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Using Census microdata on 28,000 manufacturing plants, we examine how firms manage employee retention concerns. In response to reductions in the local unemployment rate, plants take additional steps beyond increasing compensation. First, plants adjust bonus architecture to ensure bonuses can be paid. Second, plants offer more agency to employees by deploying high-involvement work practices that generate longer-term commitment. Third, plants pull these retention levers less when they have high availability and use of data as this reduces the adverse effects of employee turnover on organizational knowledge. These results are robust to using the fracking revolution as a shock increasing firms' retention concerns. Additionally, we observe that although compensation increases tend to spill over to other plants within the same firm—aligning with theories of inequity aversion—adjustments to bonus architecture and the provision of employee agency do not, suggesting these may be more cost-effective strategies for multiplant firms. JEL Classifications: J63; M51; M54. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Korean Neurosurgical Society, with its 62 years of history, has witnessed substantial growth in the field of neurosurgery, producing over 3400 neurosurgeons, establishing 12 divisions and nine regional branches, and advancing in clinical management, diagnostic methods and academic research. Despite these developments, the regulations governing neurosurgical training and evaluation methods for training hospitals have remained largely unchanged, necessitating comprehensive revisions in response to evolving medical environments. To provide balanced participation opportunities for neurosurgery residents, the Korean Neurosurgical Society formed the Training Status Investigation Standard Change Task Force (TF team) under the Training Education Committee. This paper presents the TF team's findings and proposals for revising training status investigation standards and evaluation criteria. Through the processes including a lot of team meetings, workshops, education programs, official communications with 12 division societies, benchmarking from other societies and analysis of encrypted data from the past 5 years for neurosurgical training hospitals, the TF team created a revised training status investigation proposal, supplemented main surgery criteria. And we applied this revised proposal to the training status investigation data collected from training hospitals in 2022 for simulation. We reduced the score for main surgeries to 10 points, introduced core competency surgery standards, allocating 5 points each for brain core competency surgery and spine and peripheral core competency surgery, for a total of 10 points. We also adjusted the major surgery score to 13 points, expanding the total surgery index score to 33 points. We introduced additional definitions for main surgeries in the areas of spine, pediatrics, and functional surgery. The equipment score was reduced from 17 to 9 points. We specified minimum requirements for resident allocation eligibility, and if a hospital meets all of these criteria, they become eligible to apply for resident allocation. We introduced a new bonus point system for hospitals performing mechanical thrombectomy or stenting and surgery for peripheral nerve diseases. The proposed revisions aim to improve the training and education of neurosurgical residents and overall neurosurgical care in Korea by creating a balanced and differentiated evaluation system for training hospitals. Further monitoring, communication, and adjustments are crucial for successful implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the risk taking properties associated with incentive plans that use relative performance evaluation, with a focus on the form of payout, whether in cash or shares. By analyzing determinants and consequences of payout form choice, I find that share-based plans offer risk-averse managers weaker incentives to pursue projects with idiosyncratic risk compared with cash plans. This occurs because share plans—unlike cash plans—expose managers to systematic performance trends, as payout values are linked to stock prices. Additionally, I document that the variation in risk taking incentives depends on expected relative performance and the strength of the incentives. Overall, this study's findings suggest that commonly used share-based relative performance plans might not always motivate managers to pursue innovative projects with high idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available. Data Availability: All data are available from the sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; J41; M12; M41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation analysis, we find that CEOs with riskier pay packages receive a premium for pay at risk that represents 13.5 percent of total pay. The premium is positively correlated with proxies for CEO risk aversion, but implied risk aversion values suggest that the premium is economically smaller than suggested by prior studies. We perform our tests using a variety of proxies to measure the variance of pay and find consistent evidence of economically small pay risk premiums. These results are consistent with recent findings suggesting that risk may have a more limited influence over the level of pay than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Business Studies is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We use a database composed of 2,545 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) worldwide for the period 2008–18 to explore the effect of a larger share of women's workforce on both staff wages and overall monetary compensation within MFIs. MFIs are different from other industries, as they are traditionally women‐centered, i.e. they have a significant share of women employees at every level of the corporate hierarchy and mostly serve women clients. Applying both traditional estimation methodology and techniques aimed at accounting for possible endogeneity among the main variables, we find that a higher proportion of women on staff significantly increases the average expense per worker (which also includes the incentive components of remuneration) while the effects are considerably smoothed (or not significant) on the base salary. This leads us to conclude that, unlike what is seen in other sectors of the economy, MFIs do not pay women less. Yet, significant positive effects of women in the workforce, especially on average overall monetary compensation, suggest that women are likely to exploit their superior skills and/or gender affinity advantages with customers of the same gender to enhance MFIs' efficiency and profitability, thereby achieving higher incentive compensation, mostly in the form of bonuses and other benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bankwide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs negative earnings shocks. Using payroll data for |$1.26$| million employee-years in all functional divisions of Austrian, German, and Swiss banks, we uncover several empirical patterns in bonus pay that are difficult to rationalize exclusively with incentive theories of bonus pay but that support an important risk sharing motive. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public-private partnership is a prime factor for the exponential growth of an economy. Growth here assumes a holistic approach that comprises financial, technical, and environmental well-being. Of the various public procurement models - Bonus System, Swiss Challenge, Automatic Shortlisting, Direct Negotiation, and Full Competition - the Swiss Challenge Model (SCM) has come a long way with its application in various developing and developed countries even without proper regulations and robust framework. Regional laws exist but with meager detailing. Claiming an age-old history right from its inception through the Swiss government's mode of awarding contracts, the Swiss challenge had now extended its roots into its application in Insolvency proceedings under The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of India. Though used extensively for infrastructural development processes in many emerging global powers, SCM poses deficiencies and limitations. The article analyses the extent of the effectiveness of this concept based on the existing studies conducted so far around the globe, critically examines and compares the guidelines, rules, and practices followed, and then connects it with the logic of using the same in Insolvency proceedings in India for suggesting an ameliorated model of better public acceptance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I study productive activity, measurement, and compensation in a principal agent model that relaxes common restrictions on the action set of the agent, the distribution of performance measures, and the shape of the wage schedule. The solution to this relaxed problem unifies insights from extant theory and shares features with well-known empirical phenomena. In particular, the optimal outcome distribution has a kink, optimal measurement is conservative, and optimal wages ensure congruent incentives and resemble accounting-based bonus plans featuring a floor, hurdle bonus, incentive zone, and ceiling, with thresholds that may reference other performance measures. Beyond these specific insights, the paper provides a flexible framework for studying how incentives are shaped through measurement and contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the properties of long-term bonus pools (BPs) with rollover provision in a multiperiod moral hazard setting, where the principal uses subjective information to privately assess the agent's performance and the agent is protected by limited liability (LL). To provide incentives, the principal funds a multiperiod BP with a fixed payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal long-term BP contract features performance targets that are contingent on past performance. Specifically, high subjective performance implies an easy target, and low subjective performance implies a difficult target. To implement the long-term BP contract, the principal provides nondichotomous performance reports. The study contributes to the literature that discusses the mechanisms that make subjective performance information useful for incentive contracting. JEL Classifications: D82; M52; M54. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the competitive business world, companies are required to have an effective and objective performance appraisal system. One crucial aspect of employee performance appraisal is the annual bonus distribution. One effort to improve employee performance is by providing annual bonuses. For this reason, currently, many companies are implementing this bonus so that their employees are motivated to improve and increase the quality of their work. One of them is a CV. Laras Alam Pamekasan. CV. Laras Alam Pamekasan is a company operating in the tobacco sector specifically supplying PT. Djarum Tobacco. Every year, CV. Laras Alam provides annual bonuses according to employee performance. However, bonuses are still based on rough calculations. That's why research was conducted to produce a decision support system in determining employee annual bonuses based on performance. This research uses the Profile Matching method. Profile Matching is one method in performance appraisal systems that uses a comparative approach between employee profiles and predefined ideal profiles. The aspects used in determining employee annual bonuses are the Work Attitude Aspect including criteria, behavior, responsibility, and cooperation. Performance Aspects include criteria, discipline, absenteeism, acceptance of additional assignments, and loyalty. From this research, a trial was carried out on 22 employees and then calculations and rankings were carried out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to study the theoretical and applied aspects of the functioning of the system of motivation of staff on the example of a production enterprise and to outline the directions of its improvement in the context of increasing the competitiveness of enterprise. The article analyzes the current state of staff motivation on the example of a leading Ukrainian company specializing in the trade of furniture components and accessories. In the course of the analysis, it has been found that over the past three years, the motivational system of enterprise has remained sufficiently balanced and generally satisfies the basic needs of employees. The company uses a wide range of financial motivation instruments, which includes competitive wages, a bonus system, providing production personnel with summer and winter overalls, paying for mobile communications, compensation for fuel costs when using own cars for work purposes, etc. Common measures of non-financial motivation of production enterprises are the functioning of corporate universities and libraries, career development of employees, support for employees serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, sports events, and so on. Despite a fairly effective system of motivation, some of its weaknesses have been identified as follows: in particular, a low share of additional wages, an insufficiently competitive social package of the company, which contains only basic elements, imperfection of non-material motivation, insufficient individualization of motivation, etc. In modern wartime conditions, measures to improve non-financial motivation can become effective motivation instruments, such as: the introduction of the «Best Employee of the Month / Quarter / Year» programs, recognition of employees’ merits by awarding certificates of honor, letters of gratitude, valuable gifts, holding rallying events, creating a psychological service to support the mental health of staff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it is well understood that product market competition acts as a disciplining mechanism that reduces inefficiencies, our understanding of the implications for firms' incentive design choices is still limited. We use a comprehensive new measure of competition and examine its effect on four major choices: CEO equity portfolio incentives, annual bonus plan incentives, choice of performance measures, and difficulty of financial performance targets. We find that competition reduces firm profits and total CEO compensation, including equity grants, which then also weakens portfolio incentives. Firms respond by adjusting annual bonus plans to restore incentives. Specifically, we find that competition goes together with stronger bonus plan incentives, more challenging annual performance targets, and a greater emphasis on long-term performance measures. Finally, we show that competition increases performance relative to annual bonus targets, which we interpret as evidence that CEOs work harder but get paid less in highly competitive environments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M52. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The editorial article of the Venezuelan Journal of Current Analysis highlights the recognition received from the Council of Scientific and Humanistic Development of the Central University of Venezuela for its contribution to open access to knowledge. In addition, the activities carried out by the Institute of Economic and Social Research in commemoration of the 86th Anniversary of the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences are mentioned. The publication presents four articles that address topics such as death in the Humanities, citizen participation in housing programs in Venezuela, the rights of older people, and the effectiveness of the Patria System bonuses in overcoming poverty. [Extracted from the article]

Purpose: The primary purpose of this article is to identify the manifestations and causes of unethical pro-organisational behaviour related to the lowering of quality, as well as to propose measures that could prevent such behaviour. Design/methodology/approach: The main research method used was a literature review. The applied procedure was in line with the general methodology for conducting research in management sciences (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Exemplification was used as an ancillary research tool. Findings: Manifestations of unethical pro-organisational behaviour aimed at the lowering of quality include falsifying system documentation, hiding quality errors that occur in individual processes, deliberately impairing product quality by reducing the quantity of particular components or replacing them with lower-quality substitutes, providing customers with a completely different product under the organisation’s own name and reducing quality objectives. Paradoxically, the occurrence of such behaviour is fostered by excessive identification, affective commitment, organisational support resulting in a sense of indebtedness to the organisation, pressure for results and even satisfaction with one’s job. The possible measures that could prevent unethical pro-organisational behaviour include the following: applying the principle of positive discipline, entering into transparent psychological contracts, abandoning annual employee appraisals, employee rankings and bonus systems whose results depend on employee cooperation, as well as the variable part of managers’ remuneration. Research limitations/implications: A literature review is not a perfect way to obtain information. The article does not discuss all causes and manifestations of unethical proorganisational behaviour that may occur in organisations oriented towards quality. Practical implications: Based on the conclusions formulated on the basis of the conducted research, managers can significantly reduce the development of unethical behaviour (mainly by following the recommendations of E. Deming). Originality/value: While there is a large body of literature on the causes of unethical proorganisational behaviour, very little is known about their causes and manifestations in organisations focused on quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies how receiving a bonus changes consumers' demand for auto loans and their risk of future delinquency. Unlike traditional consumer products, auto loans have a long-term impact on consumers' financial state because of the monthly payment obligation. Using a large consumer panel data set of credit and employment information, the authors find that receiving a bonus increases auto loan demand by 21%. These loans, however, are associated with higher risk, as the delinquency rate increases by 18.5%–31.4% depending on different measures. In contrast, an increase in consumers' base salary will increase their demand for auto loans but not their delinquency. By comparing consumers with bonuses with those without bonuses, the authors find that bonus payments lead to both demand expansion and demand shifting on auto loans. The empirical findings help shed light on how consumers make financial decisions and have important implications for financial institutions on when demand for auto loans and the associated risk arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Having limited information regarding how pay is distributed in their organization, employees often find it difficult to assess the fairness of their pay. Uncertainty management theory (UMT) posits that fairness uncertainty is aversive and that individuals experiencing it search for information to reduce this uncertainty. Pay information exchange – the communication of one's pay‐related information to others in return for information from that other – provides a mechanism to reduce pay information uncertainty. We focus on third‐party mediated pay information exchange (such as via Glassdoor and PayScale), an increasingly prevalent form of exchange. Drawing on UMT, we investigate why and when individuals exchange their pay information with such agents. Using data from a field experiment we find that (a) the willingness of employees to disclose their pay to a pay information exchange platform is influenced by perceived utility of a‐priori information offered by the exchange partner, but that this relationship depends on the salience of fairness uncertainty to the employee, and (b) employer pay communication restrictiveness only attenuates the impact of disclosure willingness on actual disclosure when individuals engage in deliberative thinking about such restrictiveness and its possible consequences. We discuss the implications for theory and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Third-party liability is the most important sub-category in automobile insurance, that is why actuaries seek always to design the ideal price list by classifying the insureds into homogeneous classes. However, the heterogeneity persists in the priori tariffication. For that, actuaries use the Bonus Malus system to redistribute the cost of claims more equitably between insureds by rewarding good insureds with a bonus and penalizing bad insureds with a Malus. Nevertheless, the classical approach used in the conception of Bonus Malus systems is limited to the parametric methods that need to make the hypothesis of the number of claims distribution and don't consider the cost of claims. In this direction, this paper seeks to avoid this issue by using machine learning algorithms, in response to offering a fair Bonus Malus System. Two models of posteriori tariffication will be built. In addition, three algorithms will be used, in occurrence, the CART Classification And Regression Tree method, SVM the Support Vector Machine for regression, and KNN the K-Nearest Neighbor. The suggested models take into account, not only the number of claims but also the importance of the cost of claims. A numerical illustration shows the flexibility of posteriori premiums calculated by our models in relation to the risk levels. This work is a start for new actuarial research which seeks to use artificial intelligence in the design of bonus malus systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are responsible for customer relationship management. Although incentives motivate sales performance, private information can induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. The authors investigate the sales performance–moral hazard trade-off in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information. Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from a microfinance bank, the authors detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition incentives induce salesperson moral hazard, leading to adverse customer selection, but maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople recognize the negative effects of acquiring low-quality customers on future payoffs. Critically, without the moderating effect of maintenance incentives, the adverse selection effect of acquisition incentives overwhelms the sales-enhancing effects, clarifying the importance of multidimensional incentives for customer relationship management. Reducing private information (through job transfers) hurts customer maintenance but has greater impact on productivity by moderating adverse selection at acquisition. This article also contributes to the recent literature on detecting and disentangling customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (defaults) with a new identification strategy that exploits the time-varying effects of salesperson incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the 'black box' picture of public management and the 'balanced view' of HRM literature in the Spanish public context. Specifically, we explore the link between structural empowerment and organisational performance and the mediating role of three employee outcomes: job satisfaction and affective commitment as attitudinal variables related to eudaimonic well-being, and job anxiety as a variable related to hedonic well-being. Using a multilevel methodology with data on employees from 103 local authorities for 2016, results support the mutual gains perspective, but not as intensely as expected (empowerment does not affect attitudinal variables), since empowerment contributes to reducing job anxiety in Spanish local governments. Specifically, information and rewards are the structural empowerment dimensions that help to reduce job anxiety levels in employees and, thus, enhance performance. These results suggest that local government managers could usefully apply techniques such as disseminating information on the organisation's aims among employees or paying bonuses for meeting targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To Pool or Not to Pool? Analyzing Customer-Intensive Services with Strategic Agents In customer-intensive services where service quality increases with service time, service providers commonly pool their agents and give performance bonuses that reward agents for achieving greater customer satisfaction and serving more customers. Conventional wisdom suggests that pooling agents reduce customer wait time whereas performance bonuses motivate agents to produce high-quality services, both of which should boost customer satisfaction. However, in "Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services," Wang, Yang, Cui, Ülkü, and Zhou find that when agents act strategically, they may choose to speed up under pooling in an attempt to serve more customers, thus undermining service quality. If this happens, pooling can backfire and result in both lower customer satisfaction and agent payoff. Consequently, the researchers propose a simple practical solution to restore the efficiency of pooling. They propose pooling a portion of the performance bonuses (incentive pooling) in conjunction with pooling agents (operational pooling). In customer-intensive services where service quality increases with service time, service providers commonly pool their agents and give performance bonuses that reward agents for achieving greater customer satisfaction and serving more customers. Conventional wisdom suggests that pooling agents reduce customer wait time while performance bonuses motivate agents to produce high-quality service, both of which should boost customer satisfaction. However, our queueing-game-theoretic analysis reveals that when agents act strategically, they may choose to speed up under pooling in an attempt to serve more customers, thus undermining service quality. If this happens, pooling can backfire and result in both lower customer satisfaction and agent payoff. We propose a simple solution to resolve this issue: pooling a portion of the performance bonuses (incentive pooling) in conjunction with pooling agents (operational pooling). History: This paper has been accepted for the Operations Research Special Issue on Behavioral Queueing Science. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2259. Funding: Z. Wang acknowledges support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72001118, 72132007]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data on earnings targets in annual bonus plans, we construct and validate an empirical measure of beginning-of-year target difficulty and show that it is negatively associated with market uncertainty, retention concerns, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) entrenchment. We then present several findings about the effect of target difficulty on performance and CEO compensation. First, greater target difficulty in annual bonus plans is associated with significantly lower CEO cash compensation as well as with decreases in other compensation awards. Second, moderately challenging targets (neither too easy nor too difficult to achieve) are associated with abnormal reversals in fourth-quarter performance, particularly reductions in fourth-quarter performance after abnormally favorable third-quarter performance. Third, greater target difficulty is associated with higher same-year abnormal earnings but at the same time with lower next-year earnings and stock returns. Combined, our findings suggest that target difficulty is an important incentive design choice that affects performance and executive compensation. Data Availability: Data used in this study are publicly available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Angolan electoral processes, in all their institutional structuring and electoral practice, are designed to sustain the hegemony of the party in power. In this sense, in addition to the mechanisms and practices commonly referred to, I present here some of the characteristics of the Angolan electoral system that objectively reduce the political capacity of the citizens of the large electoral constituencies by means of the double constituency, which in practice has been meant, since the 1992 elections, an electoral bonus for the MPLA and a deficit for the opposition. This effectively undermines citizens' electoral political capacity to change the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examine tension between transparency and opacity produces, and observe that some employees wish to discuss their salaries and bonuses, while others prefer to keep quiet. It mentions how employees see their remuneration and number of tools have been added to salaries as part of compensation packages. It also mentions definition of wages, and extend it to the representation employees have of the total compensation they receive.

Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which has contrasting effects under each contract frame. Results from an experiment support this theory, with an increase in ambiguity leading to less employee effort with penalty contracts (as employees optimistically expect small penalties) and more effort with bonus contracts (as employees optimistically expect large bonuses). We also find that these effects are stronger for more dispositionally optimistic employees. Overall, our results suggest that bonus contracts may be more motivating and penalty contracts less motivating than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study investigates and establishes the factors that lead to short-term orientation strategies in western organisations. Moreover, this study used questionnaire-based surveys to assess the relationship between these factors and what it would take for the organisation to move to a long-term orientation strategy. At the start of the study, it was evident that the annual bonus system is a key reason for prioritising a short-term orientation strategy. The sample was composed of 300 companies of different sizes from different western countries. Furthermore, the general consensus within these companies was that most managers knew that long-term orientation was necessary; however, either their superiors/shareholders/supervisory board only reward short-term results, or the managers and stakeholders prefer short-term goals for evaluations because it is challenging to transform a long-term strategy into multiple short-term strategies and goals. At the end of the study, a basic framework has been suggested to be used as guidelines for any company moving from short-term to long-term orientation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pervasive use of merchandise (i.e., noncash) incentives in sales compensation plans is an empirical and theoretical puzzle given the supposed superiority of cash incentives in the standard theory (i.e., principal–agent models) as well as the scant, and contradictory empirical evidence. The authors conducted a large-scale field intervention that switched 580 salespeople at a large frozen food manufacturer away from their cash plus “merchandise points” bonus to a commensurate all-cash bonus. After controlling for salesperson, seasonality, year, and target effects, the authors estimate that sales,on average, dropped by 4.36%. Furthermore, they estimated individual level sales changes and effort changes to validate the incentive–effort–sales causal chain. The results show that the top salespeople experienced the largest drops in sales. A post-intervention survey of social and individual difference variables reveals that salespeople from households with more discretionary financial resources and those who think more abstractly about the uses of cash income exhibited smaller reductions in effort and sales. Although the absence of a control group prevents the authors from making strong causal inferences, this set of results nevertheless provides descriptive and suggestive evidence for separate mental accounts as the most promising explanation for the greater utility provided by merchandise incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bonus pools, in which a worker’s realized bonus depends both on a worker’s share of the pool (which serves as the incentive) and on the size of the pool (which is largely outside of the worker’s control), are a common method for distributing incentive pay. Using data on the variation in the size of the bonus pool generated by a US manufacturing plant’s gainsharing plan, which varies incentives for quality and worker engagement, the authors evaluate the conditions under which such bonuses have incentive effects. Overall, results are cautionary: The evidence suggests gainsharing’s benefits operate outside of the incentive channel, and incentives may backfire if they are too small or too diluted by group performance metrics. The authors illustrate how random variation in the size of bonus pools offers researchers a powerful, readily available, and underused tool for studying how workers respond to the availability and strength of incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A bonus is an additional annual incentive for labour, as part of remuneration package systems, that goes hand-in-hand with a tantième for boards of commissioners and directors. This practical business is common in industrial relations for maintaining a spirit of productivity and loyalty. However, practices to distribute bonuses remain undisclosed and unknown, according to the views of labour. Without an earlier mutual agreement between parties, consisting of labour representatives and management, management unilaterally decides a specific bonus formulation that takes effect immediately. The management ignored suggestions and advice from labour as its partner; worse, there were no discussions between parties in advance. There are no equal labour and management rights to build a better industrial relations climate. We employed mixed methods and conducted multidisciplinary studies to determine cluster and bonus pool allocation with relevant peers to investigate how to build a fair bonus formulation. We adopted a target-based method rather than an outcome-based framework after several exercises. The most important finding is that the bonus formulation, configured from the annual bonus, utilised three underpinning percentiles (P): P-25, P-50, and P-75 implying the lowest, medium, and highest total remuneration for labour, respectively. We determine that success indicators in developing fair bonus formulation stand on how high total remuneration has been achieved by labour towards the median level of peers. The higher the value passed over the median line, the higher the success rate. The present findings contribute to building fair annual bonus formulations in the cement sector; however, other industrial sectors can use them with adequate adjustments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is part of the research on School Management and the Primary Education Development Index (IDEB) in two municipal schools in Floriano city - Piauí, Brazil. The objective of this research was to analyze the quality of basic education from the projected and observed goals in two schools. This work outlines the study on the issue of the use of the education quality indicator by school administrators. Therefore, primary data from interviews with the school community are analyzed, made in three methodological steps (observation, semi-structured interview and document analysis). Weaving with authors as: Melo and Bertagna (2016), Ferrarotto (2021), Schneider and Nardi (2014) Silva (2009) e Fonseca (2009) and also, especially on the concepts of management, assessment and the quality of education. Data show the possibility of expanding the use of IDEB indicators, beyond the bonus system that the municipality of Floriano adopts. With the expansion of the proposed use of indicators, it is suggested to expand the perspective of assessment carried out in the school's management spaces. It is concluded by suggesting the promotion of public policies that make it possible to improve the infrastructure conditions and training spaces for managers. It points out the need for protagonism, valuing the instruments of listening and autonomy, making participation processes feasible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While paying employees for performance (PfP) has been shown to elicit increased motivation by way of competitive processes, the present paper investigates whether the same competitive processes inherent in PfP can also encourage aggressiveness. We tested our hypothesis in three studies that conceptually build on each other: First, in a word completion experiment (N = 104), we find that PfP triggers the implicit activation of the fighting and defeating facets of competitiveness. Second, in a multi-source field study (N = 94), co-workers reported more interpersonal deviance from colleagues when the latter received a performance bonus than when they did not. In our final field study (N = 286), we tested the full model, assessing the effect of PfP and interpersonal deviance mediated by competitiveness: Employees with a bonus self-reported higher interpersonal deviance towards their co-workers, which was mediated by individual competitiveness. These findings underscore that PfP can entail powerful yet widely unstudied collateral effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior theory suggests that incentive plans, such as piece-rate or commission plans, motivate good performance because employees anticipate that current performance will generate matching future incentive payments. In this article, we move beyond reward expectancy to argue that performance can also derive from employees' reactive responses to received incentive payments. We propose a salience-based theory casting incentive payments as recurring temporal markers that periodically increase the salience of the incentive plan, to which employees respond by temporarily increasing incentivized and unincentivized performance. We introduce multivariate time-series methods to test our hypotheses in longitudinal data spanning 169 weeks (1,183 days), drawn from an online firm using an incentive plan for its customer-support employees. While we find no evidence that incentive payments affect the dynamics of incentivized performance, they do temporarily boost several unincentivized behaviors and outcomes. Combined with fieldwork, these findings support our proposed mechanism of "salience-induced reciprocity"—that is, the temporary reciprocity in response to a periodic increase in the salience of the incentive plan. This article contributes to a more complete understanding of performance and effort dynamics in incentive plans, offers new inroads into studying temporality in the functioning of human resources practices, and provides other future research avenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]