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Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as active participants within global security environments has increased in the last two decades exponentially. States have progressively incorporated PMSCs in their security functions, both domestically and internationally. Since the conflict in Iraq in the early 2000s, there have been numerous plausible reports of PMSCs violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only a few have ever been prosecuted, suggesting a fundamental challenge to understandings regarding state control and monopoly over violence. Utilising a historical case study of an Australian PMSC in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this article argues that PMSCs undermine Australian sovereign legitimacy. It demonstrates how Australian oversight and accountability regarding its use of PMSCs is significantly fractured and current regulatory mechanisms concerning PMSCs are deficient. Thus, the Australian government's ability to provide control over the actions of PMSCs is diminished, affecting its sovereign legitimacy and ability to monopolise violence. The article overall conveys the dubious position states come into when the use‐of‐force is wielded by actors for distinct material incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with the Egyptians in the Ancient Age, almost every empire has tried to make foreign military elements fight on its own behalf. These companies, which appear to be commercial enterprises in theory, but are frequently used in intelligence and secret military operations, have become more known and recognized, especially after the invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003. Private military company personnel composed of military professionals retired or dismissed from the armed forces. Russia has also tried to use private military companies in order to realize her national security and interests. However, some restrictions originating from the constitution and criminal code of the Russian Federation made that solution difficult. The Russian Constitution and the Russian Penal Code does not allow the establishment of mercenary and private military companies and describe such organizations and activities as illegal. Additionally, the Russian military companies, were late for the international security market because of economic problems and the opposition from the armed forces. In this study, the first period of the establishment of the private military company system, the period between 1999 and 2013, is explained in the chronological method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate privatization of security has generated a neoliberal iteration of an old profession: the private military contractor. This development has revolutionized security policies across the globe while reviving old patterns of inequality. Following neoliberal logic, outsourcing fosters two types of employment: the exploitative and the exclusive. The first refers to low-status individuals hired en masse to perform menial labor; the second refers to experts who perform functions central to the employer's mission. We contribute to this discussion by focusing on the qualifications of a different subsample of this industry: American contractors who died while performing military and security functions in Iraq. We assert that such American employees directly engaged in mission-essential combat and security functions better fit the employment category of an exclusive, expert sector at the core of the private military industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an increased global use of private military contractors (PMCs) since the large-scale American use of them in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has included an increase in Russian and now Chinese PMCs. As China continues to develop its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is likely that the world will see an increase in the number of Chinese PMCs used to protect these projects. In this event it is important to bring Chinese PMCs into the PMC industry's most effective private regulatory bodies, as these bodies are often more effective at ensuring ethical PMC conduct than international and national legal regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States' strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical issues are an integral part of business life and daily life. Business ethics concern the ground rules of individual, company and societal behavior. With industrialization, business activities have become more complex and this occasionally causes violations of rights. The number of private military companies increased rapidly in the conflict areas after 1990. The purpose of this study is to examine the activities of private military companies in terms of business ethics and to emphasize the necessity of a human-centered thinking system. In the study, firstly, the definition of private military companies was made and then the differences between private security companies were mentioned. Then, the definition of business ethics was made. Finally, the situation of private military companies in terms of business ethics has been evaluated by considering some experienced events. In the 21st century, non-ethical activities such as operations of private military companies, severe human rights violations, ill-treatment of prisoners of war, torture and rape were recorded in various official reports in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, it cannot be said that private military companies are very successful in practice morally and legally. These new companies, known in the past as names such as legionnaires or mercenaries, but nowadays referred to as private military companies or private military contractors, have reached an annual turnover of over $ 200 billion and the number of employees expressed in hundreds of thousands. However, the uncertainty of the positions and responsibilities of private military companies in armed conflicts brings along many moral and legal problems. Along with the law, violations of rights can be prevented by addressing people's moral worlds, hearts and consciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2007 private contractors working for Blackwater, a private military contracting firm based in the US, killed seventeen people in Nisour Square in Iraq and severely injured more than twenty others. For over seven years the contractors evaded legal liability. This paper examines the way that legal jurisdiction played out in this evasion of accountability. We first examine the role of Order 17 in mandating that private contractors in Iraq “be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their sending states”. We then turn to interrogate the ways that ‘juridical othering’, which operates through appeals to jurisdiction, has been employed by the state to distance itself from its own actions, in that the contractors were seen to be accountable neither to martial nor to domestic civilian law. Subsequently, we examine the impact of this juridical othering on the victims of the violence, as they too are ‘othered’ in the law. Through this analysis we demonstrate that the processes of juridical othering are the result not only of deliberate state action, but also of complex spatiolegal jurisdictions that are historically ingrained and are called into being in times of war in particular kinds of ways. In our conclusion, we point to the October 2014 ruling in the US federal courts that found three Blackwater employees guilty of manslaughter and one of murder, to show how law is continually unfolding and, as it does so, reinforces the intimate ways that law and war are co-constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been gaining increasing media and scholarly attention particularly due to their indispensable role in the wars in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Nevertheless, theoretical insights into the agency problems inherent when hiring PMSCs and how to optimally incentivize them are scarce. We study the complex relationship between intervening state, host state, and PMSC, taking into account the diverging interests of all involved parties as well as potential agency problems. We develop a theoretical model to characterize a state's optimal choice whether to perform a task associated with an intervening mission itself, or hire a PMSC and optimally design the contract. We find that it might be optimal to hire PMSCs even if they are expected to do a worse job than the intervening state would do itself. Furthermore, the government's reputation in rewarding PMSCs for a good performance is crucial and might render it optimal to only deal with a limited number of PMSCs — who are not necessarily always the most efficient providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case of the Saleh V. Titan Corp. related to private military contrator immunity. It informs about interrogation in which both low-ranking soldiers and private military contractors (PMCs) allegedly subjected Haidar Muhsin Saleh when he was in U.S. custody in Iraq. It further highlights that the U.S. has constantly relied upon private military contractors (PMCs) abroad, wwhere number of instances in foreign nationals have brought tort actions against PMCs.

The proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised many questions regarding the use of armed force by private contractors. This article addresses the question of whether the increased acceptance of PMSCs indicates a transformation of the international norm regarding the state monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force. Drawing on theoretical approaches to the analysis of norm change, the article employs four measures to investigate possible changes in the strength and meaning of this norm: modifications in state behaviour, state responses to norm violation, the promulgation of varying interpretations of the norm in national and international laws and regulations, and changes in norm discourse. Based on an analysis of empirical evidence from the United States of America and its allies, the article concludes that these measures suggest that the USA is leading the way towards a transformation of the international norm of the state monopoly on violence, involving a revised meaning. Although this understanding has not yet been formally implemented in international law, it has allowed a growing number of countries to tolerate, accept or legalize the use of armed force by PMSCs in the international arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iraq War cannot be explained without mentioning private military companies. In fact, the role of war contractors in Iraq is an implication of the erosion of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. There are three types of private military companies: private military companies, military consulting companies and military support companies. Usage of private military companies, in other words war contractors, was the most significant one in Iraq because of their core competences: waging war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of armed security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to widespread criticism of their insufficient control through international laws and conventions. This article suggests that one reason for this omission has been the (re)construction of actors who provide armed force for profit in international legal discourses. During most of the 20th century, armed persons who participated in foreign conflicts for monetary gain were identified as ‘mercenaries’. They were outlawed through international legal documents such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on Mercenarism and given restricted rights in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Today, the same types of actors are increasingly defined as ‘private security contractors’, and new discourses and international agreements are emerging that attribute to them legality and legitimacy. The aim of this article is to examine the changing legal constructions of armed security providers since the 1970s and the consequences with respect to their control. The article argues that the (re)construction of actors who supply armed force for money in international legal discourses has been made possible by three main discursive strategies: the distinction between persons and corporations providing armed force for profit, the changing focus from the motivations of these actors to their relationship to a ‘responsible command’, and the shift from a concern about the actors to one about certain activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iraq War was a watershed regarding the scope of battlefield support by Private Security Companies (PSC). Skeptics soon raised concerns about these new actors being an impediment to the success of the very same operations they are meant to support. According to the critics, PSCs are grist to the mill for insurgents as they employ aggressive tactics and thereby alienate the population, cause credibility problems because they enjoy impunity, and increase coordination problems since they are not subordinated under the military chain of command. This article argues that this is not a necessary result of their employment, but rather the consequence of a lack of preparedness to operate alongside PSCs. However, the military is accustomed to adapting to new unexpected circumstances. Hence, when problems occurred, the armed forces underwent a trial and error learning process that improved PSC employment. The empirical picture supports this view. Initially, the counterinsurgency effort did indeed suffer from the actions, lack of oversight, and lack of coordination of PSCs. However, over the course of the Iraq War, most of the shortfalls were either improved significantly or even resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the impact of private military and security companies (PMSC) on human rights. Examples from Afghanistan and Iraq to illustrate the impact of (PMSC) on human rights are also highlighted. PMSC have attracted international attention for being involved in grave human rights violations. Meanwhile, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations were able to circumvent political constraints on the use of force, because of the availability of experienced security and military personnel for hire.

This article examines the large increase in the use of private military contract firms in the Iraq theater of war. The conditions under which policy was changed to allow for growth in this area make it an interesting case study to apply Kingdon's multiple streams framework. This theoretical framework, typically applied to policy-making within the legislative branch, is used in this study to examine policy change within the executive branch. By focusing on the administration of George W. Bush, Kingdon's framework allows for insight into agenda setting and policy formulation/adoption. By identifying the elements of each of the streams in the framework, an understanding can be reached regarding how and why the policy of increased use of private military firms emerged as a viable option after the attacks of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. Further, in uncovering the rationality behind the policy adoption, ethical concerns and the impact of these decisions on the U.S. Army are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been characterized by the deployment of large private military forces, under contract with the US administration. The use of so-called private military corporations (PMCs) and, more generally, of mercenaries, has long attracted criticisms. This article argues that under certain conditions (drawn from the Just War tradition), there is nothing inherently objectionable about mercenarism. It begins by exposing a weakness in the most obvious justification for mercenarism, to wit, the justification from freedom of occupational choice. It then deploys a less obvious, but stronger, argument — one that appeals to the importance of enabling just defensive killings. Finally, it rebuts five moral objections to mercenarism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the importance of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in holding private military contractors (PMCs) accountable for the Baghdad's Bloody Sunday on September 16, 2007 in Iraq. It offers an overview of the UCMJ and the rise of PMCs in augmenting military forces. It suggests that the UCMJ should be used to hold PMCs accountable for their criminal actions by examining international law, host-nation law and U.S. civilian law.

The article discusses a court case wherein CACI Premier Technology Inc. (CACI), a private military contractor, sued Randi Rhodes, an Air America Radio talk show host, with defamation for alleging that CACI employees had tortured and raped detainees in Iraq. Rhodes and Air American were sued for defamation and both parties moved for summary judgment in the district court. In CACI Premier Technology Inc. v. Rhodes, the district court ruled that Rhodes's statements were protected by the First Amendment, a decision affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.

This study draws attention to one of the most significant but least examined aspects of the global security environment: the transnational private security business. The importance of private military companies (PMCs), which have tactical warfare capabilities equivalent to those of the militaries of developed countries, has increased since the inception of the Iraq War in 2003. The weakness of state security forces in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the need to downsize and outsource an already overtasked US military, has left security gaps in these countries. Some argue that filling these gaps with PMCs is an economically feasible, politically viable, and flexible option for US policymakers. Our study tests this argument by asking about the political effects of PMCs, profit-focused corporations that operate largely outside national and international law, on the sovereignty and legitimacy of the fragile states in which PMCs operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the allegation that private military firms in Iraq are hiring people from Latin America to become mercenaries. Erik Prince, chief executive officer (CEO) of private security company Blackwater Worldwide, has pointed out that the company's employees in Iraq who had killed 17 Iraqi civilians were not mercenaries. Peter Singer of Brookings Institution has claimed that there are citizens from 30 countries employed as security contractors in Iraq. It is said that Latin America is a fertile recruiting ground for military companies.

The article focuses on the role of private military firm (PMF) personnel in Iraq. PMF are originally employed as guards but they operate in Iraq like military units with their sophisticated military equipment. The author said that PMF are considered illegal combatants due to their participation in hostilities which could not be excused by the plea of self-defense and that the employment of PMF personnel in future conflicts may carry negative consequences as it sends a message that the U.S. conducts its military operations according to the laws of war.