corruption among African leaders. The objectives of this paper are twofold: firstly to examine and understand the trajectories of Sino Africa relations from Cold War to present; and secondly to understand the principles and ideological lenses that shaped and continues to shape these relations. In order to bridge the hiatus in our understanding of Sino-Africa relations, this paper examine the evolving history of Sino African relations, the ideological underpinnings for the relations, the patterns and nature of exchanges between Africa and China, and the changes and continuities.By Emmanuel E. Obuah ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as an economic and political power constitutes both an opportunity to promote regional stability as well as a threat to derail regional stability in Asia. One of the major factors effecting China's international role in the coming years will be the management of the so-called Taiwan question. Taiwan's unresolved future, as well as Sino-Japanese relations will, in turn, become increasingly significant issues within Chinese domestic politics. At present, China is doing its best to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise to the role of regional power. China wants to be seen as the pragmatic promoter of multilateralism to ensure regional stability, opposed to the China of previous decades, which created instability in numerous Southeast Asian countries by pursuing ideological objectives. On the other hand, when dealing with what Beijing calls a domestic affair, the so-called Taiwan question, China's stance threatens to destabilize the region, a cause of great concern throughout Asia. Increasingly, as Chinese society becomes more pluralistic, the leaders of China could conceivably come under intense pressure from factions within several domestic constituencies to adopt an even tougher stance toward Taiwan, to ensure that the goal of reunification is not nullified forever. Moreover, in the event of economic stagnation, a domestic crisis could propel the Chinese leaders to force a settlement in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to divert public opinion away from problems at home. This paper will focus on Chinese policies in Asia, describing the development of these policies as they become more accommodating, on the one hand, while simultaneously, due to domestic constraints, more uncompromising and hard-line in the Taiwan Strait and vis-à-vis Japan. The paper will attempt to analyze the effect that the diversification of Chinese politics as well as the emphasis on China's century of humiliation have on China's dual-track Asia policy and its effects on stability in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broad and complicated are the scope and themes of Chinese foreign policy. Most notably, China is seen widely as a unique power when dealing with international relations in general and foreign policy crises in particular. This paper uses the Poliheuristic Theory (PH), which incorporates both psychological and rational choice components in a synthesis of these previously isolated approaches, to explain decision-making in Chinese foreign policy crises. Taken from the authoritative compilation of International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the nine cases in which China is a crisis actor span the period from 1950 to 1996. A controlled comparison of Chinese decision-making in times of crisis is used to test hypotheses derived from the PH. The hypotheses focus on how decisions are anticipated to occur over two stages. Principal expectations are that the noncompensatory rule, which places priority on political considerations, will determine viable alternatives at the first stage, while choices more in line with expected value maximization or lexicographic ordering will characterize the second stage. This study consists of seven sections. After a brief overview, PH is introduced as the theoretical foundation in the second section. The third section reviews the state of the art in studies of Chinese foreign policy-making. Fourth, a controlled comparative case analysis is outlined as the method, along with hypotheses derived from PH that will be tested via nine Chinese foreign policy crises identified by the ICB Project. The fifth section includes an account of the coding procedures for the cases. Sixth, results are presented that generally confirm PH. Implications regarding the differences and similarities of the cases also are discussed. Seventh, and finally, the concluding remarks review the results and identify directions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working mainly from historical and sociological version of new institutionalism (NI) divergent from the mainstream IR regime theory and secondarily in line with Gramsci?s idea of hegemony, this paper explores the global dominance of the "one China" order and its discontents. It is argued that the hegemonic ?one China? order in favor of Beijing?s interest, created in a specific historical condition, has been established through the extensive and intensive institutionalization of rules concerned in both fundamental level and detailed policy realms. It is demonstrated that the ?one China? institution functions as a filter that forecloses other possibilities of historical development which were relatively open in the past, that limits Taiwan’s freedom of policy action and marginalize its diplomatic space, and that legitimates the PRC’s action in interfering in Taiwan’s international relations. Meanwhile, Beijing’s interests are embedded and entrenched in the "one China" hegemonic order. Moreover, while the institution shape agents’ organization of interests in a divergent way, its persistence hinges upon continuing practices and reproduction by the PRC or countries concerned. Finally, the state of the "one China" institutionalization was argued to be more influential than its predecessor in light of the coherence of its cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements and their consolidation within the hands of the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of the English school concepts of balances of power, great powers and middle powers, the paper argues that the US and China advocate competing concepts of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. The US prefers an order based on the instruments of war, whereas China gravitates towards instruments of diplomacy. Sino-US policies produce an unstable pattern of balancing marked by fluctuating alliance and partnership commitments, a low level of predictability, and considerable freedom of action. This intermediate type of order leaves middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia and South Korea with extraordinary responsibilities for preserving the balance. It is engendered by China’s efforts to postpone agreement on permanent mechanisms of regional order, pending the realization of its development potential allowing it to influence regional order on a par with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's emergence as a powerful and confident international actor presents both a challenge and an opportunity for states worldwide. Assessments of how international actors have responded to China's rise have typically focused on rival great powers or on China's Asian neighbours. In these cases, relative power, geographic proximity, and regional institutions have conditioned elements of actors' relationships with China. China's relationship with the developing world has largely been defined by power asymmetry and the appeal of the Chinese governance model to authoritarian regimes. Absent from this discussion is an understanding of how Western middle power democracies are responding to the rise of China. This paper compares how Canada and Australia are responding to the rise of China. The two case studies are similar in many respects. Both are Western democratic states with prominent middle power foreign policy traditions. Both are resource based economies that have a track record of bilateral and institutional engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, both states are key US allies. These similarities allow the authors to isolate differences in the Canadian and Australian response to China's rise in the fields of political, economic and military engagement. China's rise challenges Ottawa and Canberra to adopt policies that balance often conflicting international and domestic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Far from the realists? description, little has shown that China is taking a revisionist strategy against the American hegemony. Rather, China has taken a prudent policy to improve her global leadership while her comprehensive cooperation with the United States has never been excluded. China might not satisfy with the U. S. hegemony; however, China is far from the capabilities to overcome the strategic limits that her title of „Rising Power� has generated. Besides, China is not certain that the 2008 financial crisis has already speeded the decline of American hegemony. And finally, China has evaluated that she could not surpass American comprehensive power before the end of 21st century. This paper will describe firstly China?s evaluation on the relative global power distribution from the perspectives of China?s �low-profile� strategy. Then the focus will put on the dilemma that China has suffered from the global second rank. The final part will explore challenges that hamper China?s low-key rising strategy. It concludes that China is a second-tier global leader for she has neither intentions nor the capability to generate a Chinese hegemony in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has there been no confrontation or conflict among big powers after the Cold War? Neither structural realism nor constructivism can offer satisfactory answer. This paper attempts to find an answer to this puzzle by going back to the unit level to explo ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the challenges to peace from China's rise to become a hegemonic superpower. The rise is understood through the lens of powertransition theory combined with an analysis of national identity construction, with nationalism understood as ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the Vietnamese government’s and the Vietnam Workers Party’s difficulties in dealing with two “big brothers” â€" the Soviet Union and China â€" during 1965-1972, as the conflict between them deepened and the Vietnam War escalated and expan ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“…American blacks, your struggle is our struggle! The people of the world stand together with our American black brothers!” [quoted from an article in the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 9/9/63] This paper challenges international relations' silence on race in the global order by examining the influence of transnational racial categories on globalizing governments and how they define themselves and their interests. I will argue that in the 1950s, the newly-liberated Chinese Communist government began to develop a radical orientation for its foreign policy and international relations in which the explicit recognition of race, racial identification and cross-racial solidarity, Third-worldism, was an important political discursive component. To support this argument, I will exam a process of racialization, the “…extension of racial meaning…” to something that most political scientists believe is devoid of such concerns - foreign policy initiatives and international relations by examining three major events that prompted the development and dissemination of a discourse of a racialized foreign policy orientation. These three events are â€"(1) the planning for the Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955; (2) the reportage in the CPC’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) on the African-American Civil Rights Movement, particularly the major events of the pivotal year, 1963; and (3) The construction of the TanZam Railway in the 1970s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most view China as the rising power in Asia, the future of the region will also be determined by India. Despite receiving less attention, India is a growing economic, military, and political power in the region and globally. India has the world’s 4th largest economy at $796 billion and for the past decade, has registered economic growth rates over 7 percent. India has the 3rd largest active duty armed force in the world behind China and the United States and is a nuclear power. Finally, India is a respected political player and often cited as a candidate for inclusion in the UN Security Council. Certainly, India faces significant obstacles including over 350 million living dire poverty and an economic infrastructure that needs significant repair. However, Indian leaders have ambitious aspirations and it is a country on the rise. Given India’s important and growing position in Asia, its relations with China and Japan, the other key players in region, will be crucial. This paper will examine India’s economic, political, and security relationship with these other two powers of Asia and the impact these relations have on Indian and regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the primacy of unification in China's strategic thinking. Sinocentric wisdom upholds China's "great unity." Unification is regarded as the guarantor of stability and prosperity while division the recipe for chaos and sufferings. I highlight that the Chinese term for China, zhongguo, originally meant "central states" in plurality. I develop a rigorous definition of unification and show that zhongguo was more often divided than unified. I also demonstrate that the drive to achieve and maintain unification produced wars of annihilation, wars of repression, and wars of conquest. Moreover, unification did not necessarily contribute to human welfare. Singular zhongguo tended to repress dissent, stifle trade, and dominate its neighbors. In contrast, plural zhongguo was favorable to the development of state-society bargains, commercial activities, and diplomatic relations. Paradoxically, it was unification that brought about "great disorder under heaven," and division that had the potential to realize "great unity under heaven." This contrast is more pronounced if we extend the analysis from the Chinese heartland to the periphery. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically assesses the explanatory power of the Theories of Securitization (TOS) in explaining the different interpretations of Chinese energy strategy and security issues. The examination is made from both theoretical and empirical levels, embracing discussions on the relevance between TOS and energy security as well as an assessment of how the realists and liberals/institutionalists interpret contemporary Chinese energy strategy. It suggests that as a framework of revolutionary security studies TOS creates un-precedently wide dimension in conceptualising energy security. Chinese energy strategies are considered under two major interpretations: 1. The multilateral diplomacy and proactive overseas activities are a demonstration of China’s positive stance in cooperating with other key global nations and institutions; 2. The country’s foreign policy is driven by the domestic energy demand and an active international engagement in all areas to enhance its national power, which could be considered as a potential threat to the world. The role of TOS in this context provides efficient explanations as to why there are two strands of understandings through the application of useful methodologies as suggested in this theory: that is to clarify key securitization factors such as referent object, who securitizes and what is securitized. However, the weakness and limitation of this framework is considered to be over-broad in scope thus leaving space for analysts apply to one aspect of the theory to fit into their own objective and offer interpretations on social and political phenomena, in this sense, the contribution of TOS to security studies is fragmented. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to answer three questions about contemporary Chinese political economy system: As a long-time commanding state and decentralized developmental state, for what causes Chinese government decided to perform regulatory reform policies and build a regulatory state in mid-1990s? What kind of structural obstacles will Chinese regulatory state building meet and face? Which unique characteristics does Chinese regulatory state possess? By taking drug safety regulation as a typical case of risk regulation, this article will provide a series of replies accordingly as below: It is the collapse of Interest Community of Government, Enterprise and Shiye Unit (ICGES) that fosters the regulatory state rising in contemporary China. Nowadays, three major structural obstacles are threatening Chinese regulatory state building due to the path dependence of its previous political economy system: problematic regulatory independence caused by decentralized developmentalism, administrative-relied regulatory style affected by commanding economy model and rent-seeking orientation of regulatory corruption brought by authoritarian political system. Therefore, the author is inclined to employ a term of "authoritarian regulatory state" to define the characteristics of current Chinese regulatory state in contrast to general regulatory states based on well-rounded market economy and democratic political system. If the readers agree with this analytical framework, we can argue that Chinese regulatory state building in still on the road from the case of drug safety regulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid ascent of China to great power status has caused much concern among politicians and academics alike. The prospect that China may eventually attain parity with the United States dramatically increases the likelihood of security challenges between itself and the West. There has been a great deal of attention given to this issue by policy analysts and media outlets; however, the rise of China has not received commensurate attention in the international relations literature. Power Transition Theory posits that states require not only the capability, but the willingness to overtake the system leader. While China’s ability to surpass the US is a possibility, our understanding of its willingness to take on systemic leadership is relatively indeterminate. In this analysis, we employ Power Transition Theory in order to address the following questions: is China dissatisfied with the status quo and, if so, will it be willing to assume the role of dominant power? Our paper attempts to answer these questions using conventional measures as well as participation in regional and supra-regional structures. In doing so, we hope to gauge China’s dissatisfaction with the status quo and its potential willingness to advance its preferences in the international arena. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of either informal empire or colonialism is dependent on the development or breakdown of the institutions regulating interaction between expansionist actors and the periphery. How relationships between these actors evolve in a given institutional context determines subsequent interactions and societal development, as certain actors are privileged in terms of authority and resources. In this paper, I will argue that an understanding of European imperialism that appreciates expansion in terms of institutional linkage and adaptation allows better specification of the advantages and disadvantages that explain the type of imperialism established as well as its institutional persistence. I will demonstrate the usefulness of such an approach by comparing the cases of China and the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century; arguing the ability of European actors to link with existing practices and understandings in these cases allowed the achievement of imperial goals. The key point to be made is that different understandings of territoriality, the international, and legal personality in China and the Ottoman Empire led to the establishment of different institutional complexes that constituted European imperialism in these areas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has become a major institutional linkage within the ASEAN Plus Three framework. This paper will employ an historical institutional approach to examine the development of the ASEAN-China linkage. The origins of the ACFTA and the sequence of events that has promoted the linkage will be analysed. The extent to which the positive economic and political feedback process as well as the timing and sequence of events have helped to reinforce the relationship will be assessed. It is argued that the resulting trajectory of the ACFTA underscores the political nature of the emerging association and makes it difficult, although not impossible, for other relationships to supersede the ASEAN-China linkage at the centre of the APT framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there is a need to move beyond the oft-cited but mis-applied security dilemma framework to analyze cross-Strait relations. In delineating an alternative more dynamic security model, I argue that the realities of the Taiwan Strait reflect an equilibrium of insecurity, where both states choose to remain in relatively insecure rivalry because it provides a stable cognitive environment that is less uncertain than other possible alternatives. The key mechanism that maintains and sustains this dynamic equilibrium is strategic histrionics, which is a hybrid of security logics with Chinese theater and operatic theory. In using four case studies, I show the empirical validity of the strategic histrionics mechanism in sustaining the equilibrium of insecurity. Finally, in my conclusion, I provide some suggestions for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How best to avoid a possible crisis over Taiwan, which might escalate into the most unwanted war of this century? Traditional studies of Taiwan crises focus mainly on a rational choice theory of deterrence. However, they fail to account for risk-taking behavior that seems irrational but can be well explained by prospect theory. This paper employs prospect theory to explain China's different policies toward Taiwan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. By using regime security as a reference point to define the domains of action, we suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use military coercion, a more risky policy, against Taiwan's pro-independence movements when they are in a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime security faces serious domestic and international challenges. On the contrary, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ political pressure, a less risky policy, to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces, if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when their regime security is insured. We conclude that maintaining a good U.S.-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to avoid military crises in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hong Kong has long enjoyed a vibrant civil society, but Hong Kong has fallen short of developing full democracy after decolonization started 20 years ago. This paper discusses the evolution of civil society movements in Hong Kong and its relations with democratic development in Hong Kong. It discusses the ideology, mobilization structures, internal dynamics, and relations with political society and the state of the civil society organizations (CSOs). It shows that the vibrant civil society is under multiple constraints from the state and faces own problems of organization and mobilization, weakening its impact on democratization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does ASEAN's cooperative security matter and, if so, in what sense? This paper argues that the key to capturing the significance of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise is the positive interaction between two possible motives for the implementation of cooperative policies, namely, the pursuit of normative appropriateness and the egoistic calculation of strategic interests. Through the pursuit of normative appropriateness by the ASEAN counties, the elements of their self-interest associated with cooperation have increasingly been salient - namely, the achievement of their "national interests" or "national security" through the enhancement of ASEAN's relations with China, its autonomy vis-à-vis the US, and its centrality in Asia-Pacific regionalism in the security field. In this respect, for the ASEAN countries, cooperative security matters because it is in line with what they perceive as an appropriate approach to security; moreover, it matters because its promotion has increasingly been beneficial to their strategic interests defined in egoistic terms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary Chinese nationalism has its roots in the country’s nation-building and identity-forming movements in the early 20th century that sought to establish China’s place in the community of nations. Today, nationalism in China can be characterized as falling into two major categories. On the one hand, there is nationalism embedded in patriotism with great pride in China’s civilization, major achievements, and confidence in the country’s future in embracing and meeting the challenges of globalization. On the other hand, there is the sentimental nationalism that reacts to what is perceived as injustice and insult done to China and it reflects a strong victim mentality. The domestic discourse of nationalism can be influenced by government propaganda, intellectual debates, popular displays of emotion and repulsion, or a mixture of all three. As China continues to grow in economic power and political influence, how nationalism is handled can have a significant impact on relations with its neighbors and beyond. The paper will discuss various scenarios and offer some recommendations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some are concerned that China is strategically motivated and China's growing influence poses a major threat to the West. This paper assesses the strategic value of the South Pacific in China's grand strategy, China's soft power in the region and some constraints to China's hegemonic rise. It concludes that China's policy toward the South Pacific is not mainly driven by its security strategy and that China's soft power in the region is limited. It also casts doubt on China's hegemonic rise in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa has embarked on a new phase of capitalist development, powered in large part by Chinese investment. After three decades of stagnation, the continent as a whole is witnessing growth rates of five percent per year and becoming once again a focal point of geopolitical dispute. This paper will focus on the Sino-African relationship and ask two questions in particular: what is China's strategy in Africa? And what is its likely developmental impact? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]