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This article analyzes the Egyptian regime's quest to establish Islamic legitimacy for the transition from conflict to peace with Israel between 1977 and 1981. Based on an integrative analysis of a wide range of sources, it demonstrates that Islamic argumentations were at the core of Egypt's official state campaign for peace. The appeal to Islamic justifications facilitated the regime's efforts to describe its innovative peace policy as a natural link in the chain of traditional religious sequences and enclosed it within deeply socially embedded Islamic concepts and principles. Through a comparative analysis with the Islamist anti-peace campaign that the regime sought to refute, the article highlights that 'Islam' has no essential, consensual stance on peace with Israel. Rather, it demonstrates that different Muslim actors draw divergent – sometimes diametrically opposed – positions from Islamic texts in accordance with their particular needs and outlooks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the policy of former Egyptian President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak toward Israel. Topics discussed include indication of the initial seriousness of Mubarak's commitment to the normalization agreements about the peace treaty with Israel, information on Israel's war with Lebanon, and reason he decided to ignore Article 8 of the peace treaty.

The article addresses the challenge of intelligence in identifying strategic changes that may signify political opportunity. It identifies the similarities and differences between military and political surprises, including the hostility of a military surprise. The relationship between intelligence and the leadership is discussed, as well as the possibility of improving cooperation between intelligence and academic communities.

The article focuses on the failure of first Rogers plan which was proposed by the U.S. State Department for peace between Egypt and Israel and path that led to formation of political initiatives, their goals, and reasons for their failure. It mentions disagreement between the State Department and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger for the regional status quo for American interests. It also mentions peace agreement would include an agreement on the establishment of demilitarized zones.

Does trading oil promote peace between rival countries? Despite the optimism of liberal theories on the value of economic interdependence, countries worry more about the possibility of being cut off from vital oil supplies than about forgoing the potential economic gains of trade. The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace is an exception to this rule, as the inclusion of oil trade agreements during negotiations succeeded and eventually became a positive aspect of the relations between the two states. However, this resulted not from the promotion of economic interdependence during negotiations, but from its avoidance. The United States guaranteed to compensate Israel for any breach in the oil agreement. This permitted Israel and Egypt to trade freely without imminent concern of becoming too dependent on one another. In consequence, they slowly built mutual trust over the years. Israeli and US declassified documents shed light on the creation of this unique oil trade agreement during the final phase of peace negotiations. We argue that a third-party guarantee to compensate for a breach in energy trade is often a necessary condition for such deals to succeed, provided that the guarantor meets certain preconditions unique to energy trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its potential significance, scholars gloss over the concept of the firstborn son in Joseph and Aseneth with little regard to its meaning. The title of the firstborn son (πρωτότοκος) reminds us of the rivalry and the conflict between Israel and Egypt in Exodus. In particular, the death of the firstborn son of Pharaoh evokes the destruction of the firstborn Egyptians in Exodus. One of the main motifs in Joseph and Aseneth is the rivalry between Joseph and the firstborn son of Pharaoh; Joseph the firstborn son is described as the victor of the competition. The death of the firstborn son of Pharaoh alludes to the destruction of the firstborn sons of the Egyptians in Exodus 11. Therefore, the motif of the firstborn son in Joseph and Aseneth refers to Israel's self-perception with regard to the superiority of the Jews over the gentiles (or Egyptians) as seen in Exodus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1969 and 1971 US diplomat Joseph Sisco was the driving force behind all initial steps to resolve the Israeli‒Egyptian conflict. But despite his tremendous efforts, his ability was limited as President Nixon did not throw his weight behind these efforts. Three main initiatives were taken during the discussed period: the Rogers Plan, the Rogers Initiative, and Sadat’s initiative for an interim agreement. Most of Sisco’s efforts concentrated on the latter initiative. His failure to reach an interim agreement, coupled with his inability to persuade Israel and Egypt to accept the Rogers Plan, led the region to political stagnation, from which the two parties only emerged in the aftermath of 1973 Yom Kippur War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores the wellsprings of U.S. President Jimmy Carter's policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Carter administration succeeded in facilitating a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt but failed to achieve a wider peace settlement. The author discusses the declassified records in U.S. archives about the matter. He also explains the role of domestic political considerations of various kinds in U.S. policymaking toward the Middle East.

This article deals with the Israeli–Egyptian talks after the October 1973 War, which are known as the Kilometer 101 talks since most of them took place at this spot on the Suez–Cairo road. After 17 years of indirect Israeli–Egyptian discussions, representatives from both sides met for direct talks that led to an agreement that allowed solving the exigent problems, like prisoners of war exchange and supplies for the encircled Egyptian Third Army. After about a month the talks ended, allegedly due to disagreement on disengagement and separation of forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on role of arbitration in political settlement along with information on Egypt/Israel Treaty of Peace signed on March 26, 1979 provided that Israel would withdraw to the "recognized international boundary" between Egypt and Mandated Palestine. It mentions Israeli diplomat helped the U.S. to avoid a serious mistake in midst of arbitral process and the U.S. as a witness to Peace Treaty. It also mentions approach of Yitzhak Shamir, former Prime Minister of Israel, on the same.

This article analyses the Cairo International Book Fair as a “field configuring event” (FCE), namely, as a recurrent mass event that both reflects the social fields surrounding it and contributes to the shaping of these fields. More specifically, it is argued that the Cairo International Book Fair constitutes a major FCE in Egyptian society, which plays a significant role, not only in the publishing field and in the cultural and economic fields at large, but also in the political field. Focusing on the political field, the article traces how the Cairo International Book Fair in recent decades both reflected key struggles and developments in the Egyptian political field and affected these struggles. In the 1980s, the fair served as a platform for voicing and negotiating various positions toward Egypt’s relations with Israel; in the 1990s, it served as a platform for negotiating the relations between Islamists and Liberals; and in the 2000s, it served as a platform for negotiating the “permitted” level of criticism toward Mubarak’s regime. The article thus shows that the Cairo International Book Fair constitutes a useful prism for examining developments in the Egyptian political field over the years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses relations between Egypt and Israel along with its impact on material culture. Topics discussed include archaeological and extrabiblical sources related to their relations between Egypt and ancient Israel during the early Iron Age, Egyptian-style seals distributed in the Levant and commemoration of achievement of the Pharaoh Sheshonq I, founder of the Twenty-Second Dynasty by inscribing a monumental triumphal relief at the Temple of Karnak.

The history of Israel's turbulent relations with the Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War has one exception, Romania. Unlike other Warsaw Pact members, Romania did not sever relations with Israel following the 1967 war. Central to these relations was Romanian Communist leader Nicolai Ceausescu, who managed to establish himself as an important figure among both Arabs and Israelis. This article will examine Romanian–Israeli relations during the 1970s and especially Ceausescu's role in the Egyptian–Israeli peace negotiations. Recent Israeli and some Romanian documents released from the Israeli State Archive and the Begin Centre reveal much about Israel's attitude towards Romania and Ceausescu's involvement in the Middle East, and serve to shed light on a heretofore neglected aspect of Israeli foreign policy. Some of the main issues to be addressed are Ceausescu's influence on Egyptian and Israeli decision makers, Israel's prime motives in maintaining a close relationship with Romania, the importance of Romanian Jewry's position to Israel's policy vis-à-vis Romania and the extent to which these relations represented a back channel that facilitated some contact with the Kremlin. All these will be examined against the larger backdrop of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented, which was adapted from previous articles by the author, which discusses the development of Israel's alliance with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, within the context of Israeli-Arab relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the late 1940s through the mid 2010s. The role that mutual animosity towards Iran plays in the Saudi-Israeli alliance is discussed. Egypt's relations with Israel, including the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, are also discussed.

As part of the peace accords with Egypt over 30 years ago, Israel was required to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula and to transfer its three military bases to the Negev. The largest of them was moved to Tel Malhata in the northern Negev. Toward its establishment, it was necessary to evacuate and resettle the Bedouin residents. The article reconstructs and analyzes the steps that preceded this process, including specific legislation, attempts to reach agreements during the legislative process, and the program that was ultimately accepted and implemented. It traces the circumstances that made it possible for the resettlement to take place without extensive public protest and without the authorities having to resort to enforcement. It examines the implications of this process for the long-term relationships between the State of Israel and its Bedouin citizens. Moreover, a complex of factors is presented, both changing and permanent, internal and external, that influenced the outcome. The contribution of this study lies in its scrutiny of the successes, limitations, failures, and future implications of the process through the perspective of time. Thus, it can serve as the basis for understanding the contextual changes that have taken place from then until today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses changes made in textbook "The Geography of the Arab World and the History of Modern Egypt" by Egyptian government over country's relation with Israel.

The article offers news briefs related to the Arab countries as of September 1, 2015. Topics include Egypt's involvement in Israeli and Palestinian diplomatic initiatives, the terrorist group Islamic State's control of the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria and the deteriorating living conditions in the camp due to escalating violence, and the advancement of the Syrian rebel groups in the southern region of the country.

The article discusses the bold economic policies and moves of Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to address fundamental challenges of the country's economy.

The article discusses the presidency of Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, focusing on the implications of legitimacy sources to the country's democracy and relations with Israel.

Rabin differed considerably from the average ambassador – a representative receiving and issuing reports. He viewed himself not only as a diplomat, but as capable of shaping policy with respect to both the Arab–Israeli conflict and the relationship with the United States. During his term as ambassador to Washington he displayed sober realism with regard to the political, and to some extent the military, reality – the very realism that was absent from the government that sent him. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines Israel's decision to launch the 1956 campaign against Egypt. While the current literature tends to argue that, in 1956, the campaign was a response by Israel to security threats, it is suggested here that, if so, these threats certainly did not predetermine any specific response. Israel could, for example, have responded by adopting a defensive posture. In reality, domestic factors were just as influential as external ones. The most important of these was the severe economic crisis caused by mass immigration to Israel during 1948–1951. This crisis in turn led to the creation in 1953–1956 of a war coalition whose three components—David Ben-Gurion (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence), MAPAI's party bosses and the army—had different interests but shared the idea of a war against Israel's Arab neighbours as a way in which each could advance its preferred aims. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]