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For over three decades, sanctions have been a consistent feature of United States policy towards Iran. Following the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, in 2018 the United States withdrew from the agreement through Executive Order 13846, reinstating previous sanctions. Consequently, Iran decided to bring its case against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on the 1955 Treaty of Amity. The present article analyzes the ICJ's substantive jurisdiction (Merits) over this case, as well as the political and legal implications of the United States' unilateral sanctions against Iran. The research employs an analytical methodology, utilizing library research and note-taking to collect data. The research findings indicate that the ICJ's opinion is based on the illegality of comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on national security grounds, and that the Court has substantive jurisdiction over this case. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the United States' unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions not only violate Iran's sovereignty, but also infringe upon the human rights of the Iranian people. The United States' sanctions policy aligns with liberal and realist theories of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has experienced deep identity changes in its foreign policy. The Islamic Republic redefined the way to interact with the world based on the Shi’ite ideas and the historical memory of Iranians. With the growing tensions between Iran and the West, conflicts can be seen between Iran’s defined identity and its foreign policy actions, to the extent that in cases such as Iran’s policy towards Russia and the path of Iran–China relations, the principles of Iran’s identity have been ignored. This article considers why there is a conflict between the positions and actions of Iran and the identity that this country represents, focusing on the period after the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Using the descriptive-explanatory method, this article tests the hypothesis that although the intensification of sanctions has strengthened the narrative of anti-Westernism in Iran, the transformation of anti-Westernism into a dominant identity discourse has caused other layers of identity to be marginalised and even ignored in some cases. This situation has created a disconnection between Iran’s actions and its biographical narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under extraterritorial sanctions the sanctioning country extends its policies to trade of third countries with the sanctioned country. An example is President Trump's decision in 2018 to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a multilateral agreement with Iran. In this article, I develop a game‐theoretic model to explain the emergence of extraterritorial sanctions. Such trade sanctions (i) do not arise when the harmful activity of the sanctioned country ("build a nuclear bomb") is verifiable even if monetary transfers are ruled out, but (ii) emerge if a second activity ("sponsor international terrorism") is not verifiable, and the sanctioning countries differ in their gains from trade with the sanctioned country, their harm from the non‐verifiable activity, and their cost from abandoning the international economic order. In the context of the US–Iran–EU conflict, I argue that the oil and gas fracking boom in the US together with former President Trump's ignorance of his international reputation are key factors in the emergence of extraterritorial trade sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear acquisition is a historically rare event driven by a broad range of factors, of which US nonproliferation policy is only one.[61] Nonetheless, the political benefits that nuclear weapons continue to offer the states that possess them, along with the broader geopolitical dynamics that may increase some states' incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, are likely to ensure that proliferation remains plausible.[62] Our argument suggests that the United States will likely become less central to the choices that states make about whether to seek and acquire nuclear weapons. Second, domestic political consensus within the United States has provided long-term credibility to the deals and commitments the United States makes, allowed policymakers to use the full set of nonproliferation tools in tandem, and ensured that nonproliferation policies endure across administrations of varying political stripes. First, US material power - military, economic, and within the civilian nuclear energy sector - has allowed the United States to shift the incentives of states contemplating a decision to pursue or acquire nuclear weapons, enabled the United States to build an international order that supports nonproliferation goals, and reinforced the US motivation to prevent proliferation. Third, US normative legitimacy has helped the United States achieve nonproliferation successes at lower costs, created an international order that states sought to enter even at the cost of eschewing their ability to acquire nuclear weapons, and allowed the United States to paper over some of the tensions within its portfolio of nonproliferation policies. [Extracted from the article]

Following the signing of the JCPOA nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 countries in June 2015 and the subsequent lifting of international sanctions, many observers predicted that Chinese carmakers would be squeezed out of the Iranian market by European and South Korean manufacturers. In 2018 however, after the Trump administration withdrew the United States from the agreement and reinstated sanctions, the situation moved in favour of the Chinese car industry. China has now become the biggest overseas player in Iran's automobile market. This article argues that the abandonment of the JCPOA by Washington led to the 'China-ization' of the car industry in Iran and shows how Iranian carmakers played an instrumental role in this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to maintain profound economic and political relations with the People's Republic of China. In the interim since the 1970s China has not only enjoyed diplomatic and economic relations with the US but has become its largest trading partner. Having diplomatic relations with both Washington and Tehran, as well as being a permanent member of the United Nation's Security Council the government of China has openly served a constructive role, for all its own purpose and intentions, in attempting to bring Iran and the United States (such as in the case of the 2015 nuclear negotiations or JCPOA) back to the negotiation table. The 2015 nuclear agreement in particular was important as it potentially offered both Iran and the United States with a diplomatic opportunity and a platform to de-escalate their tensions, differences, and hostilities. The agreement also meant getting rid of most sanctions and barriers in doing business openly with Iran and hence the opening of the lucrative Iranian market to the Chinese, amongst other international players. Therefore, we have witnessed triangular relations between these three states which have influenced their political, economic, and diplomatic ambitions. This article examines the US factor in China and Iran relations in order to highlight China's dual policies towards Washington and Tehran. It concluded that the US factor compels the Chinese side to pursue a dual policy towards Iran which revolves around limited cooperation and limited abandonment. At the same time, Beijing tends to tilt toward Tehran in order to send Washington a message that China would not tolerate unilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran and the United States (US) have resorted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on five occasions to settle their disputes. The latest dispute was initiated by Iran and pertains to US's decision of withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement and re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, including its nationals and companies. In this brief critique, the authors have analysed the preliminary objections and the ICJ's approach in deciding the dispute. The authors have noticed that the ICJ digressed from its earlier decisions which involved the Treaty of Amity 1955 between Iran and the US. It is also to be noted that the ICJ has not substantiated its deviation with analytical observation. Also, it is opined that although the international adjudication lacks a system of precedent, it is the sacrosanct duty of the ICJ to establish a coherent jurisprudence in the interest of justice, which the ICJ has consciously neglected to achieve in this present dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the product of aggressive “secondary sanctions”—innovative sanctions that put economic pressure on the target state by punishing states and entities that engage in transactions with the target state. Prior to the JCPOA, the United States used secondary sanctions to “outcast” Iran—isolate it from the international community. After Iran entered into the JCPOA, these sanctions were removed as a reward for its cooperation. In May 2018, however, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed the secondary sanctions in order to “re-outcast” Iran. But unlike the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime, the re-outcasting regime was not imposed in response to any violation of international law by Iran; instead, it was imposed for solely policy reasons. As a result, members of the international community condemned the use of secondary sanctions as politically motivated and illegitimate. Although the use of secondary sanctions is a relatively new phenomenon, it has become increasingly more prevalent since the Iran sanctions regime, serving as one of the main sources of pressure against nations such as Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. In contrast to the growing prominence of secondary sanctions, however, the academic literature on the topic remains thin. This piece seeks to fill that gap. By comparing the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime with the re-outcasting regime, this piece provides a timely insight into the counter-productive consequences of imposing secondary sanctions for purely policy reasons. This piece highlights that without international law, secondary sanctions are viewed as illegitimate, which leads to defiance by states and creates a “chilling effect” that makes cooperation less attractive for the outcast. Thus, this piece proposes that the United States should only impose secondary sanctions in response to a state’s violation of international law in order to avoid undermining the power of these sanctions in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Presidencies of the EU Council 2020: Croatia (1 January-30 June) and Germany (1 July-31 December) Subsequent presidencies 2021: Portugal (1 January-30 June) and Slovenia (1 July-31 December) January 1 Despite weeks of nationwide strikes by trade unions, French union CGT calls for more strikes in France, after President Macron pledged to push through the pension system reform. Meanwhile, EEAS chief Josep Borrell states that the EU is ready to engage in "monitoring" of any potential ceasefire plan in Libya and to "control" a UN embargo on arms transfers to the country. They are presenting themselves as new allies of EU integration in countries where illiberal and populist governments have clashed with EU institutions over the bloc's values and rule of law. [Extracted from the article]

The article examines the foreign policy challenge facing U.S. President Joe Biden in relation to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal, and Iran's demand for sanctions relief. It discusses sanctions as a significant tool of U.S. non-proliferation policy and how better outcomes may be achieved by having clear objectives and mechanism for sanctions relief. Also noted is the security threat that a failed sanctions relief could pose to U.S. strategic interests.

With a US administration fully sympathetic to Benjamin Netanyahu's strident hostility towards Iran, Israeli officials have little to debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the different considerations involved in maritime security in the Persian Gulf region. Topics include withdrawal of Washington from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and application of maximum pressure on Iran through economic and diplomatic sanctions, events in Persian Gulf in 2019 which underscores growing tension and the prospects of military confrontation, and massive hydrocarbon resources held by the Persian Gulf states.

The article focuses on elections in Iran. Topics discussed include abandoning of the joint nuclear deal with Iran and reintroducing sanctions by U.S. President Donald Trump administration; the politico-religious thought of Iranian politician Ayatollah Khomeini and the Reform Era emerged during the 1997 presidential elections.

In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21st century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran's nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As to whether the effectiveness of the sanctions through the cooperation has been enhanced, the answer is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cooperating transatlantic partners managed to coerce Iran through isolating the country from international economic contacts and negotiated the JCPOA. On the other hand, Trump's renouncement of this agreement brought many negative consequences and undermined the earlier joint effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study adapts the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to help explain the puzzle of continuity and changes in U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward Iran. It shows how coalitions of governmental and nongovernmental actors promoted negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to sharply curtail Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief and engagement. This agreement remained in place from 2015 to 2018, even though President Trump and other opponents sought to dismantle the deal. This article demonstrates how competition and power balances shaped the foreign policy decision‐making process over time. Evidence suggests that the ACF offers a compelling lens to explain continuity and change in foreign policy. Related Articles: Carlsson, Lars. 2017. "Policy Science at an Impasse: A Matter of Conceptual Stretching?" Politics & Policy 45 (2): 148‐168. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12196 David, Charles‐Philippe. 2015. "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Reorientation of National Security Policy under the G. W. Bush Administration (2001‐04)." Politics & Policy 43 (1): 163‐195. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12106 Haar, Roberta. 2010. "Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11." Politics & Policy 38 (5): 965‐990. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00265.x Related Media: Brookings Institution. 2018. "Debating the Iran Deal." https://www.brookings.edu/series/debating-the-iran-deal/ Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics. 2015. "The Iran Nuclear Negotiations: A Discussion with Wendy Sherman." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LF-Oiu99Gn8 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an argument that the constraints on Iran's influence and power are remained after the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the nuclear deal. Topics discussed include the launch of the nuclear program in the country by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s, the limits imposed by the JCPOA on country's nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations (UN), and the implication of constraints on the foreign policy of the U.S.

The article focuses on the eventual withdrawal by the U.S. from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It mentions the U.S. Congress's forced review of the agreement and bipartisan majority votes against the deal and sapped the deal of its legitimacy and eased the path for President Donald Trump's withdrawal. It also mentions imposition of strict Congressional sanctions, including the Central Bank of Iran secondary sanctions, which impact oil purchasing of Iran.