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The great Sumatra-Andaman earthquake of 26 December 2004 caused seismic waves propagating through the solid Earth, tsunami waves propagating through the ocean and infrasound or acoustic-gravity waves propagating through the atmosphere. Since the infrasound wave travels faster than its associated tsunami, it is for warning purposes very intriguing to study the possibility of infrasound generation directly at the earthquake source. Garces et al. (2005) and Le Pichon et al. (2005) emphasized that infrasound was generated by mountainous islands near the epicenter and by tsunami propagation along the continental shelf to the Bay of Bengal. Mikumo et al. (2008) concluded from the analysis of travel times and amplitudes of first arriving acoustic-gravity waves with periods of about 400-700 s that these waves are caused by coseismic motion of the sea surface mainly to the west of the Nicobar islands in the open seas. We reanalyzed the acoustic-gravity waves and corrected the first arrival times of Mikumo et al. (2008) by up to 20 min. We found the source of the first arriving acoustic-gravity wave about 300 km to the north of the US Geological Survey earthquake epicenter. This confirms the result of Mikumo et al. (2008) that sea level changes at the earthquake source cause long period acoustic-gravity waves, which indicate that a tsunami was generated. Therefore, a denser local network of infrasound stations may be helpful for tsunami warnings, not only for very large earthquakes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the discourse of U.S. relief efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and argues that exceptionalist rhetorics rely on citizen virtue to motivate state action. Examining speeches and interviews by U.S. presidents and newspaper articles and editorials from domestic news sources, themes of compassion, humanitarianism, and global leadership converge to form an exceptionalist rhetoric of compassionate generosity that legitimates U.S. global hegemony. This critique highlights how, in moments of international crisis, virtues are mobilized to buttress America's moral position and advances a rhetoric of humanitarian militarism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004 December 26 Indian Ocean tsunami severely hit Sri Lanka. Although it was not in the direct path of the initial tsunami waves, the western coast was struck by diffracted waves that caused much damage. The numerical model GEOWAVE is used to compute tsunami generation, propagation and inundation from the earthquake source to the Sri Lankan coast. A nested grid system is constructed to increase the resolution until Galle Bay, on the southwestern coast, where a 20 m-grid is used. The six nested topobathymetric grids are interpolated from ETOPO2 and high resolution data, at sea as onshore. Simulation results are compared with tsunami height data from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA; US) and Geological Survey & Mines Bureau (GSMB; Sri Lanka). When the grid resolution increases, the discrepancy between the model and the data remains, on average, good, whereas its spread increases. We then conclude that the order of magnitude of the tsunami height is consistent from the 180 m-resolution grid, but the spatial imprecision is too high to locally predict reliable water heights. Nevertheless, the comparison between computed time-series of sea surface elevation at the Colombo tide station and tide-gauge data shows a very good agreement as both amplitude, and arrival time of the first wave are well reproduced. When focusing onshore, the modelled inundation limit is compared with the limit measured in the field. With its a priori setup, computed inundation spreads much farther behind the field limit. We then integrate more accurate nearshore conditions into the model. Non-linear shallow water equations are chosen instead of fully non-linear Boussinesq equations; the bottom friction on land is increased to a much higher value than at sea; the buildings cover and the low tide conditions are taken into account in the DEM. The resulting high resolution simulation agrees better with field data, even if discrepancies are still locally observed in places of DEM imprecision and in a river valley. This simulation, however, demonstrates that taking into account nearshore and onshore features may significantly improve tsunami impact assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the 2004 tsunami disaster ill the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Navy deployed teams aboard the USNS Mercy to provide aid during Operation Unified Assistance (OUA). To date, few research studies have examined how Navy nurses prepared for and clinically performed during this relief operation. The current article describes the challenges faced by Navy nurses throughout OUA. A purposive convenience sample was recruited: 11 participated. Data were collected from interviews, observations, field notes, memos, and a demographic tool. Information was categorized, coded, compared to incoming data, then analyzed using Strauss and Corbin's open coding, axial coding, and selective coding methods. A theoretical model was developed to illustrate how participants experienced the mission. Key lessons learned were that most were unprepared for providing pediatric care, and saying "No" in delivering care. Recommendations include: deployment of advanced-practice nurses (specialists in pediatrics and well-mental health) and predeployment training on moral distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent disasters have been of such scale and complexity that both the common assumptions made about learning from them, and the traditional approaches distinguishing natural from technological disasters (and now terrorism) are thus challenged. Beck's risk thesis likewise signals the need for a paradigmatic change. Despite sociological inflections in disaster research and management, however, an examination of the risk management practices deployed during Hurricane Katrina and the Indian Ocean tsunami reveals attendant problems with a persistent instrumental rationality and disjuncture between society and environment. Therefore, an alternative, post-social understanding is proposed. It includes relational (rather than instrumental) approaches which reinstate the importance of nonhuman nature, but it also recognizes that disasters are post- normal problems, and that disaster research and management increasingly deal with phenomena beyond the limits of current know-how. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prominent communicative approaches to humanitarian crisis assume that international action is constrained by definitional disagreement. Yet interpretive agreement is not always enough to stimulate states into acting. Reflexive discourse is an alternative form of communicative action, and it occurs when international actors (state, nonstate, or suprastate) generate insecurity in powerful states, and stimulate these states into actions that they might initially be reluctant to pursue. By calling out the discrepancy between a targeted state’s actions and its biographical narrative, reflexive discourse challenges a targeted state’s self-identity and thus illuminates the interest such a state has in confronting certain crises. I use the American response to the recent Asian Tsunami, reviewing how then U.N. Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland inadvertently used reflexive discourse by suggesting that Western nations were being “stingy” with their initial aid offers. This (in part) prompted the United States, albeit with much indignation, to increase by twenty times its aid to the affected areas. I then posit how a reflexive discourse strategy might have been used to persuade the United States into acting to confront the genocide in Darfur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. response to the December 26, 2004 tsunami in Indonesia heralded modifications of our responses to previous natural disasters, modifications that were highly successful and should be refined and repeated. These included seamless hand-off of responsibility from a line response unit to medical; the use of civilian medical practitioners working closely with military and public health service personnel aboard a Navy vessel; close prior communication and planning with the local medical, governmental, and U.N. establishment ashore before the arrival of the military medical unit; and with both line and medical units working closely in support of established ashore U.N. agencies instead of performing independent actions. The success of this total approach was unquestioned, and the lessons learned should be utilized fully in planning future disaster responses, both foreign and domestic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004, was one of the most devastating natural disasters in modern history. In particular, this disaster created massive, unique, public health threats, necessitating equally massive public health response efforts. The U.S. government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DoD), played a pivotal role in the response. This article examines some of the central policy issues and strategic coordination and planning measures involved in the public health response. The nearly unanimous consensus of international public health experts has been that the potential public health crisis in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami was averted largely because of the coordinated efforts of host nation officials and professionals, international and nongovernmental health organizations, and bilateral donors, especially the USG, including the DoD. The DoD played a central role in public health efforts through coordination and communication assistance, logistical and materiel support, disease surveillance activities, health needs assessments, and the contributions of the USS Mercy hospital ship. The core lessons involve the importance of an early, dedicated, public health response as a component of the overall disaster relief effort, as well as seamless coordination of health sector stakeholders in the USG and with those of the international community and affected host nations, which allows each organization to play to its strengths and to avoid duplication. The Asian tsunami relief effort highlighted the value of civil-military cooperation in disaster relief, particularly in the area of public health. The prominent role of the DoD in tsunami relief efforts, including public health efforts, also yielded beneficial secondary effects by bolstering security cooperation and winning "hearts and minds" in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of Internet in changing and influencing the communication practices during crises. It also provides an overview on the communication practices during calamities such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the December 26, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis in Phuket, Thailand. Several factors that make the Internet an ideal communication technology include availability, reliability and flexibility of network to network interface. It also can route and reroute data when communication linkage encountered problems.

The article presents information on natural disasters that has taken place in 2005. According to the author, vulnerable people are generally the worst hit by the natural disasters. Disasters are a consequence of development and industrialization. The year 2005 saw the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 earthquake and tsunami waves in Asia, hurricanes in north and central America, especially Katrina, which stimulated flooding in the U.S. city of New Orleans. Spokesperson for World Health Organization's Health Action in Crisis department Marko Kokic stated that some communities are more vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters than hundred years ago because of ecological degradation. According to many disaster experts, microfinancing is another avenue, giving vulnerable people the means to improve their economic situation so that a disaster does not hit them as hard as it would otherwise. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies notes, in its World disasters report 2005 that a simple phone call saved thousands of lives when the giant tsunami waves hit India in 2004.

Cites key research findings on American children's attitudes towards the tsunami disaster in South Asia in December 2004. Comparison between the reaction of American children to those of other generations; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on consumer behavior.

Presents a series of journal entries by Michelle Chaya, a nurse in the emergency department (ED) in the Medical Center at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA) who joined rescue teams providing urgent health care in Banda Aceh, Indonesia following the Indian Ocean tsunami of late 2004. Description of the tsunami afflicted area following the author's arrival and of her various work with the relief effort there.

Discusses the global response to the 2004 Asian tsunami. Comments on charitable contributions of the Muslim world to victims of the disaster; Implication of the U.S. response to the disaster; Action that will be taken by the Australian charity Youth Off the Streets to help Indonesian orphans.

This article presents the author's plan for a better use for the amount of money that the United States is spending on the Iraq War. The author examines the impact of the $1 billion that the U.S. spent on tsunami relief. The author suggest how the U.S. could spend $1 billion a week to bring the world closer to global peace. The author would set aside $1 billion to quadruple the annual budget of the Peace Corps to increase the amount of American volunteers working in 138 countries around the world.

The article focuses on the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia's donation of $11 million worth of medical supplies to Indonesia's Ministry of Defense in late January 2006. The action continued the disaster relief relationship between the two countries created immediately after Indonesia was hit by the decimating tsunami in 2004. The supplies were part of unneeded U.S. military medical equipment and were sent to provide the humanitarian relief the region urgently needed. The medical equipment would be sufficient to build a fully functional mobile hospital.

The article presents information on the relief work done by ANA Clearinghouse after the giant Tsunami struck South Asia in December 2004. The ANA working in collaboration with the U.S. government provided registered nursing (RN) staffing through Project Hope, a nongovernmental relief organization, and the Navy hospital ship, the USS Mercy. The ANA worked with Rabia Graney, PhD, RN and a representative of the International Consulting Institute for Nursing, to solicit textbooks and other nursing education material for India and Sri Lanka.

The article discusses the competitive intelligence lessons that Hurricane Katrina can teach. The recent tragic events that took place after Hurricane Katrina struck the east coast of the U.S., has once again raised issues about the value of early warning. The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina might be hard to comprehend. However, it was not unexpected. Major disaster areas were declared and emergency supplies were ready as there was ample warning of the devastating nature of the hurricane. However, the top leadership in the U.S. was not prepared for the impending domestic crisis. It took two days for President George W. Bush to fly over the disaster zone in Air Force One. Effective early warning systems have been widely accepted as necessary to avoid threats. Throughout the world, there are many forms of early warning systems. Latest among them is a device to warn against tsunamis in the aftermath of the December 2004 events in the Indian Ocean region. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the biggest lesson was that not everything is under the control of man.

Praises the philanthropic work of U.S. citizens. Donations of the people to victims of the 2004 Asian tsunami; Forecast for the philanthropic work of the people in 2005; Percentage of households that make charitable cash contributions.