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CEO compensation in Canada is significantly lower than that in the United States. In this article, we examine the choice of, and impact on Canadian CEO Compensation, using U.S. firms in their compensation peer groups. Using a two-stage model to control for endogeneity, while we find the choice of peers associated with labor market factors, we still find that the use of U.S. peers positively associated with higher Canadian CEO compensation. This finding is after controlling for the traditional determinants of CEO compensation, as well as use of domestic peers. While this result holds for all components of the compensation package, we also find that having U.S. peers is associated with a greater proportion of equity in the compensation package. Our results are robust to various formulations including change models and using an earlier time period when peer disclosure was voluntary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate executive compensation in Canada, as in many developed economies, has risen significantly since the 1980s relative to that of the average worker. This has posed an issue for corporate governance due to concerns that the trend may not be serving the corporation and its stakeholders well, and also an issue for society as a whole due to its impact on income inequality more generally. This has raised interest in the role played by institutions in shaping executive pay decisions and also in what role they might play in resolving these issues. This paper looks at the role played by one such institution, the courts, with two ends in mind. The first is to gain an empirical understanding of what the courts actually do with respect to executive pay disputes. It does so by examining a set of decisions by Canadian courts between 1876 and 2018 collected by the author in which the claim of a corporate executive to their pay was at issue in order to get a better picture of how the courts are accessed, who relies on them, what rules they use, how the courts respond and how trends in these have evolved over time. It finds that the litigation of executive pay disputes has varied widely over time with a variety of stakeholders using a variety of legal areas – corporate law, contract law and bankruptcy/arrangement law in particular – to dispute the entitlement of executives to their pay. In recent years however litigation has come to be dominated by oppression remedy applications, with plaintiffs being successful in challenging pay in a majority of decisions. This paints a significantly different picture of the role of the courts than that developed in the American literature which focuses almost exclusively on shareholder use of derivative actions to monitor pay decisions. The second is to examine how better use might be made of the courts in order to remedy the broader problems for corporate stakeholders and society as a whole that corporate executive pay practice presents. It suggests that an expanded role for the oppression remedy by corporate employees should be considered as a policy option which would better reflect a stakeholder model of governance and address broader inequality concerns at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is the best of times for Canada's public markets, it is the worst of times for Canada's public markets. It is an age when markets have been rewarding public companies with the highest valuations seen in generations. It is an age of a rapid decline in Canadian companies opting to go public. Given that Canada's reliance on public markets is far higher than that of any other country -- double that of the next-highest country -- we should be alarmed that fewer and fewer companies are choosing to go public. Companies that stay private are, on average, less successful, less productive, less likely to grow into national champions, and more likely to be sold to foreign buyers. The current decline of public markets may go to the heart of what is arguably the biggest long-term policy issue in the country: our innovation gap and declining relative productivity growth. There is no shortage of advantages for a company to go public. Public companies grow faster, grow larger, become both more productive and efficient, and have cheaper access to capital. An IPO permits early investors to exit while allowing managers to continue to build the company. What is evidently causing more and more Canadian executives to avoid going public, despite all these advantages, is a regulatory and governance ecosystem that has grown increasingly hostile to and distrustful of corporate leadership. Executives who consider going public face an environment in which their compensation levels will be high; indeed, pay for senior executives at public companies has grown remarkably in recent years. However, because of increasingly onerous regulatory disclosure requirements, earning those rewards comes at the cost of having their pay disclosed to the public, debated by shareholders and scrutinized by the media. Companies that go public also face a growing loss of control over their own governance due to pressure to adhere to an ever-evolving list of so-called universal best practices that can run dozens of pages long. These practices exact costs but don't generally improve results. The result is a dominant one-size-fits-all governance model that does not in fact fit many, or even most companies. The key factor creating this hostile environment is a massive intrusion by outside forces on the powers traditionally exercised by boards and executives. Corporate governance used to arise from the bargaining and experimentation of the private parties that coalesce around corporations. Now governance is frequently imposed ex post on public companies by third parties with their own agendas. Particularly problematic are third-party commercial proxy advisors, ostensibly representing the interests of institutional shareholders. Their short-term, faddish, complex, and value-harming governance practices diverge dangerously from the interests of long-term flesh-andblood investors. The innovations over the past three decades in governance rules were designed to reduce agency costs and improve corporate performance. Those that have proven failures at doing so, and there are several, should be scrapped. Rather than helping Canada's markets become stronger, public markets have grown substantially weaker, and rather than making Canadian companies better, we now face an environment where companies would rather sell to a foreign buyer and leave the country, than go public here. The repercussions can only be adverse for Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a large sample of North American firms, from 1999 to 2016, we investigate the effect of corporate governance structures, specifically ownership, board characteristics, and executive compensation contracts on innovation intensity and output. We consider both R & D expenditures and patents as innovation proxies and evaluate consequences of the economic downturns of 2000 and 2008. We find that R & D investment increases with ownership by institutional blockholders and with the number of institutional owners, confirming the key role institutions play in innovation activities of firms. We observe higher R & D levels for firms with more independent boards, more females board members and more outside directorships held by directors. We report that firms with CEO/chair of the board duality have lower R & D intensity, as do firms with higher ownership by directors and with a higher mean board age. Innovation is negatively related to CEO salary levels, but positively related to the ratio of incentives to total compensation, confirming that incentives contribute to aligning shareholders and management interests, which leads to better long-term decisions. However, those incentives reduce the number of patents. We do not find any systematic changes in R & D for the 2000 recession, however there is an increase for the 2008 financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Say-on-Pay (SOP) gives shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. Unlike in a number of other western countries, SOP is not prescribed by regulation in Canada, although more and more firms are now adopting this practice voluntarily. We take advantage of this legal context to first examine the characteristics of firms that have voluntarily adopted SOP. Secondly, we examine whether shareholders' votes are linked to the extent and specifics of the compensation granted; and thirdly, we determine whether the votes cast affect executive compensation growth in the next year. The statistical analyses are based on a sample of 744 observations covering the years from 2013 to 2017. Results suggest that the firms that have voluntary adopted SOP differ significantly in several ways from those that have not. SOP vote results appear to be negatively related to the level and growth of total CEO compensation and its components involving immediate cash outflows. The vote does not seem to impact executive compensation and its components in the following year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study investigates how the implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts is determined by both the acquisition and the acquirer features for a set of M&A deals undertaken by Canadian acquiring firms. Our findings reveal that when agency problems are higher, manifested by larger control premiums and poor firm performance, boards of directors tend to implement stronger mechanisms of incentive alignment around M&A transactions. Relying on multiple interdisciplinary logics that are activated to explain directors' ability to effectively perform their monitoring function, we show that boards are reactive rather than proactive in dealing with agency problems. Data are further interpreted in light of the unique aspects of the Canadian institutional context. Based on asymmetric risk properties of two different groups of executive compensation modes examined in this study, testing the substitution effects between alternative governance mechanisms is proposed as an interesting avenue for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canadian firms face a trade-off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in-the-money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade-off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider-trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Française de Gouvernance d'Entreprise is the property of Institut Francais des Administrateurs and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We examine the effect of CEO option compensation on firm risk in Canadian firms listed on the S&P/TSX index. Results show that there is a robust size effect. Option compensation has a positive and significant effect on firm risk only in small firms and no significant effect in large firms. Moreover, option compensation has no significant effect on firm risk in cross‐listed firms, but within the sample of cross‐listed firms option compensation has a positive and significant effect in small firms only. Overall, our results suggest that CEO compensation is more effective in encouraging risk taking in small Canadian firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of geographic location on the level and structure of executive compensation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Canada, using a panel data sample between 2008 and 2011. Our results show that SMEs pay a higher price for talent by paying a large proportion (71%) of compensation as guaranteed cash pay to their executives. We also report a strong influence of location on compensation structure. Specifically, rural firms pay 13% more incentive based equity pay to their executives compared to their size matched urban counterparts. However, there is no difference between the total compensation for managers of rural and urban firms after controlling for the cost of living index. In cross-sectional tests, we observe that total compensation is positively related to CEO/Chair duality and family ownership but is not related to management quality. In addition, we find that rural firms display a higher pay-performance sensitivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview and salary by job title of regular employee benefits in the 2016 Annual QP Salary Survey in the U.S. and Canada. The survey includes employment status of respondents and salary by employment status. The survey found vice president or executives leading the earnings race in Canada but has noticeable difference in the overall results for Canadian respondents, giving the appearance of having shrunk since 2015.

Stock option plans are a powerful tool used by employers to attract and retain valuable employees in addition to rewarding their performance. While the Canadian taxation of employee stock options in a domestic context is relatively simple, the taxability of stock options held by non-resident employees is fraught with complexity and uncertainty. This article discusses the Canadian tax treatment of employee stock options held by individuals who emigrate from or immigrate to Canada by reviewing the relevant legislative rules and jurisprudence as well as the administrative positions of the Canada Revenue Agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose -- The purpose of this article is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the total remuneration of top management and the ratio of stock-based remuneration to total top-management remuneration. Design/methodology/approach -- The study draws on data from the largest public Canadian companies, the constituents of the TSX/60 index. The study controls for firm size and profitability. Findings -- The authors concludes that total remuneration of top management is directly linked to board-member total remuneration and the board average number of director-tenure years. The study also shows that the ratio of stock-based to total top-management remuneration is positively affected by the percentage of independent directors, total remuneration of board directors, the ratio of stock-based remuneration of directors to their total remuneration and the average number of tenure years of the board of directors. Practical implications -- If regulators are determined to curb the excesses in top-management remuneration by means of promoting boards with certain characteristics, they should implement measures facilitating the control of directors' remuneration and tenure, to discourage cronyistic behavior. Good corporate governance requires that the board act as a counterbalance to top management, ensuring that a substantial percentage of top-executive total compensation is variable, and not fixed. According to our findings, the boards that are the most likely to hold managerial avoidance of variable pay in check are those favoring director independence, variable director remuneration and longer director tenures. Social implications -- The present article examines specifically the latter aspect, namely, the role of board characteristics (independence, size, compensation, board director ownership and tenure, etc.) in the determination of top-management compensation. This relationship is important because it allows us to further the analysis of corporate governance. If the above-mentioned traits of boards have a meaningful relationship with the compensation of the top management, one might conclude that certain practices in the composition of boards could influence good corporate governance practices. This is relevant for regulatory agencies, for investors and for corporations. Originality/value -- The article adds to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers the role of the traits of the board in the determination of the compensation of the top-management teams, and not only of the chief executive officer, as is the focus of previous literature. Secondly, the article focuses on the power interplay between boards and managers, and, more particularly, on the ability of boards to be an effective mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the article examines the potential impact of board traits in the determination of top-management compensation in the context of Canadian firms, a subject that has received less attention from academic research, which has mostly concentrated on analyzing the issue in the US context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an article similar to this one was published in Canada, it reflected primarily knowledge derived from firsthand experience in several provinces and territories, and empirical research in Ontario and British Columbia. Since that article was published in 2013, this new article reflects my research on recent publications in the United States on Workers’ Compensation. The article begins by explaining the damaging and overwhelming significance of experience rating. To enhance an understanding of current situations, the article then explains the legal history of Occupational Health & Safety and Workers’ Compensation. Then the role of physicians is discussed, particularly the difficulties they often have in distinguishing questions of law from questions of medicine. The article then deals with how decisions are made in the claims department of a Workers’ Compensation Board and by appeals tribunals. The practice of actuaries is explained, including the problems that their role creates. The limited role of judicial review is then mentioned, and finally the significance of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization. The article concludes with conclusions and comments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis of owner managers expropriating minority shareholders by receiving excessive compensation. Using a sample of Canadian family firms, we found that when there is divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, owner CEOs receive higher compensation than non-owners. The higher the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the excess compensation. Further analysis shows that only poorly governed firms are affected by the expropriation problem. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is wide consensus that chief executive officers (CEOs) of US firms earn significantly more than their Canadian counterparts. Using a matched sample, we find that the majority of this difference is due to US CEOs earning 50% more than CEOs of Canadian non-cross-listed firms. We find no such "US premium" for Canadian cross-listed firms, because the use of options allows the cross-listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south. While firms that list only in Canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary, crosslisted firms appear to be competing directly with their US counterparts for executive talent. In investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for Canadian cross-listed firms, we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 companies for a 7-year period, the authors examine the role that institutional activism types and three salient board monitoring mechanisms--CEO/board chair split, board composition, and compensation committee independence--play in influencing CEO contingent compensation in Canada. The authors find that the effect of institutional activism, especially proxy based, is stronger on contingent CEO compensation and that its effects span a longer time. As opposed to the interactions of cumulative proxy-based activism with any of the three monitoring mechanisms, the interactions of cumulative non-proxy- based activism with both CEO/board chair split and compensation committee independence appear to influence CEO contingent compensation. The study's implications are given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance-related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a survey regarding regular employees salary by American Society for Quality (ASQ) and RABQSA International Certification in the U.S. and Canada. The survey showed that 2.8% of the respondents have earned the Green Belt (BB) certification and only 1.4% of the respondents have achieved the new Black Belt (BB) certification. It is reported that the most popular RABQSA certification is quality management system (QMS) lead auditor which 5.9% of the respondents earned, and the second most popular RABQSA certification is internal auditor which 4.3% has achieved. Moreover, the respondents with certifications relating directly to their jobs earn higher counterparts without RABQSA certification.

Previous research has investigated the links between Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and the monetary magnitude of executive compensation, but failed to inquire how the adoption of specific attributes of compensation contacts relates to M&A activities. We address this gap in the literature by examining the impacts of some M&A characteristics and acquirers' features on the adoption of executive compensation protection provisions and new Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). The study adopts a longitudinal design before-after M&A deals for 80 Canadian acquiring companies that engaged in M&A activities between 1995 and 2001. Our findings suggest that both transactional and organisational characteristics significantly explain the executive compensation arrangements' adoption around M&A transactions, but that the adoption of new LTIPs is subjected to a different set of determinants than the adoption of compensation protection provisions. We interpret these results in the light of the agency, political and institutional perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses how executive compensation can be used to promote corporate social responsibility. We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: , Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: , Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: , Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: , The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: , Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the results of the 2006 Salary Survey on regular quality employees based by American Society for Quality (ASQ) and RABQSA certifications which was conducted in the U.S. and Canada. Several tables have been presented that depict the salary of employees by number of ASQ certifications and RABQSA certifications, separately; differences in salary by ASQ certifications and RABQSA certifications, separately; and salary by auditing and engineering ASQ certifications and job title.

The article presents the results of the 2006 Salary Survey on regular quality employees based by highest level of education which was conducted in the U.S. and Canada. Several tables have been presented that depict the relationship between salaries and higher education based by regrouping respondents into several categories including employees with no higher education past high school, two-year educational programs, four-year educational programs, master's degree and doctorate level.

The article presents the results of the 2006 Salary Survey on regular employees based by number of years' experience in the quality field which was conducted in the U.S. and Canada. Several tables have been presented that depict the salaries of employees by number of years' experience, salary by number of years' experience and job title, and number of employees with the most number of years' experience in the quality field which have been itemized from the top management to the rank and file.

The article presents the results of the 2006 Salary Survey on regular quality employees based by job title which was conducted in the U.S. and Canada. The survey shows that full-time employees in the U.S. earned an average of $ 77,049 in 2006, an increase of $ 4,731 from $ 72,318 in 2005, while in Canada, there is an increase of $ 4,777 from $ 66,807 in 2005 to $ 71,584 in 2006. A substantial increase in the average salary of part-time employees in both countries has also been shown.

Purpose - Legitimacy is defined as the ability to exercise authority without resorting to open coercion. It is an essential asset for firms seeking to reach and maintain profitability. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to present the case of the Canadian banking industry, which has been highly criticised during the last decade for its record profits, low level of risk taking, high fees and buoyant CEO compensation packages. More specifically, this research aims to analyze the general public's perceptions of the industry during a 50-month period, starting with the first strong reaction to recurrent announcements of record profits. It also seeks to look at industry reactions as a response to bank bashing. Design/methodology/approach - The case study in this paper was conducted in two steps. It first analyzed public perceptions by studying the content of a sample of newspaper articles on the Canadian banking industry from 1996-2000. It then examined the industry's reactions by reviewing the documents found on the web site of the Canadian Bankers Association. Findings - the study shows that the crisis faced by the banking industry was of limited but sustained intensity. The industry used a mixed strategy, justifying itself through its public discourse and mounting a program to inform and educate the Canadian public on the effects of economic factors in their lives. The banking industry limited its reactions to Sethi's first-level strategy found in the literature. Originality/value - The paper highlights how the general public perceive profit levels in the Canadian banking industry and how legitimacy is clearly an issue in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the effectiveness of compensation strategies in international technology intensive firms. The dilemma between cultural and sector predictors of compensation policies is more important than ever in a context of internationalization. If relations between sectors of activity and compensation practices are well established in a single country, international comparisons are less common. In contrast with the strategic human resource perspective, whereby human resource managers have high autonomy in alignment of human resources with various business contingencies, such as strategy and structure, institutional pressures in a particular country somewhat limit firms' power to adopt well-established international compensation policies. Based on data from 602 large firms in three countries, Canada, France, Great Britain, this study demonstrates that country is a more appropriate level of analysis than the high technology sector in understanding compensation policies. However, the results show that several compensation strategies are more adapted to firms in high technology environments.

This paper examines the association between long-term compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 90 publicly traded Canadian firms. Social responsibility is considered to include concerns for social factors and the environment Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341-359). Long-term compensation attempts to focus executives' efforts on optimizing the longer term, which should direct their attention to factors traditionally associated with socially responsible executives (Mahapatra, 5.: 1984, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 347-376). As hypothesized, we found a significant relationship between the long-term compensation and total CSR weakness as well as the product/environmental weakness dimension of CSR. In addition, we found a marginally significant relationship between long-term compensation and total corporate responsibility. Our findings are that executives' long-term compensation is associated with a firm's environmental actions, and that firms that utilize long-term compensation are more likely to mitigate product/environment weaknesses than those that do not. Implications for practice and research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the required disclosure in proxy statements of the details of executive compensation in Canada. Major issues surrounding executive pay; Economic importance and potential governance problems of executive compensation; Elements of executive compensation that attract scrutiny.

In analyzing the sources of female-male earnings differences, this paper goes beyond the narrow focus of human-capital theory with its view that the only relevant productive attributes of individuals is their cognitive capabilities. Using a unique firm-level Canadian data set on managerial employees and a "social model" of earnings that includes behavioral and organizational as well as cognitive variables, the paper estimates the determinant's of earnings differences in general and the gender gap in particular. The statistical analysis reveals that, for all employees in the sample, experience with the company has a significant positive impact on earnings while a reluctance to leave the company has a negative impact. As for the gender gap, the analysis reveals that the earnings of women are penalized by their disproportionate responsibilities for work in their family homes [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the incentives offered to managers of Canadian equity mutual funds based on their efficiency in the market. Link between performance and renumeration of managers; Effect of competition among funds; Effects of investor expectations; Efficiency of the market for mutual fund management services.

The article focuses on a 2007 survey regarding the regular employee salary by geographic location. It is reported that more than 99% of the people who participated in the survey are working in the U.S. or Canada, and the remaining 0.54% are working in other places. It stated that although the East North Central region has the most respondents including the people who work in the U.S., it is not the highest paying region, but rather the Pacific region. The Pacific region averaged salary is $90,373 which is higher than the U.S. national average salary of $80,710. However, even though the Pacific region has highest salary, it does not mean that those respondents have more money to spend after they pay all of their living expenses.

The article presents the results of the 2006 Salary Survey on self-employed consultants based by quality experience, education, American Society For Quality certification, and Six Sigma Training which was conducted in the U.S. and Canada. Several tables have been presented that depict a comparison of the average salary of part-time with full-time self-employed consultants, and base earnings for self-employed consultants in both countries.